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The Nigerian Press 1984 – 1999: ‘Magnificent and Heroic’? 
Summary 
Against the background of ‘the global resurgence of democracy’ (Diamond and Plattner 1996), 
and focusing particularly on the democratic waves that swept through Africa in the 90s, 
scholars have acknowledged the central role of the press in the restoration of democratic 
governance in Africa. The Nigerian press in particular has been touted as Africa’s symbol of a 
liberal press (Seng and Hunt 1986, Ogbondah 1994). It is said to have played a significant role 
in the battle against military dictatorship, leading to Wole Soyinka’s trophy: the press as 
‘magnificent and heroic’ (Soyinka 1998). Yet in spite of the ‘adversarial and lively 
outspokenness’ of the press (Olukotun 2002, 2010), the military had a sixteen-year reign. How 
can this paradox be explained?   
The thesis explores four military regimes during the sixteen-year period focusing on specific 
events of national significance in each regime, with a view to establishing what role/s the press 
played in restoring democracy; and whether it deserved the award of ‘magnificent and heroic’ . 
Methodologically it adopts a critical discourse analysis approach (Fairclough 2013, Van Dijk 
1991), particularly analysing headlines, news reports, editorials, photographs, politica l 
cartoons and articles; across seven national newspapers and two weekly magazines. 
Additionally it draws on interviews with state officials and editors with knowledge of the 
periods to provide a further interpretation of the press at particular historical moments.  
It opens up the issue of a liberal press to suggest that there are serious questions about the 
press’s relation to the various military regimes and thus the degree to which the press really 
was ‘magnificent and heroic’. Indeed an argument can be made that much of the press was 
complicit with these regimes and contributed to delaying the realisation of a democratic rule. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Learning to Question the Press: A Personal Story 
For all intents and purposes, the New York Times or CBS News can best be understood 
as departments of the federal bureaucracy….In the end, the government is fine, thanks 
to the media; and the men in the media are heroes, thanks to their relationship with the 
government. 
Tom Bethell (1990) 'The Myth of an Adversary Press' (cited in Tom Koch The 
News as Myth: Fact and Context in Journalism) 
Daniel Lerner contended that ‘the connection between mass media and political democracy is 
especially close (Lerner 1963, p. 342), and that the media mature the political systems so that 
they are able to respond and adapt to change. In somewhat different terms, John Merrill and 
Ralph Lowenstein argued that ‘media systems are closely related to the kinds of governments 
in which they operate; they are, in essence, reflective and supportive of the governmenta l 
philosophy' (Merrill and Lowenstein 1971, p. 173).   
Seemingly adopting Lerner's view, in Africa generally, and in Nigeria particularly, scholarly 
debates have been advanced that the press is a potent institution for realizing national goals and 
aspirations (Udoakah 1988; Uche 1989; Ogbondah 1994; Ette 2000; Olukotun 2002; Uko 2004, 
Oyeleye 2004; Enemaku 2005; Mano 2005). Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (1960) in 
‘The Politics of the Developing Areas’ for example, drew on the press in illustrating African 
nationalist motivations, objectives and organizations and Seston Humphreys suggested that 
even before Nigeria's independence ‘the press was independent… vigorously so. There is 
perhaps no press anywhere in the world so outspoken as that of this emerging nation’ (cited in 
Ogbondah 1994, p. 4). Further, in his discussion of the comparative roles of the press, William 
Hatchen described the ‘Nigerian press of 1960 to 1965 as a unique phenomenon for black 
Africa: diverse, outspoken, competitive, and irreverent’ (1971, p. 165). 
From independence (1960), this view of the Nigerian press tended to continue right through 
the periods of military rule, such that in 1998 shortly before the handing over of power to a 
democratically elected government on May 29 1999, Wole Soyinka, radical literary professor, 
1986 Nobel prize winner and an opposition figure during the years of military rule, acclaimed 
in a media interview:  
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The press and let me seize this very opportunity to stress this, the press has been 
magnificent, really magnificent, heroic and one of these days, when there’s more 
pleasure, we are going to erect a statue. I am going to see personally to this, that a statue 
for heroism of the press is erected at a prominent place in this country; we must never 
ever forget (The Guardian, Saturday October 17, 1998, p. 5). 
From the foregoing emerged such appellations of the press as: ‘virile’; ‘vigorous’ and 
‘independent’; these promising phrases in turn lead to some pertinent questions: is the press 
really independent, partial/impartial, objective/subjective? As further discussions will make 
clear, the notion of the press being ‘independent’ is generally mythical. There are tonnes of 
scholarly works that have debunked this notion of a free press. Where there is freedom from 
the state control (if partial), the freedom from the market clutches appear a mirage. James 
Curran contends that the period when liberal argument held sway was when the state was 
viewed as the ‘main source of oppression’, noting that ‘market liberalisation has seen new sets 
of power blocs emerging with dominant ideologies being reinforced’ (Curran 2002, 2005). 
Specifically in the case of Nigeria, the ‘independence’ of the press can be characterised as 
being more of a perception than a reality. Even, from the ‘glory’ of independence from where 
these flattering phrases arose, were compelling misgivings about the press, which though 
seemed adversarial of the colonial regime, but yet, is tied to the apron-strings of its businessmen 
– proprietors who hid under the agitation for independence to pursue their narrow interests 
(Coker 1960, Chick 1971, Uche 1989). Under the civilian regime between 1979 and 1983 when 
newspapers flowered, their independence from direct state control was then compromised 
indirectly by the fact that they were established by the party men who used them to advance 
their political and commercial interests (Uche 1989, Olayiwola 1991), the upshot of which was 
that, the democratic state became a victim. Thus, here, I mark out that the press has been 
historically problematic than being free or independent. 
Yet the history of the Nigerian press, especially during the years of military rule, might also be 
thought of in the terms offered by Tom Bethell in my opening quote or those of Merrill and 
Lowenstein above: less ‘magnificent and heroic' or committed to Nigeria's democratic 
development, than supporter of ‘government philosophy’ and sometime collaborator with 
‘anti-democratic forces' (Agbaje & Adebanwi 2004, p. 73). Agbaje and Adebanwi do not quite 
refute the notion that the press might have contributed to the restoration of democratic rule in 
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Nigeria, but they do seriously doubt the steadfastness of the Nigerian press in advancing 
democratic culture. They reason further: 
In this often overdrawn fact (of press responsibility), there is the tendency to occlude 
not only the fact that a significant portion of the press has always collaborated with 
anti-democratic forces, but that there are many tendencies in this important institut ion 
in the Nigerian civil society which are patently anti-democratic and expressive of 
flagrant violations of the known canons (Agbaje and Adebanwi 2004, p. 73).   
Similarly, Mercy Ette while not underestimating the contribution of the press, avers that the 
notion of the press as ‘a pillar of democracy is uncertain' (Ette 2000, p. 1) and that the press 
may actually not have had a proper understanding of the workings of democracy. She argues: 
It is an undeniable fact that the Nigerian press has resisted moves to have its voice 
silenced by the military and has often occupied the position of an opposition party in 
its relationship with those who wield political power. However, the press has not been 
a consistent champion of democracy or its values (Ette 2000, p. 8). 
These interesting lines of debate by Ette, Agbaje and Adebanwi drew my attention to the fact 
that the military reigned for sixteen years (1984-1999), in spite of what Odia Ofeimu touted as 
the capacity of the press for 'advocacy and adversarial haggling' against Nigeria's rulers during 
the period (Olukotun 2002, p. 22). Germane to these ambiguities, my political background as 
a son of a First (1960 – 1966) and Second (1979 – 1983) Republics politician and my personal 
experiences during the years under study, also later aroused my interest to revisit the period of 
military regimes, this time in the form of a proper intellectual inquiry. 
As I was growing up, my interest in politics and news was that of excitement to hear what 
happened when and where. My father told me stories of uprisings of the late 1950s before 
independence. As a member of the ruling National Council of Nigerians and the Cameroons 
(NCNC), he had experienced political persecution under the opposition regional government 
of Obafemi Awolowo's Action Group (AG). In the aftermath of the riots that attended the death 
of his friend and member of the NCNC, Adelabu Adegoke, in a ‘suspicious' car crash ‘linked' 
to the AG in 1958, he was arrested and jailed for three years at the Ilesa Prison, in the present 
Osun State, Nigeria for being one of the masterminds of the riots. 
15 
 
 
 
Then between 1979 and 1983 when he was a member of the ruling National Party of Nigeria 
(NPN), I was in primary school and I was always taken along to political meetings. I vivid ly 
recall the home of the national chairman of the ruling party, Adisa Akinloye, and got to know 
many notable personalities. In the 1983 general elections, I was in primary six (the final of 
primary school in Nigeria) and the School's Senior Prefect (Boy). By then, as a result of the 
violence building up to the general elections, I was no longer following my father to meetings. 
Coincidentally, at this time, my class teacher, Mr. Tunji Taiwo resigned his post to contest a 
seat in the State Assembly under another party, National Advance Party (NAP). That offered 
me another practical experience during the electioneering as I followed my teacher around the 
communities. 
The elections ended in chaos, with interparty rivalries bringing arson, killings and hooliganism, 
as in the First Republic (Olayiwola 1991, p. 41, Nwosu 2000, p. 156). However, the electoral 
violence was also exacerbated by press partisanship: the tendency of many papers to pursue 
the various political goals of their respective proprietors (Agbaje 1990, p. 223; Olayiwola 1991, 
p. 40, Uko 2004, p. 55). In the violence that trailed the election, my father had a lucky escape 
into the bush but not the party's Urvan Bus allocated to him which was burnt by Awolowo’s 
party, Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) political thugs, protesting their party’s loss. Later he took 
me to the scene of the arson attack in Apatere Town, near Ibadan city.  
Unfortunately, the Second Republic (1979 – 1983) did not survive the lingering violence: the 
military intervened on December, 31, 1983 (Uche 1989, Agbaje 1990). But perhaps not 
surprisingly, although I did not wholly understand the events, it was an exciting period for me. 
It laid the foundation for my active political involvement.  
Prior to my enrolment at the University of Lagos in 1995 to study mass communication, I had 
been enmeshed in politics. As an activist, albeit I did not think of myself in this way at the time, 
between 1991 and 1992 when General Babangida's ‘transition without end' (Diamond et al 
1997, p. 1) started causing civil unrest, I was following and participating in many anti-state 
demonstrations by civil society organisations. Moreover, as a school leaver without a job, the 
first self-imposed assignment every morning was to visit the newsstand along with other 
members of ‘Free Readers Association of Nigeria’1 so as to know where the next protest would 
take place, who the organisers were and what we protestors were expected to do.  
                                                                 
1 During the period under study and given the poor state of the economy, the majority of Nigerians gathered at 
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The often chaotic scene at the newsstand was always characterised by arguments and counter -
arguments precipitated by newspaper headlines and cartoons. There were moments when blows 
were exchanged between pro and anti-state supporters leading, at times, to the arrival of police 
who used tear gas to disperse and then arrest ‘trouble makers'. As I recall, security operatives 
often arrested journalists and seized newspapers from vendors, claiming they were incit ing 
violence with their false reports. At some point, when a journalist was arrested, or a media 
house closed down, we poured onto the streets the more to call for their journalistic freedoms. 
We saw journalists as sources of inspiration who illuminated our paths, and thus should be 
defended. Indeed, we believed the press was promoting democratic change. 
During this period, I knew many leading activists, including lawyers, labour leaders, clergy 
and student leaders at the University of Ibadan and The Polytechnic, Ibadan (my city). 
However, a moment came towards the end of 1992 that confused me further about the process 
of governance and the relation between leaders and the led. A community leader and retired 
civil servant, one of those who used to caution us each time we went on demonstrations, but 
also the father of a close friend, invited me to his house, counselling me that the government 
was not always wrong and that perhaps citizens could also partly be blamed for the crisis of 
democratization. He offered me what turned out to be a ‘big job' as a member of the Caretaker 
Committee of the Transition to the Civil rule programme2 in my Local Government. At that 
point of the conversation, and unlike previous occasions when I would refute any suggestion 
that agitation against the state might be wrong, partly because my friend had encouraged her 
father to approach me, I could not respond. Feeling I had no space or time to think through the 
implications, I simply accepted the job, though not without a moment of paralysis: a concern 
that my appointment was a form of patronage by the government to reduce the number of state 
‘enemies'. 
Specifically, the job involved the implementation of the newly introduced system of balloting 
tagged ‘Option A4' or ‘Open Ballot System', a system where presidential candidates were 
required to go through party primaries from the ward through to local and state congresses and 
                                                                 
the newsstands to glance at papers' headlines or beg the vendor to read for free. In some cases, some could 
offer the vendor a tip to read specific items such as cartoons, editorials and articles by notable columnists, if the 
vendor refused free reading. I personally did this many times. That gave rise to the nomenclature ‘free readers 
association of Nigeria' to describe those who were unable to buy papers, but yet yearned for information. 
2 This was General Babangida’s third revised transition programme. The previous two pledges to hand power 
back to civil ians were not honoured leading to accusation that Babangida was trying to perpetuate himself in 
power. It was in the midst of public distrust that this particular revised transition timetable was announced. 
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finally emerging as candidates at the national conventions (Nwosu 2000, p. 157; Campbell 
1994, p. 183). We were allocated to communities to educate, enlighten, convince and mobilise 
a sceptic populace that the new system would lead to a democratic government. While there 
was an element of doubt within me as to whether the new approach would indeed deliver that, 
it was nonetheless a matter of honour for me to pursue this with commitment. For me 
personally, it offered a leadership role – I had advanced from newsstand chaos and street protest 
to state/community duty. After a period of campaigning, the nationwide committee test ran the 
new ballot system to elect executives to the offices of the two government's sponsored parties, 
the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRC). The process 
was not without its critics but ‘not as cantankerous as before' (Nwosu 2000, p. 157) and it was 
celebrated nationwide as a success: the system was to be used for the general elections in June, 
1993. Yet my own experience highlighted a corruption at the heart of this celebrated 
'democratic' process. 
After the election, when we had filled in the necessary forms, and were ready to leave for the 
collation centre at the Council headquarters, a guest drove into the community polling centre. 
By then the voters had dispersed and party agents, having authenticated the results, had also 
left the venue. The mission of this ‘big man' (later identified as a serving commissioner in my 
state) was simple and straight forward. He called the three of us to a corner, handed us a sheet 
containing the names of candidates he wanted us to complete on the forms as ‘winners', 
claiming this was an ‘order from above'.  
This was strange; because these were the names we didn’t know. Of course we had forms left 
in case we made genuine mistakes. ‘But how do we reproduce the signatures of the party 
agents?' I queried! ‘Forging wasn't difficult', he answered. We resisted and told him our 
appointment letter stated that the post we held was ‘a call to national service' and that if we did 
not follow procedure, could end up in jail if caught. He insisted we were safe, then opened the 
boot of the car and showed us a stash of cash meant to compensate us, with a promise of more 
goodies to come. At that point, the atmosphere was charged but we did not give in and 
eventually managed to escape. Whether there were similar attempts to abuse the polls 
nationwide, I could not tell, but certainly the poll was judged a success nationwide and in the 
press.  
This first hand episode of how the electoral process could be undermined, juxtaposed with my 
earlier position derived from the newsstand, confused me even here: my belief that the civil 
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society was committed to the ideals of democracy was challenged though my belief that the 
military might not be committed to the course of democracy was hardly dispelled. If this event 
had not occurred, I might have remained intransigent in my view that the military was solely 
responsible for the crisis of democracy. My involvement in advocacy for the election process 
and the encounter with the ‘big man', was a critical moment in that I became uncertain about, 
and turned away from the ‘democratic’ protest of the street and the consensus of the newsstand.  
In a further twist, and not long after this political event in March 1993, I secured another, 
unconnected appointment as a clerk in the Federal High Court. In June, 1993, the presidentia l 
election was held, as scheduled. Acclaimed by General Babangida's own admission to be ‘free 
and fair and peaceful' (Campbell 1994, p. 191), it was won by business mogul and newspaper 
proprietor, Chief MKO Abiola. But my happiness over the success of the election was short-
lived: the electoral commission stopped announcing further results of the election midway in 
the process, owing to a court injunction obtained by the Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) 
- ‘a shadowy pro-military group' (Lewis 1994, p. 326) whose leader Chief Arthur Nzeribe 
canvassed for an extension of Babangida’s regime. Dramatically, the election was annulled on 
June 23, 1993 by the Federal Government, citing various court litigations, electoral 
malpractices and other security issues as reasons (Lewis 1994, Campell 1994, Kwarteng 1996, 
Ojo 2007).  
As a civil servant at this time, I could not openly be part of the struggle against this annulment, 
but as violence spread, another episode occurred that pushed me back into political activism. 
From June 23, 1993 after the annulment, students, politicians and journalists, as well as 
activists were arrested and detained, in what turned out to be, in Olukotun's words, a period of 
‘heavy repression' (Olukotun 2002, p. 86). Coincidentally, many of the cases to free detainees 
were brought to the Federal High Court, Ibadan where I worked. That brought me in direct 
contact again, with human rights lawyers, activists and students. As soon as the detainees 
arrived, each time, we exchanged banter, discussed the state of the nation, with many calling 
me out loud, ‘comrade'! When the Registrar in charge of the court got to know of my affiliat ion, 
he called me and warned me to stop ‘hobnobbing with government enemies', or I would be 
dismissed.  Provocatively, I would tell him they were not government enemies but patriotic 
citizens fighting for democratic change.  
When these exchanges continued, I was eventually removed from the open court and posted to 
the court library, so I was no longer in contact with ‘government enemies'. But the arrests and 
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detentions of activists continued, particularly under General Sani Abacha, who took over 
November 17, 1993 after violent protests forced Babangida and the Interim Government he 
had put in place, out of power (Lewis 1994, Alimi 2011). During this latter period, I felt that 
my civil service job was hampering me from being part of the struggle for democracy and 
reform so that after enrolling to study mass communication at the University of Lagos, in 1995, 
I voluntarily left the court. 
My move to Lagos was a political tonic: Lagos was the centre of civil society activism 
(Kwarteng 1996) and the University of Lagos Students Union in particular was a hotbed of 
civil unrest. My political background in Ibadan enabled me to integrate into the student union 
almost immediately, and after just three months as a fresher, I was elected as the Deputy 
Speaker of the Faculty of Social Sciences Students' Parliament, a position that leapt frog me to 
the frontline of activism. But during this year, another episode, this time in the classroom, 
occurred which also led me to question my views. 
It was a media class sometime in 1996, led by Dr X, now a professor and media teacher in the 
US. The course was ‘Mass Media, Nigerian Peoples and Cultures' (MAS 101). The class 
digressed from the topic of the day to discuss the argument between the Minister of 
Information, Dr Y of the History Department, University of Lagos and the press. Dr X had 
counselled us not to become irresponsible journalists like those the minister had angrily 
criticised for a particular news story earlier that day. We responded to Dr X by saying that if 
bringing down repressive military leaders amounted to irresponsible journalism, then we were 
ready to be such journalists. As the tension rose, Dr X labelled us ‘agents of western powers' 
paid to ‘destabilise your country'. Some of us stood up and accused him and ‘your minis ter 
brother' as ‘military apologists' offered and accepting appointments to delay the democratic 
process. 
Our effrontery jolted Dr X and in anger, he threw an object at a student and made an attempt 
to slap another (Dr X was known to be temperamental). The class erupted in frenzy with objects 
flying everywhere, bringing the class to an end. But neither Dr X nor us reported the matter. If 
we had done, under university regulations Dr X may have been dismissed and we risked being 
expelled too. This episode with Dr X was not a one-off event but occurred with many teachers, 
as current and controversial topics in the media were often the substance of discussion in media 
classes. 
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A further issue emerging from the encounter above was Dr X's claim that we were being ‘paid' 
to ‘destabilise' our country and our counter claim that the university teachers who accepted 
appointments were ‘military apologists'. In our own case, funds utilised for pro-democracy 
activities (demonstrations, seminars etc.), did come directly from western donor agencies as 
part of their policy, allegedly, to strengthen civil society. Obviously without the monetary 
assistance from these organisations (which was not in short supply), it would have been 
impossible to sustain our violent agitation that led to several deaths and destruction of property 
(Kwarteng 1996, Lewis et al 1998, Myers 2009). At the same time, it was also a legitima te 
policy of the government to appoint university teachers to public positions, apparently as a way 
of reducing tensions, since the university students formed the bulk of activists in the pro-
democracy movements. The government believed students could be easily swayed from their 
destructive agitation by seeing their teachers as some form of credible voice in government. 
However, the strategy failed: some teachers in government were seen as traitors, to the extent 
that for their own safety, some of them could not return to their universities.  
For example, the June 12, 1993 elections, judged the ‘fairest and freest' in the history of Nigeria 
were also midwifed by a professor of political science from one of the universities. Sadly, the 
acclaimed professor, who was celebrated after the peaceful outcome of the election, became a 
pariah the moment the election was annulled. He went underground. Nonetheless, it was 
perhaps simplistic on our part to have suggested that the appointment of such figures was only 
to rubber stamp military rule and delay democracy. 
For me personally, that episode with Dr X and our disagreements with many other teachers on 
the vexed issue of state/press relations, coupled with the earlier experiences I have recounted, 
presented me with a challenge: how to understand more about this period in Nigeria's politica l 
history. As I progressed to graduation, and my level of knowledge increased, I began to reflect 
further on the views I held. Were the assertions by our media teachers wrong? After all, what 
was the level of my knowledge compared to theirs such that I could feel that we were right and 
our teachers were wrong? Was the press irresponsible? At that moment, it became necessary 
for me to explore these aspects further, though I was not sure then, how or when I would do 
that. It was events in 1998, in particular the death of head of state, General Abacha that 
challenged me further.  
When the latter suddenly died on June 8, 1998, confusion followed but activists and people, 
including me, again poured onto the streets of Lagos to celebrate. Professor Wole Soyinka, one 
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of the leading opposition figures returned from exile and made his declaration describing the 
press as ‘magnificent, really magnificent, heroic’, and we again celebrated the triumph of a 
civil society ably led by the ‘patriotic' press (Olukotun 2002, p. 1). Yet back at the Univers ity 
after the celebrations and Soyinka's declaration had become a point of reference in the media, 
our teachers again faulted us for believing in Soyinka's speech which they termed an 
‘outpouring of emotions'. They claimed that Soyinka was a professor of English literature and 
thus could not make a valid claim on the subject of media. In the absence of an evidence-based 
study, his views, we were told was subjective and should be disregarded.  
Still when one considers Soyinka’s affinity with the press on one hand, and his link with the 
state as a player on the other hand, his views become even more interesting. James Gibbs in: 
‘Tear the Painted Masks. Join the Poison Stains: A Preliminary Study of Wole Soyinka's 
Writings for the Nigerian Press’ (1983) focuses on his political writings in the press which he 
stated ‘accounted for most of the column inches he produced’ (p. 4) at the time. In Gibbs’s 
study of Soyinka and the press from the 1960s, I am most interested and concerned about his 
writings from the moment the military handed over in 1979. Up till the time the military sacked 
the democratic regime on December 31, 1983, Soyinka, just as some sections of the press loyal 
to the opposition’s Obafemi Awolowo did, used every space in the media to despise President 
Sheu Shagari who he accused of electoral fraud. Not even the Supreme Court pronouncement 
could tame Soyinka’s attack on Shagari.  
As Gibbs chronicled, Soyinka’s campaign against Shagari was clearer in a 1981 article ‘The 
Bogus Revolution in our Time’, in which Gibbs stated Soyinka was not forthcoming on his 
‘revolution’ suggestion. On another occasion, he expatiated on this ‘revolution’ where he 
‘spoke so approvingly of violence as a way of bringing change’ before admitting his ‘faith in 
an inevitable revolution’ (p. 40).  Asked again at the same gathering ‘Do you believe in a 
violent Revolution’? His answer: ‘Look out of the window, the violent revolution is in full 
swing’ (p. 40). Thus it was not a coincidence that blood, tears and sorrow trailed the 1983 
general election (Olayiwola 1991, Agbaje 1992). 
Out of the above extracts from Soyinka’s political exploits in the press, and other various 
personal and politically unsettling engagements, and by the time I returned to study for my 
master's degree in 2002, emerged my interest in this set of issues about the press and democracy 
during Nigeria’s long period of military rule. I no longer found Soyinka and other outspoken 
activists, whose claims hitherto I had supported, persuasive. I questioned them and the role of 
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journalism in the struggle for democracy. I wanted to explore further the role of the press during 
those ‘definitive years' (Diamond et al 1997, p. 2); hence the subject of this thesis.  
Outline of Chapters 
In order to begin questioning the idea of the Nigerian press as ‘magnificent and heroic’ I first  
explore the earlier anti-colonial protest tradition of the press, raising the issue of whether this 
history set the terms for thinking about the press once independence was achieved and, indeed 
beyond, into the military years.  
Thus Chapter two reviews relevant studies and periodises the period prior to 1984 beginning 
with the debates around the role of the Nigerian press in the struggles for independence, 
reflecting upon the protest tradition of the Nigerian press as it earned the accolade of ‘diver se, 
outspoken, competitive, and irreverent’ (Hatchen 1971, p. 165). I then consider the transition 
from colonial subordination to independent state and the first democratic government post-
independence (1960–1966) when the potency hitherto associated with the press was said to 
have evaporated in exchange for the promotion of a ‘parochial agenda' (Uche 1989, p. 100), 
culminating in the first military coup in 1966.  
The chapter then focuses on the relationship between the press and the first wave of military 
rule between 1966 and 1979 when the second democratic republic was established after a 
general election. Interestingly, the advent of democratic rule between 1979 and 1983 saw to 
the flowering of the press, with individual politicians, groups and governments establishing 
new titles to pursue their respective political agendas (Uche 1989, p.102). Whilst it might be 
thought that this proliferation would contribute to a mediated public sphere and strengthen 
democracy, it went hand-in-hand with what might be described as media recklessness, 
hastening collapse of the regime and a return to military rule. Here, the chapter considers 
scholarship and debates around whether multiparty democracy guarantees press responsibility 
and greater participation in the political life by the citizenry.  
Through engagement with this earlier period, I aim to establish how the alleged radical 
journalism became a thorn in the flesh of the colonial administration and how the 
outspokenness (Ogbondah 1994) of the press at the dawn of independence dissipated as the 
press retreated  into regional enclaves (Uche 1989). A ‘free' Nigeria with a national agenda 
failed to take off, with a civil war (1967) breaking out partly owing to press partisanship.  
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The chapter also reviews the works of academics with liberal and critical leanings, such as 
Francis Nyanmjoh; Hallin and Mancini; Luke Uka Uche; Adigun Agbaje; Golding and Ellio t; 
Winston Mano; Fred Omu; Chris Ogbondah; William Hatchen; Ndaeyo Uko, Mercy Ette and 
others. While Olukotun believes that the liberal agenda of the Nigerian press was in full display 
during the years of military rule that I engage with, and that it overtly led to the ousting of the 
military in 1999 (Olukotun 2002, p. 1), Ette cautions that the role of the press as a pillar of 
democracy was unclear (Ette 2000).  
Luke Uka Uche argues more firmly that the best of the press was during the colonial rule before 
1960 independence and that the press lost the ‘nationalistic orientation' it earned then to an 
ethno-political agenda after independence (1989). Francis Nyamjoh in ‘Africa's Media: 
Democracy and Politics of Belonging’ is emphatic in his critical assessment of the alleged 
‘democratic winds' blowing across Africa in the 90s – and which some liberal scholars credited 
to the press –  querying such optimism. Rather, he argues that ‘media that have facilita ted 
genuine democratisation may appear rare in Africa' (Nyamjoh 2005, p. 272). 
Further, the chapter reflects on Gramsci's concept of ‘hegemony’, in relation to the Nigerian 
context. Stuart Hall in his analysis of the Gramsci’s concept describes hegemony in politica l 
term as ‘the various levels of the relations of force in the society’ (Hall 1988, p. 3) because, ‘in 
modern societies, hegemony must be constructed, contested and won on many different sites, 
as the structures of the modern state and society complexify and the points of social antagonism 
proliferate’ (1988, p. 168). By ‘relations of force’, I will assume, in the Nigerian context, it 
refers to an array of political groups; civil society coalitions; traditional institutions and others 
involved in the battle for the soul of the Nigerian state during the periods of the research. As 
Cox further opines, hegemony ‘centres upon the state, upon the relationship of civil society to 
the state, and upon the relationship of politics, ethics and ideology to production' (Cox 1993, 
p. 124). In these practices the news media are key. The concept of hegemony is thus mobilized 
in later chapters to raise how during many of the regimes hegemony was less won (via the 
media and other institutions) than there develops ‘a crisis of hegemony or general crisis of the 
state’ (Hall 1988, p. 168). 
Chapter three explores methodological issues. Each of the regimes studied represents a 
‘definitive period[s] of democratic struggles' (Diamond et al 1997, p. 2) which reversed or 
delayed Nigeria's development efforts to establish a democratic state.  During each of these 
periods, I wish to engage with journalistic news practice since it seemed that arguments about 
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the press as ‘heroic’ (or otherwise) were not based on any detailed analysis of news reporting 
but rather on the aura of the moment for example (death of Abacha). To this end seven 
newspapers were sampled: The Guardian, National Concord, The Punch, Nigerian Tribune, 
Vanguard, Thisday, and Champion and two weekly magazines, Tell and TheNews. These titles 
enjoyed national spread, but most significantly for my purposes were regarded as having 
political antecedents defining them (at least as far as most commentators were concerned)  as 
seemingly healthy adversaries of the State with ‘a capacity for advocacy and adversarial 
haggling against those they consider guilty of malfeasance' (Olukotun 2002, p. 22). Thus, as I 
will go on to explain, I selected the titles which at face value seemed the most likely to adopt 
a ‘fourth estate’ role and the least likely to be ‘corrupted’ or compromised by government or 
act in consort with a coercive military regime.  
In this chapter I discuss reasons for selecting to analyse a particular range of newspaper items 
such as headlines, new stories, editorials, opinion articles, photographs and cartoons (partly 
related to the nature of newspaper reading in Nigeria, i.e. the ‘free readers association of 
Nigeria'). In addition, I engage with the methodological issues raised in interviewing journalis ts 
and state officials about events in which they were involved and which happened many years 
earlier and consider how to draw on this material.  
In particular I explore the method I selected for analysing the newspaper items, i.e., Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) which I broadly adopt in order to determine how language was used 
by the press in reporting events in the periods of study. I go on to argue in later chapters how 
the fine nuances of language are critical to how an event is constructed and interpreted by 
readers.  
Chapter four is the first of four chapters exploring specific titles, National Concord and The 
Guardian and specific periods. In particular, the chapter engages with General Buhari's regime, 
first exploring what seemed to be press support and justification for overthrowing the 
democratic regime (led by Alhaji Sheu Shagari) which Buhari replaced. I argue that the 
involvement of the press in this coup shaped Buhari’s view of the press as not to be trusted and 
needing to be tamed. Besides his uncompromising approach to government, he thus attempted 
to curtail ‘press freedom’, eventually generating a crisis which culminated in the collapse of 
his regime.  
25 
 
 
 
Analysis of the papers in the early days of the regime indicates a ‘honeymoon’ period between 
the press and the Buhari regime. Editorials in particular were not in short supply during this 
early period, justifying the emergence of Buhari, spelling out policy directions for the regime 
while castigating the deposed democratic regime of Shagari. 
But once the promulgation of Decree 4 1984 (Public Officers, Prevention Against False 
Accusation) which the press claimed was designed to protect public officials from criticism, 
was in place, this relationship began to break down. Analysis of the coverage of the symbolic 
trial and jailing of The Guardian journalists ‘The Guardian Two’ under the Decree, in spite of 
public outcry against it shows growing criticism of Buhari. I argue that Decree 4 was part of 
Buhari’s war on corruption which permeated the entire society at the time, including the press. 
But in initially supporting Buhari, the latter, seemed to believe that its own corrupt practices 
should have been overlooked. They were not. 
In Chapter five, I analyse the press during the longest of the four military regimes: Gene ral 
Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida's eight years of ‘transition without end' (Diamond et al 1997 , p. 
1). To further his aim of ‘nation building’, Babangida managed the press by working in 
partnership, co-opting several journalists into his cabinet. This arrangement led to what I term 
an ‘agreed liberalism’ between the regime and press.  However this seemingly beneficia l 
arrangement also meant that rather than serve as the public watchdog, the press instead became 
a part of the regime as analysis of The Punch and Nigerian Tribune suggests. When the June 
12, 1993 presidential election result was annulled (only the most significant of many other acts 
of impropriety by the regime) the press was slow to criticise. In calling for the revalidation of 
the annulled election and an end to military rule, the Nigerian people sidestepped the press. 
They took action into their own hands, through organised protests, general strikes and civil 
disobedience. In the face of this popular revolt, unable to maintain its alliance with the regime 
any longer, the tenor of news reports and features shifted in support of the demands of the 
people. But jolted by what was regarded as press betrayal, the regime fought back, arresting 
and detaining several journalists without trial, proscribing titles and introducing a new decree 
demanding the re-registering of news media providers.  
Though, Babangida did not survive the uprisings and was forced to stand down, analysis of 
these titles indicates that contrary to a commonly voiced  account that credits Babangida’s fall 
to the ‘liberal press’, it was indeed the Nigerian people who took destiny into their own hands, 
with the press only belatedly following.  
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Chapter six focuses largely on General Abacha’s regime (1993-1998) regarded by scholars as 
the most brutal of those studied here (Ogbondah 1994, Lewis et al. 1998, Olukotun 2002, Ojo 
2007, Alimi 2011). When Babangida hurriedly put in place a civilian interim government the 
press seemed to support this move, at least that Babangida was gone. Yet analysis of the news 
titles Vanguard and Daily Champion (and particularly the former) suggests that no sooner was 
Ernest Shonekan in office than the press agitated against him, inviting Abacha to seize power, 
on condition that he redressed the annulment of the June 12 election. But again this meant the 
press acted in unholy alliance with the military (though Daily Champion kept its distance).   
However Abacha betrayed this promise, cracking down on the press by proscribing titles and 
arresting editors and journalists as he pursued his own personal ambition: transforming from a 
military head of state to a civilian president without first resigning. Under Abacha, so-called 
‘guerrilla journalism' (Maringues 1996) was at its height, with Tell, TheNews, Tempo and Razor 
magazines continuing to hit the newsstands even as journalists abandoned their newsrooms, 
homes, and other places where they could easily be identified by state agents.  But although I 
discuss these titles in more general terms, I engage in detailed analysis of press accounts, 
including cartoons, in Vanguard and Daily Champion over the period Abacha made his bid to 
become the presidential candidate. I argue that whilst both titles could be seen to be supporting 
Abacha, Daily Champion offered a more ‘balanced journalism' whilst Vanguard, one of the 
newspapers that was generally accorded respect, did not. Its coverage continued, if not wholly 
to support the Abacha candidacy, not to query it. I would argue that Abacha was the first 
Nigerian leader to emasculate the press or at least instil such fear that sections of the press were 
unable to act as fourth estate. Abacha got very close to defeating the press when he 
mysteriously died on June 8, 1998 in the thick of the violent crisis that rocked his regime. His 
death brought an instant relief to the besieged press.  
Chapter seven considers the short military regime of General Abdusalami Abubarkar, and in 
particular press coverage during the ‘extraordinary confluence’ in the month of June/July 1998 
(Robinson 1998, p. 136): the death of MKO Abiola (the anticipated next civilian president for 
many Nigerians) within a month of the death of Abacha, which again threatened nationa l 
security. Exploring the newspapers Thisday, Vanguard and Nigerian Tribune and the ‘radical 
magazines’ Tell and TheNews, I discuss the possible Western conspiracy to ensure Abiola did 
not achieve power and also analyse press treatment of the regime’s transition, leading to the 
inauguration of an elected government on May 29, 1999, after sixteen years of military rule.  
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Once in power Abubakar offered a welcome ‘olive branch’ to the press – the release of jailed 
and detained journalists as well as the reopening of the shut media houses.  The press was also 
shocked by the death of Abiola and the impossibility of a return to the June 12 election, and 
thus the need to find another solution. Analysing headlines in particular I demonstrate the 
investment the newspaper titles placed in Abubakar as he took on the reins of power (though 
Tell and TheNews were more sceptical), and the ways the press rallied round Obasanjo. I argue 
that Abubakar’s olive branch made it hard for the press to properly scrutinise the transition: the 
military, in effect, ‘won’. It was their preferred candidate, Olusegun Obasanjo, who was 
selected as the next President. In some ways it could be said that there was a conspiracy 
between the new regime and the press on the need to find a permanent solution to Abiola and 
the June 12 crises. Or perhaps, in the aftermath of Abacha's crackdown, the press was war 
weary. I suggest, following Diamond et al that the upshot was ‘a low quality democracy’ (1999, 
p. 2). 
In the concluding chapter, the thesis critically appraises the sixteen years of military rule and 
re-engages with the liberal assertions that the press might have been responsible for the 
restoration of democracy in 1999. In particular, I question Soyinka's proclamation of a 
‘magnificent and heroic' press by considering what specific newspaper analysis of each of the 
military regimes contributes to a counter argument that in key ways the press explicitly or 
implicitly supported the military and contributed to the erosion of democratic culture in those 
years.  
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Introduction 
The notion that news has a kind of independent character or that stories tell themselves 
is simply wrong, just as it is incorrect to think that reporters and editors somehow stand 
apart from the political, economic, social and cultural system that has shaped 
them….To imagine that journalists are a breed apart, somehow able to be ‘objective’ 
about the world around them in ways others cannot is to believe in a logical absurdity. 
Herbert Altschull (1984) Agents of Power: The Role of the News Media in Human 
Affairs 
The sunrise of what is today’s global media debate about press freedom can be traced to April 
13, 1738. A law was passed by the British Parliament ‘declaring it a “notorious breach of 
privilege” ’ (Koch 1990, p. 1) to report parliamentary activities. London Magazine rebelled 
against the ban, publishing under another guise. Edward Cave, publisher of Gentlemen’s 
Magazine also in June 1738, started publishing reports on the ‘Parliaments of Lilliput’ . 
Apparently realising the futility of the ban, the law was repealed in March, 1744 (Koch 1990, 
p. 1). The sunrise the other side of the Atlantic occurred with the adoption of James Madison’s 
draft ‘First Amendment’3 by the United States’ Congress on December 15, 1791 (Hamilton et 
al 2008). Debates about ‘freedom of the press’ grumble on but like a volcano, erupt from time 
to time, as evidenced in Siebert et al’s Four Theories of the Press (1956), UNESCO’s 
communication debate in 1980, New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO)  
(Uche 1989) and in response to Jürgen Habermas’s seminal work, The Public Sphere 
(Habermas et al. 1964). More recently, James Curran’s illuminating dissection of the 
‘admirable and inspirational’ American press which is like a ‘shining city on the hill when 
viewing from a distance’ but ‘not so luminous’ from inside (Curran 2011, pp. 16, 26) points to 
a further engagement with this debate.  
The role of the media in a political context has been well documented. From its role in both the 
American and French revolutions, in the struggles to end colonialism in Africa and elsewhere, 
and the more recent frontline role in the democratic waves which continue to sweep unevenly 
                                                                 
3 The First Amendment declares that the people of the United States are to be free — free from certain forms of 
government control. Its full  citation is given by the Harvard Law Review: ‘Congress shall  make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of their 
grievances’ See Zechariah Chafee, Jr’s ‘Freedom of Speech in War Time’ Harvard Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 8 
(Jun., 1919), pp. 932-973 
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through Latin America and Africa (Oloyede 2004). Specifically, Kelly and Donway see the 
media performing the ‘watchdog function of protecting against the tendency of the state to 
aggrandize its power and abuse the rights of its citizens’ (1990, p. 70), or as an ‘agency of 
information and debate that facilitates the functioning of democracy’ (Curran 2005, p. 129).  
Yet, on the other hand, McGuire (1986), Liebert and Sprafkin (1988) link the media to incit ing 
violence and aggressive behaviour and regard it as biased in its stereotyping and instigation of 
antisocial behaviour (cited in Perse 2001). Other effects include serving as a tool for 
manipulation and social control (Lasswell 1927) and engendering a ‘legacy of fear’ (DeFleur 
and Dennis 1994). James Curran also writes about dominant ideologies being reinforced 
(Curran 2005) and of an independent watchdog role being undermined by corporate interests 
(Curran 2002). At times some sections of the media are also actively associated with patently 
anti-democratic forces (Agbaje and Adebanwi 2004).  
The Nigerian press from the period of colonialism, through post independent civilian and 
military governments is said to have been repeatedly linked with the promotion of self-interest 
on the part of owners with respect to their political interests. This inclination to ‘politics of 
clientelism and Kingship Corporation’ (Eribo and Jong-Ebot 1997, p. x111) or ‘double 
allegiances to political and professional goals (Golding and Elliot 1979, p. 31) has had a 
profound effect on the attempt at integrating Nigeria into a developed nationhood (Chick 1971, 
Adesoji 2010).  
Debates about press freedom or free speech have dominated much media discussion, not only 
in established democracies but also in semi-democratic or authoritarian societies. Broadly, 
views adopt liberal or critical (political economy) models (Curran and Parks 2000, p. 13). 
According to Daniel Hallin, the liberal view suggests a freedom from the state which is 
‘conducive to democracy’, the expansion of commercia l media markets enabling a separation 
from state and political parties. In this way the press can act as effective ‘watchdog’ of 
government (Hallin 2000, p. 90). Press freedom then, refers to a non-restricted arena where the 
press can freely air views without censorship or intimidation. As Eribo and Jong-Ebot describe 
press freedom it involves a ‘free market place of ideas and information for all the citizenry’ 
(Eribo et al 1997, p. 52).  
From Asia, Erik Kit-Wai Ma argues that contemporary Chinese media provides ‘breathing 
spaces for the general public and provides more opportunities for freedom of expression than 
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the authoritarian rule of the past era’ (Kit-Wai Ma 2000, p. 26). From Africa, liberalists have 
been vehement that the media have been central to the aspirations of the people. Abeku 
Blankson in his re-examination of the state, media and the Ghanaian public believes that the 
Ghanaian press ‘fosters the dissemination and free exchange of information leading to social, 
political and economic reforms’ (Blankson 2002, p. 4.7), just as Helge Ronnings and Tawana 
Kupe allude to this liberal culture, arguing that despite constraints, the Zimbabwean press 
continues to keep the ‘Zimbabwean society relatively open’ and that it is the struggle over 
maintaining this open space and extending it, that is still a factor in the conflict between 
President Mugabe’s government and the democratic agenda of the press (Ronning and Kupe 
2000, pp. 160, 176).   
Similar arguments also dominate Nigerian discursive space: ‘the tradition of a vigorous and 
virile press dates back beyond the period of colonial administration’ (Ogbondah 1994, p. 26). 
This point was also corroborated by Ekwelie that the press, despite obnoxious laws to stifle it 
‘remained relatively free in its 110 year history’ (cited in Ogbondah 1994, p.  26). Thus, it was 
this culture of bravery by the press that made Robert Stevenson conclude that: ‘Nigerian 
journalists face a daily struggle beyond the imagination of most Western journalists’ 
(Stevenson 1994, p. 249), even as Martin Ochs noted in affirmation that ‘Nigeria seems to have 
journalists who bounce back’ (Ochs 1986, p. 67). 
But those of the critical school believe press liberalism is mythical. In calling for a re-appraisal, 
James Curran contends that the period when liberal argument held sway was when the state 
was viewed as the ‘main source of oppression’, noting that ‘market liberalisation has seen new 
sets of power blocs emerging with dominant ideologies being reinforced’ (Curran 2005, p. 
217). Hallin points to how critical political economy ‘tends to portray the media and politica l 
democracy as essentially antagonistic’ (2000, p. 90). Media markets less encourage democracy 
than concentrate ownership and control in the hands of the few, increase a dependency on 
advertising and delimit the range of content. German philosopher, Jürgen Habermas in his 
essay and extended work on the ‘Public Sphere’ also recognises the impact of the rise in market 
forces. His postulate of  ‘a realm of social life in which something of public interest can be 
formed by the coming together of individuals, without inhibitions, to hold opinions about 
matters of general interest and publish them’ (Habermas 1991, p. 136), is compromised by 
various economic and political interests. The ‘Public Sphere’ is thus an ideal acting as a 
measure of the media’s democratic ‘health’ not an already achieved process. Francis 
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Nyamnjoh’s discussion on ‘media and democracy in Africa’ is critical of the relevance of a 
liberal framework for thinking about news media in the continent (Nyamnjoh 2005). He 
highlights that it focuses on the individual and an ‘objective’ and fair journalism, neglecting in 
the African context, the significance of ‘ethnicity and belonging’ (p.37) which places pressures 
on journalists ‘to promote the interests of the various groups competing for recognition and 
representation’ (p.39). He suggests, therefore, that ‘media that have facilitated genuine 
democratisation may appear rare in Africa' (Nyamjoh 2005, p. 272). This Nyamjoh’s view is 
consonant with Herbert Altschull’s position quoted in the beginning of this section that, the 
notion about journalists being independent of the world around them is mythical. 
To pursue this debate further some scholars have canvassed for a comparative media studies, 
with Curran and Park positing that this paradigm shift in media theorising is ‘a result of growing 
reactions against the self-absorption and parochialism of Anglo-American media theories 
which view the rest of the world as a forgotten understudy or as if they stand-in for the rest of 
the world, or assume that their models and ways of thinking about media especially news media 
are appropriate to other countries’ (Curran and Park 2000, p. 3). But as the African case 
demonstrates, and Nyamnjoh (2005) for one describes, the history of news media, and thus the 
appropriate ways of thinking about it, are very different to European or US developments.  
Hallin too, explains how neither a liberal approach nor critical political economy does justice 
to the development of Mexican news media and its place in the society (2000). I will return to 
this more comparative study in a moment (See p. 35 below). 
Nevertheless to some degree scholars have still discussed the news media in Africa in terms of 
its contribution to democratic processes. They repeatedly pinpoint the very laudable role played 
by the media in the long struggle against colonialism and the battle against post-independent 
authoritarianism and military dictatorship. In the former, it is argued that the media played a 
significant role, not only rattling the colonialists, but also forcing them to accept the inevitab le 
ending of colonialism. In the fight against authoritarianism and in the attempts to establish 
good governance, the media’s role has also been described as crucial to uplifting the people of 
the continent (Ansah 1988, Omu 1978, M’Bayo et al. 2000, Amin and Napoli 2000, Oloyede 
2004, Adhikari 2005, Adesoji 2010). Specifically, Winston Mano writes about African 
journalists and the media contributing to ‘citizenship, entertainment and democratic processes’ 
(Mano 2005, p. 57), while Festus Eribo and William Jong-Ebot echoing this view suggests that 
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‘the media are in the fore-front of the war for democracy in Africa’ (Eribo & Jong-Ebot 1997, 
p. x).  
Charles Okigbo (2000) puts this role of the African media in perspective: 
Africa’s media and civil society are at the epicentre of the efforts for a new social 
orientation directed at inaugurating a new politics in the continent. The role of the media 
in politics was clear to the pioneer nationalist journalists and publishers during the 
independence movements. They were helped in their efforts by a virile civil society that 
was organised along ethnic, religious and professional lines. These formed the 
rudiments for the eventual evolution of the earliest political parties. A closer 
examination of the development of the mass media in Africa will shed more light on 
their symbiotic relationship with civil society in the task of promoting polit ica l 
development (2000, p. 67). 
In Nigeria, the press has been almost wholly credited with the success of the anti-colonial wars 
leading to the country’s independence in October 1, 1960. So ferocious were the press attacks 
on the Colonial regime that a colonial official complained that Nnamdi Azikiwe’s group of 
publications, in particular ‘are like a plague, afflicting the whole country’ (Uko 2004, p. 10). 
Azikiwe, who edited the influential West African Pilot4 and later became Nigeria’s post-
independent president, apparently understood the power of the press in anti-colonia l 
campaigns, and thus deployed it, as did other nationalists, to gain victory over the colonia l 
powers. 
Interestingly, the birth of Nigeria’s political press, which later became a weapon against 
colonialists, was in fact orchestrated by these same colonialists, presumably inadvertent ly. 
Henry Townsend, a clergyman from the Church Missionary Society (CMS) of England, 
seconded to Nigeria to propagate the Christian faith, established the first newspaper in 1859 – 
Iwe Irohin.5 In a message to London, Townsend excitedly informed CMS that the objective of 
                                                                 
4 West African Pilot was launched in 1937 by Nnamdi Azikiwe — described as the father of Nigerian modern 
journalism, with the ‘supreme task’ to promote human liberty. The paper’s popularity was such that it became 
the highest circulated daily at 9000 copies, becoming the rallying point for the propagation of nationalist ideas. 
See Fred Omu (2000) ‘The Nigerian Press: Milestones in Service’ in Tunji  Oseni & Lanre Idowu (eds.) Hosting the 
140th Anniversary of the Nigerian Press.  
 
5 The full  title of the newspaper was ‘Iwe Irohin Fun Awon Ara Egba ati Yoruba’, which literarily translates as ‘a 
newspaper for the Egba and Yoruba people’. It was the first newspaper to be published in an African language, 
with an English edition later on. See Omu, F. I. A. (1978) Press and Politics in Nigeria 1880 - 1937 
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the newspaper was to ‘get the people to read…to beget the habit of seeking information by 
reading’ (Uche 1989, p. 93). From publishing church programmes, Iwe Irohin gradually 
included community news and socio-political activities in its publication (Olorede et al 2013). 
Specifically, Iwe Irohin reported the sharp practices of the colonial administration against the 
indigenous people. Clearly people did more than ‘read’ and ‘seek information’; they were also 
engaged in political and social agitation leading to ‘cultural nationalism’ or ‘cultura l 
renaissance’ (Omu 1978, Alimi 2011). The increased activities of the paper to enlighten the 
people concerned the colonial powers, leading to Townsend’s recall by London. But politica l 
dynamite was already laid. Nationalists latched on to this foundational practice by Iwe Irohin: 
a series of publications emerged with the sole aim of combating the colonial powers.  
Yet many scholars bemoan what became of the patriotic role of the press after the attainment 
of independence.  The very weapon – the press – used to end colonialism became the same 
weapon that undermined the solidarity of the people and stifled their socio-political and 
economic development. Thus, from the time of independence, whilst some have lauded the 
press’s contribution to nation-building and democratic debate, the press has also been critica lly 
appraised: as an institution that has engendered ethno-religious polarisation of the people, less 
than steadfast in promoting democracy and good governance and whose integrity and 
professional standing have been severely undermined by bribery and corruption (Golden and 
Elliot 1979; Uche 1989; Agbaje 1992; Ette 2000; Uko 2004; Adesoji 2010; Fayemiwo 2012). 
Indeed, in virtually all the regimes since independence (military and civilian), the press has 
always been at the epicentre of the struggle for power. The configuration of Nigeria, as a 
conglomerate of over 250 ethnic nationalities (Uche 1989), has contributed to this, with the 
struggle for political power like a theatre of war among the various ethnic groups, particula r ly 
the dominant three – Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and the Yoruba. But this historical configuration has 
meant that the press has also become a tool of power, dangerously deployed by politica l 
gladiators in combat with one another. Subsequent chapters on specific regimes and news titles 
(Chapters Four - Seven) take up this idea of the press at the epicentre of the struggle for power 
and as a tool of power. But the analysis also explores how the protest tradition which held sway 
during colonialism did not wholly disappear. It continued as ‘idea’ and re-emerged in practice, 
in the form of guerrilla journalism, especially in the Abacha years.  
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However, in order to understand the particularity of the Nigerian press in a broader conceptual 
context, I draw on Hallin and Mancini’s comparative study: Comparing media systems: three 
models of media and politics (2004). In classifying western media system, they propose three 
models viz; “The Mediterranean or Polarised Pluralist Model” where the media are dependent 
on the state, seen traditionally as organs of the parties and with a weak market base. The 
“Liberal Model”, synonymous with US, British and Canadian media systems, has such 
characteristics as market-based, autonomy from state control and a degree of politica l 
partisanship. The third model “The North/Central European or Democratic Corporatist Model” 
is evident in European countries with historical, cultural and political similarities, with the press 
having characteristics similar to aspects of the other two models: a strong commercial market 
and a high level of journalistic professionalization together with what the authors refer to as 
‘political parallelism’ (p. 26) including strong political partisanship.  
In expanding the three models, they stress the importance of comparative analysis for thinking 
about a media system, in that it ’forces us to conceptualise more clearly and draws our attention 
to aspects of any media system, including our own, often taken for granted and difficult to 
detect’ (2004, p. 2). They go on to usefully suggest four key dimensions in discussing the 
western media systems. The four key dimensions are: (1) the development of media markets; 
(2) political parallelism i.e. the links between the media and party politics; (3) the 
professionalism question; and (4) the regulatory system (p. 21).  
The differentiation in the media markets in terms of circulation (low or high), readership, 
language and audience segmentation is said to be ‘naturally accompanied by different roles 
played by the media, with deep implications for the development of the media as politica l 
institutions’ (Hallin and Mancini 2004, p. 24). These media roles range from political advocacy 
to publicist role and entertainment. The authors view political parallelism as the extent to which 
the media ‘structure paralleled that of the party system’ (p. 27) and it is manifested in different 
ways. One of the indicators of the party-press alliance is manifested in the content of the news 
where distinct political orientation is reflected in the style of reporting. Another indicator is 
what the authors referred to as ‘organisational connection’ — the link between the media and 
political parties and such other organisations with links to political parties, such as the church, 
trade unions, cooperative societies etc. Other components of political parallelism include the 
partisanship of media audiences which they demonstrate by buying certain newspapers or 
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watching particular broadcast channels; as well as the active political life of journalists who 
work for political parties or are appointed into public offices (p. 28). 
Hallin and Mancini also discuss the problematic issue of professionalism in journalism 
practice, alluding too to its global manifestations. Most practitioners do not have journalism 
degrees and entry into the profession is not regulated. Even in areas such as Italy where the 
‘Order of Journalists’ is based on a mandatory examination, journalism still has ‘a low level of 
professionalization’ (p. 34). Thus, the degree to which a newspaper is professionalised whether 
by formal journalism training or by means of professional codes of practice may affect the role 
played by journalists in mediated politics. The final factor in the four components proposed by 
Hallin and Mancini is the regulatory system. Here, the authors confirm the important role of 
the state in shaping media system in any society (p. 41). The state role may be in form of laws 
or policies that may impede the functions of practitioners. These regulatory measures are often 
premised on national interest/s. They conclude that whether in areas where the market forces 
direct the media or in societies with heavier state control, the fact cannot be overemphas ised 
that the state as a ‘source of information and “primary definer” of news will always play an 
important role in influencing the agenda and framing of public issues’ (p. 44). 
Whilst their models focus on western media systems triggering criticisms about their usefulness 
in thinking about other media systems, the authors have since expanded their comparative 
study. Comparing media systems beyond the Western world (Hallin and Mancini 2011) builds 
on the earlier work, with perspectives from other world regions. But African media and 
Nigerian news media in particular, can be discussed in terms of the narrative and framework 
offered by Hallin and Mancini in both studies. For instance, Adria Hadland, in his contribution 
to the expanded study ‘Africanising Three Models of Media and Politics: The South African 
experience’ (2011) confirms the prevalence of the features of the three models, though pointing  
perhaps to deeper implications than those cited by Hallin and Mancini. Hadland suggests a high 
level of ‘political parallelism with the tendency of the mass media to act as an instrument of 
clientelist networks and neo-patrimonial politics’ (p. 104). In South Africa, as with many 
African countries, state intervention has been increasing since the end of Apartheid in the 90s 
and there is tendency by the state to poach senior media executives to work as government 
spokespeople. Hadland emphatically notes then that ‘Africa’s media landscape has strong 
features of political parallelism, with media products, ownership and audiences frequently 
reflecting ethnic, linguistic, racial or clientelist features’ (2011, p. 116). Some of these issues, 
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in particular, professionalism in media practice have been highlighted by earlier media 
historians in the Nigerian context. Increase Coker (1960) points out that the idea of professiona l 
commitment comes last in the thinking of journalists of the colonial era. Journalism is thus 
seen as a means to achieving political interests of the proprietors (Golding and Elliot 1979). 
The situation remains the same in the contemporary journalism practice. Though there are 
institutions of higher learning training would-be journalists to the degree level; as well as codes 
of practice for the practitioners, notwithstanding, journalists regularly breach their own codes 
and this often results in arrests and prosecution at times. 
Bearing the above in mind, I go on to outline the press’s political role in the struggle for power 
before 1984 when the research period of the thesis begins, but try to do so through a 
consideration of the conceptualisations, reflections and assessments of the Nigerian press by 
scholars and some journalists. In particular I mark out two ‘traditions’ associated with the press 
and which have been in tension with each other throughout: the anti-colonia l 
(protest/nationalist) press and the ethno-political press. Whilst there has tended to be agreement 
that the battle for independence from colonialists was won on the pages of newspapers, scholars 
have also pointed out that the press deviated from the pursuit of the common good once 
independence was established.  
Anthony Enahoro, one of the early leading lights in Nigerian journalism lamented the negative 
effects of press partisanship in the collapse of the First Republic in 1966 pointing out how the 
press was actively involved (Okafor & Malizu 2013). Yet, there are other scholars and 
journalists who continue to pinpoint that the progress recorded by the Nigerian state can be 
attributed to the fighting spirit of the press whose journalists, in spite of constraints, refused to 
bow. Moreover, but for obstacles placed in the path of the press by successive regimes, it would 
have achieved more (Ogbondah 1994, Akinfeleye 2003, Adesoji 2010). 
Germane to these discussions is the fact that between 1940 and 1984, the Nigerian state was 
crisis ridden. In this context perhaps, too much emphasis has been given to the idea of the press 
as ‘protest/liberal’. Less attention has been paid to the difficulties of achieving a national (ist) 
press and the ways that the press’s ethno-political character, associated with the co-operative 
strategy between politics and journalism, made the achievement of a stable and developed 
Nigeria unrealisable. My emphasis, in order to shift the approach away from ‘protest/libera l’ 
is firstly to adopt the notion of the Nigerian press as ‘ethno-political’ and secondly, and 
relatedly, to take up a significant conceptualisation by Golding and Elliot (1979). They 
38 
 
 
 
specifically refer to the ‘incompleteness’ of the Nigerian press, characterising it in terms of the 
‘dual allegiances of journalists to professional and political obligation’ (1979 p. 31).  In many 
ways this understanding is similar to Hallin and Mancini’s later formulation -‘politica l 
parallelism’ but the distinction between the two is the higher form of political affiliation by the 
Nigerian press as the Golding and Elliot’s study can reveal. 
Central to the discussion about a nationalist press is the concept of nationalism. Ostini & Ostini 
rightly argue that ‘in any analysis of national systems, their media structures and institutions, 
as well as their relationship with political and economic structures, must be part of the picture 
because these relationships and structures are integral to the content, distribution, and reception 
of information in a society’ (2002, p. 55). How then is the notion of nationalism conceptualised 
in Africa more generally and Nigeria in particular? James Coleman in his study Nigeria: 
Background to Nationalism (1958) traces the emergence of nationalist movements to British 
colonialism. In colonial Nigeria, the people had to organise themselves into socio-polit ica l 
movements with the sole aim of securing self-rule from the imperial powers. Ultimately, these 
counter-hegemonic movements led to the granting of independence in 1960. Ukeje and 
Adebanwi corroborate that the ‘pursuit of identities in their various and multiple forms’ (2008, 
p. 564) is at the epicentre of agitation for nationalisms the world over.  
Accentuating the discussion on nationalism, Ukoha Ukiwo argues that one of the fallouts of 
colonialism and nationalist movements was a creation of two publics: the ‘primordial public’ 
and the ‘civic public’ – both in contention for the loyalty of Africans. The primordial public is 
comprised of ethnic groups at the vanguard of providing for the welfare needs of the natives, 
which were denied by the colonial state, while the civic public is the colonial and post-colonia l 
state and all its apparatuses (Ukiwo 2005, p. 9). This contestation for the loyalty of the people 
by these two publics gave rise to ethnic politics or what Nyamnjoh (2005) referred to as 
‘ethnicity and belonging’. Paradoxically, the idea of ethnic press is traceable to the nationalis ts 
who employed the power of the press in aid of their agitation against colonialism. Citing the 
philosophies of two frontline papers during the period of nationalism, Adesoji and Hahn 
rationalise how the West African Pilot established in 1937 and Nigerian Tribune founded in 
1949, were mobilised in the 1950s. Whilst West African Pilot claimed it would promote “the 
cause of national unity” and would not “be used to foster extremes of regionalism, 
provincialism, parochialism and other forms of racial or tribal jingoism”, the Nigerian Tribune 
boasted it was set “for a policy of militant but constructive nationalism, fostered without 
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discrimination or partiality, the cohesion of every ethnical or linguistic group in the country, 
and sedulously promoted the federal unity of Nigeria” (2011, pp. 186-187). These affirmations 
by the two papers can be understood in terms of the colonial powers as a common enemy which 
only the unity of purpose could defeat. 
Then, as colonialism eclipsed in 1960, Luke Uka Uche paints a picture of what became an 
ethno-political press, as the hitherto unity press that had fought the battle of independence 
dispersed into regional enclaves (Uche 1989). Ukoha Ukiwo further explains that, ethnic ity 
then became a choice platform for acquisition of power and resources: 
The Nigerian elite who inherited the colonial state have conceptualised development as 
transferring resources from the civic public to the primordial public. The civic public 
is thus a contested terrain where representatives of the primordial public struggle for 
their share of the national cake. In this struggle, politics is amoral and the end justifies 
the means. The state is so treated because it is seen as alien, exploitative and oppressive 
(Ukiwo 2005, p. 9). 
The intensity of the contestation was such that the primordial public became a real threat to the 
national order as the newspapers in the hands of the regional leaders became tools dangerously 
deployed to propagate their ideologies. The political sophistication of these privately-owned 
papers in the 60s led to government involvement in newspaper ownership in order to cushion 
the effects posed to its hegemony by the regional powers (Coker, 1968).  
Elirea Bornman’s debate on ‘nation-building and citizenship’ (2013) is also illumina ting 
alluding again to the fact that Africa’s quest for national integration has been problematic 
owing to its diverse ethnic base. As Bornman points out, since nation-building implies that 
ethnic allegiances are collapsed into single national identity (national integration), the media 
are under pressure from the political bureaucracy to articulate a unity agenda. Bornman argues 
further that a situation where ‘national unity takes precedence over the recognition and 
accommodation of cultural diversity, could in the end be detrimental to the harmonious co-
existence of groups’ (p. 443). In suggesting a new role the media can play, Bornman renders 
the situation more complex when he writes: 
On the one hand, they can become an important instrument for embracing diversity and 
promoting cultural awareness and understanding, but they can also have a divis ive 
effect by being indifferent to difference. The result of such indifference is often the 
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marginalisation of groups, the estrangement and alienation of members of diverse 
cultures, and, in the end, divisive polarisation (p. 444).  
I will return to the expanded discussions on nationalism and ethno-political character of the 
press (see pp. 41 - 47 below). But suffice it to state here that it was ethnic politics that gave rise 
to the ethno-political character of the press, which in turn made the idea of a nationalist press 
a forlorn hope. This aligns with Francis Nyamjoh’s ‘ethnicity and belonging’ (2005) 
conceptualisation where he argues that the idea of thinking about Africa’s media from a 
western liberal perspective is problematic. The upshot is that the media are incapable of playing 
a nationalist role or advancing a democratic process.  
In the introductory chapter, I alluded to the idea of alternative media practice as exemplified 
by two weekly magazines Tell and TheNews. Here, alternative media is employed to mean 
those media activities that pose counter-hegemonic challenges to the social order. Chris Atton 
conceptualises alternative media as ‘those media produced outside the forces of market 
economics and the state’ (Atton 2004, p. 3). These categories of media include pressure groups, 
dissidents, breakaway political movements and even lobbyists, and they become a force to 
reckon with as topical issues of citizenship form the basis for their agitation. Inherent in their 
counter-hegemonic activities as Atton further points out, is ‘sustaining a community of citizens 
engaged in democratic practice’ and creating a borderless sphere (Atton 2004, p. 5).  
Another term used in discussing this type of media practice is offered by John Downing who 
used the term ‘radical media’. By radical media, Downing conceptualises it as ‘media generally 
in small-scale and in many forms, that expresses an alternative vision to hegemonic policies, 
priorities, and perspectives’ (Downing 2001, p. v). The emergence of this form of media, 
Downing explains, is made possible in the ‘face of blockages of public expression, coming 
from powerful components within the dynamic of capitalist economy and government’ (p. v). 
Going by these descriptions, the ‘alternative’ or the ‘radical’ media oppose the mainstream 
media and their variants. They do not conform and in some ways expose aspects of ‘politica l 
parallelism’ in terms of the relation between state and the mainstream media.  
The above formulations capture the phenomenon manifest in Nigeria. Tagged ‘guerrilla 
journalism’, ‘underground’ or the ‘bush press’ (Maringues 1996; Olukotun 2002; Oyediran & 
Agbaje 1999), the practice was embraced by few magazines. As Olukotun recounts, journalist ic 
practice during the period was devoid of an identifiable office, personnel identity, distribution 
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van and open sale by vendors. Nosa Igiebor, editor of Tell, explains the phenomenon as being 
synonymous with the guerrilla war tactics employed by some Africa revolutionary movements 
to defeat some of the continent’s worst dictators who conveniently commanded awesome war 
arsenals (Olukotun 2002). Bayo Onanuga, editor-in-chief of TheNews, foretold of what later 
became this practice. In his strategy paper at the inauguration of his magazine in 1993 
‘Inventing an editorial Compass for TheNews’, Onanuga argues that the existing news journals 
‘are not probing enough. They sound too boring, too uncritical of government. No magazine in 
the world can be very successful if it does not at times wear the armour of opposition or the 
critic’ (Onanuga 1993, TheNews, No 3). This framework for TheNews by Onanuga finds 
expression in Atton (2004) and Downing (2001) who both describes the ‘alternative’ or 
‘radical’ media as offering a counter-discursive space as opposed to the mainstream media 
which is often weighed down by state and market forces. 
 
The Anti-Colonial Press: Protest and Nationalism 
Debates about press liberalism and its association with the establishment of more democratic 
societies in the West have tended to centre on the period of modern mass communication since 
the development of print media. But it has been established that before the advent of 
colonialism, liberal values were evident in traditional settings, whether freedom of expression 
or of association. Writing broadly on this theme, Paul Ansha notes that in ‘traditional African 
society, freedom of expression is recognized as a fundamental human right where consensus 
was given a high premium, and this was based on the free expression of opinion’ (Ansha 1988, 
p. 5.). Claude Ake, a Nigerian political scientist also debunked insinuations that liberal values 
were alien to Nigerian people and that it was a misconception to see democracy as a Western 
creation alien to Africa. Political systems before colonialism, argues Ake, ‘were infused with 
liberal values even more potent than those in the West. Particularly on issues such as corruption 
and repression, ‘chiefs were answerable for their own actions’ (Ake 1993, p. 72). Ayo Olukotun 
also documents that any liberal tradition of the press in Nigeria in the 20 th century drew strength 
from the pre-colonial protest forms which employed mass popular culture such as music, 
theatre, oratory, poetry, sign communication, to criticise unpopular leaders (Olukotun 2002, pp 
165- 172).  
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Thus nationalists who employed modern mass media to aid their anti-colonial agitation were 
drawing on a more embedded history of liberal principles and practice. This historica l 
background is necessary to understand why nationalists appreciated the use of the press as a 
tool in their agitation to free Nigeria, and to explain further how it became a potent tool in 
political struggles after independence. According to Omu (1967), Uche (1989), Daramola 
(2006), newspapers that followed Iwe Irohin constantly challenged and scrutinised the 
activities of the colonial powers. The papers also educated the people about the evils of 
colonialism and about the freedom to govern themselves. 
Uche recalled the first political newspaper, the Lagos Times. It was established in 1880 and 
started the first pitched press war between the Nigerian nationalists fighting for independence 
and the British colonial administrators, with editorials boldly challenging the establishment. 
According to Uche several other newspapers, emerging in the aftermath of the Lagos Times, 
also backed similar campaigns for change. Uche writes further: 
The argument can be advanced that without privately-owned press by Nigerians, the 
Nigerian independence could have taken a longer period to arrive… They became the 
agenda-setting media by fanning the air of nationalism. They heralded the dawn of 
political articulation, rallying the general public and teaching it what it meant to be 
sovereign in one’s own country (Uche 1989, pp. 93, 97). 
Also, confirming this ‘oppositional’ journalistic practice, Adigun Agbaje narrates that several 
attempts by the colonial powers to checkmate the protest media tradition were resisted by 
journalists whom he said, ‘consistently attack[s] the colonial regime, calling for indigenous 
participation in governance or subjecting its policies to vitriolic attacks’ (Agbaje 1992, p. 43), 
a situation which drew ‘harassment, prosecution and intimidation’ (Omu 1996, p. 15) from the 
colonial powers.  
As early as mid-19th century (1862), Fred Omu (1968) documents that the ferocious attacks on 
the colonial regime led to the introduction of a paper tax by Governor Freeman to curb what 
the latter described as ‘a dangerous instrument in the hands of semi-civilised Negroes’ (p. 288). 
The colonial administration introduced other repressive and discriminatory policies but which 
were stoutly criticised by the press. For instance, when Lagos was separated from Gold Coast 
(Ghana) in 1886, a governor was vested with powers to administer Lagos, and key government 
departments were dominated by Europeans to the exclusion of indigenous people. Calling for 
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constitutional reforms, Lagos Reporter, The Wasp and Lagos Weekly Record, each in their 
separate editorials, discountenanced this idea of a government without the governed and called 
for a proper legislative body to promote the yearnings of Nigerians (Ogbondah 1994, p. 29). 
Later, incessant attacks on colonial policies and the need for stability drove the administra t ion 
to try to whittle away the influence of the press: removing it from British Common Law under 
which it could enjoy protection, and subjecting it to oppressive laws (Oloyede 2004, p. 4). This 
marked the enactment of the first anti-press law – the Newspaper Ordinance No 10 of 1903 – 
used to prosecute the papers for sedition and libel (Omu 1968). If the law was intended to curb 
press hostility, it offered instead another avenue of attack against the colonial powers (Oloyede 
2004, p. 3). Unable to curtail the press’s war against its increasingly unpopular rule, the colonia l 
regime gradually acceded to the dismantling of its activities, beginning first with the period of 
self-rule6 or ‘period of decolonisation’ (Osoba 1996, p. 373) and leading eventually in October 
1, 1960 to the granting of independence.  
Scholars are in near agreement on how the press accelerated Nigeria’s independence, but there 
were also what might be thought of as some problematic aspects of this ‘wonderful’ press. 
These were mentioned but downplayed, understandably given the struggle against colonia l 
occupiers. They were, however, to rear their heads later and were issues the colonialists had 
observed. According to Golding and Elliot (1979), freedom fighters hid under the cloak of anti-
colonial war but feathered their political and commercial interests with the aid of the 
newspapers they established. To these ‘freedom fighters’, ‘journalism was a narrow avenue’ to 
advance their ‘political ambitions’ and the ‘flowering nationalism of these papers was 
consistently watered by self-interest’ (p. 29). Citing Coker (1960) they point to the fact that 
these paper men were not trained journalists: ‘The proprietors who fostered this party press 
were still professionals first, politicians second and journalists last. Ownership and control 
were in the hands not of trained journalists but of lawyers, doctors, chemists, businessmen and 
even surveyors and architects’ (Golding and Elliot 1979, p. 30). Chick also recalled that, once 
it was clear that colonialists were moving towards granting political independence, attacks on 
the colonial regime were ‘overshadowed by a struggle for succession [to power] in which 
politicians and newspaper men alike were deeply involved’ (1971, p. 116).  
                                                                 
6 This period between 1940 and 1960 was the period Nigerians were granted freedom to organise themselves 
into political parties and vie for elective posts, but the period was stil l under the British control until  1960 when 
the independence was granted. 
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As the scrabble for power by the Nigerian people intensified, the press became a veritable tool 
for political propaganda along sectional lines. An English journalist who visited Nigeria in 
1945 had sensed even then the impending political implosion among the indigenous people 
when he lamented that ‘a revolutionary native press … quite seriously threatens the stability of 
this part of the Empire’ (Chick 1971, p. 116). This was truer by the late 1950s. Broadly then, 
as self-rule beckoned, many scholars agree that the press became even more involved in 
divisive activities. Adigun Agbaje aptly captures the situation when he notes that ‘the press 
became so enmeshed in the struggle for political power that it found it virtually an uphill task 
to rise above the personal, political and ethnic acrimonies of the period’ (Agbaje 1992, p.144). 
Whilst the press, lit up by the ‘glory’ of independence, might still merit the appellation 
‘protest/nationalist’, I would argue that its glory was in fact fading even before formal 
decolonisation. Indeed, by the time independence was granted, any ‘protest’ or ‘nationalis t’ 
press was watered down by pervasive ethno-political allegiances. 
 
Rise of an ethno-political press 
As the preceding discussion reveals, the legacy of Iwe Irohin seemingly accentuated the pace 
of Nigeria’s political independence. However, with the process of decolonisation in the 1940s, 
there appeared a paradigm shift. While opinions diverge among scholars, a window into the 
political future of the role of the press was opened by the Governor General who, in an address 
to the Legislative Assembly in 1946, made a mockery of the ‘free’ press: 
Our Press is free – free to abuse, to sabotage effort, to kill enthusiasm, to impute bad 
motives and dishonesty, to poison the springs of goodwill and foul the well of trust, to 
impregnate the body politic with envy, hatred and, malice – in short, free to do the 
Devil's work (Chick 1971, p. 115). 
The sarcasm by the Governor-General may be dismissed as the ranting of a political figure 
whose administration is losing hegemony. Nevertheless, the crumbling of the solidarity of the 
hitherto united nationalists paved the way for personal, regional and political leanings; this was 
real enough. During this period of decolonisation leading to the 1959 elections ushering in 
independence, many newspapers were launched. These included, the West African Pilot of 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, mentioned earlier, and backed by his political party, National Council of 
Nigeria and Northern Cameroon (NCNC); in the North, Gaskiya Ta fi Kwabo was established 
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in 1945 metamorphosing into The Nigerian Citizen in 1948 and in 1949, Obafemi Awolowo’s 
Nigerian Tribune. While The Nigerian Citizen was linked to the Northern People’s Congress 
(NPC), Awolowo’s Nigerian Tribune was affiliated to his Action Group (AG) based in the 
Western region (Chick 1971, Omu 1978, 2000, Uche 1989, Okafor & Malizu 2013).  
This is the history and configuration of the Nigerian press referred to by Golding and Elliot:  
Nigerian journalism was thus created by anticolonial protest, baptised in the waters of 
nationalist propaganda, and matured in party politics. The separation of politics and 
journalism has remained incomplete and the dual allegiances of journalists to 
professional and political goals have created conflicts whose resolution in daily practice 
underpins much of contemporary Nigerian journalism (Golding and Elliot, 1979, p.31). 
What ‘matured in party politics’ was an ethno-political press, an ‘incomplete separation of 
politics and journalism’ and journalists with ‘dual allegiances…to professional and politica l 
goals. Notwithstanding, scholars of liberal hue were optimistic about the contribution of the 
press during the turbulent era of pre and post-independence. Seston Humphrey (1960) 
suggested that even before Nigeria’s independence “the press was independent…vigorous ly 
so. There is perhaps no press anywhere in the world so outspoken as that of this emerging 
nation” (Cited in Ogbondah 1994, p. 4). In his discussion of the theories of press control in 
post-independence, William Hatchen described the ‘Nigerian press of 1960 to 1965 as a unique 
phenomenon for black Africa: diverse, outspoken, competitive, and irreverent’ (1971, p. 165). 
Yet the governor general in 1946 and the concerned English journalist who visited in 1945 
were to some degree right in their assessments of the press. By January 15, 1966, a politica l 
crisis gave rise to the first military coup, taking the lives of the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa; 
Northern Premier, Ahmadu Bello; the Finance Minister Okotie-Ebor; the Western Region 
Premier Ladoke Akintola and other notable politicians (Chick 1971, Akinyemi 1972, Uche 
1989, Agbaje 1992, Oguibe 1998). Scholars are critical of the press suggesting that the role it 
played in the collapse of the First Republic was ignoble. Olayiwola lamented that ‘leading 
political party newspapers were not only locked in vicious combat but also provided 
remarkable examples of over-zealous, irresponsible partisanship and recklessness’ (Olayiwo la 
1991, p. 36). The use of obscene language and spread of fear among the populace were the 
fallout of political campaigns marked by bitterness, disagreement and no consensus, 
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particularly between the Azikiwe’s Eastern Outlook and the NPC’s Nigerian Citizen (Omu 
1978, Uche 1989, Agbaje 1992, Oloyede 2004). 
Nothing described the situation of the era more precisely than President Nnamdi Azikiwe’s 
criticism of the editor of Nigerian Citizen. In a scathing letter in July 1964, he accused him of 
“beating the tom-tom of tribal hatred” and added “. . . it seems that I have failed to bring home 
to journalists like you the disastrous role you are playing to disintegrate this nation” (Chick 
1971, p. 116). Paradoxically, this was exactly the sort of criticism heaped on Azikiwe and 
others by the colonial Governor General, who accused them of using their papers to spread 
fears and promote discontent among the people. Insisting that the press played a significant 
role in the collapse of the First Republic, veteran journalist, Anthony Enahoro comments that 
“whoever and whatever ruined Nigeria’s first Republic, did so with the active collaboration of 
the greater section of the Nigerian press” (Okafor & Malizu 2013, p. 87). From the tone of 
Azikiwe’s letter to the editor of Nigerian Citizen, his frustration over trying to hold the nation 
together, amidst active attempts by the press to destabilise it, is clear. Whilst Azikiwe’s distress 
is understandable given his responsibilities, it appears that he forgot his own legacy: of using 
the press as a potent tool to power. As Golding and Elliot note Azikiwe was the quintessentia l 
journalist-politician to reach high public office (1979, p. 31, my emphasis).  
The killing of notable state officials in the 1966 coup worsened an already complex situation. 
The coup was construed by the North as ethnically inspired since young Igbo officers, forming 
the bulk of the coup plotters, spared the life of the Eastern (Igbo) Premier, Michael Okpara, 
and another Igbo army commander, Major General Aguiyi Ironsi  took over power. Ironsi’s 
inability to bring the coup plotters to justice, further engendered the accusation that he was 
shielding his kinsmen. Hence a further counter-coup in July 1966 by Northern officers and the 
assassination of Ironsi (along with his host Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi, the military governor of 
the Western region) while on an official visit to Ibadan. He was replaced as head of state by 
Lt.-Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a Northern army officer (Akinyemi 1972, Obasanjo 1987, 
Oluleye 1990, Oguibe 1998). But with the assassination of Ironsi another bloodbath in the 
North ensued, with more revenge killings of Igbos leading to a secession attempt in 1967 by 
an Igbo officer, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, and declaration of the Republic of Biafra. The 
ensuing civil war, ended in 1970 but only after an Igbo death toll of more than one million 
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lives. This was genocide, though a UN report (at the instigation of the British) ruled against 
such an interpretation 7 (Oguibe 1998, p. 95). 
What role did the press played during the coups and counter-coups, the civil war and the death 
of so many Igbos? Chick recalled that tribal resentment between Hausas and Igbos, 
precipitating the drift into the 1967 civil war, was preceded by ‘provocative journalism of an 
alarming kind’ (1971, p. 116). Together with Azikiwe’s scathing letter to the editor of Nigerian 
Citizen and Enahoro’s lamentation about press partisanship, this suggests that the press was to 
some extent culpable. Uche (1989) further records that during the conflict the press became an 
instrument of war on both sides.  
 
A press undermined? 
Unfortunately, Lord Cudlipp's famous expression “Publish and be Damned” is taken 
seriously by many African journalists to mean absolute freedom to publish anything. 
Self-criticism is a quality for which the people of my own country are well known. 
Other African countries do it in varying degrees. But all too often, it is carried too far 
by journalists in Africa to the point of self-destruction. A news item or an editorial 
concerning government that would merely raise eyebrows in London can incite inter -
tribal riot or violent anti-government demonstration in an African country. It may bring 
down the government and where there is no organised opposition party or where it is 
not ready to be the alternative government, there will be anarchy (Jose 1975, pp. 259-
260). 
If there was any hope of an early resolution of a return to democracy after January, 1966, the 
bloody civil war (1967-1970) closed that hope. Instead, the military reign was consolidated. 
This was understandable. The human cost of the war as well as the heightened suspicion 
between ethnic groups, arguably made a military presence inevitable. However, there was no 
commitment either by the military or the press to bring the nation together and return the people 
to a participatory form of government. Having ‘won’ the civil war, General Gowon appeared 
                                                                 
7 The UK Guardian in its editorial of 11 October 1968, 'If not "genocide", sti l l  bloody', rejected the report of 
international observers that there was no genocide, but accepted a report by two Canadian MPs and quoted 
them: ‘If any foreign observer says there is no genocide in Biafra, he is either on the payroll of Britain or he is a 
bloody fool. If anyone wants to see genocide, he should come to Biafra ’. See A.B. Akinyemi:  'The British Press 
and the Nigerian Civil  War’ African Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 285 (Oct., 1972), pp. 408-426   
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to count on the continued support of the press in order for his government to quicken the 
recovery. Uche (1989); Oseni (1999); Uko (2004); Alimi (2011) point out that initially the 
relationship between the regime and the press was harmonious but in later years of his nine 
year rule, turned sour owing to the profligate expenditure of the military regime and its 
intolerance of criticism. There was, however, accusation (and counter-accusation) of 
corruption on both sides: the press attacked the regime’s intensifying corrupt practices , 
demanding that the military hand over power to civilians, and the military reacted to what it 
thought was the hypocrisy of the press by introducing measures to curb the latter’s criticism.  
 As far as the press is concerned, Ndaeyo Uko confirms that the allegation of corruption against 
it was true, but the regime’s attempt to hide its own was a means to try to prevent the press 
from acting and being regarded as a competent referee (Uko 2004, p. 82). Writing during the 
period of Gowon’s regime, Babatunde Jose, the Managing Director of Daily Times (quoted at 
the top of this section) went so far as to warn the press to be careful if further destruction was 
to be avoided (Jose 1975, p. 259). 
Uko’s acknowledgement of press corruption, but claim that it took second place to the larger 
corruption of the regime and to the requirement that the press be able to pursue ‘its crusade’ 
throws up two issues. In 1975 the Gowon regime collapsed in another military coup, with the 
press having played a ‘pivotal role’ (Olayiwola 1991, p. 36). It was not due to the press fighting 
for the public good – the Nigerian public and their democratic aspirations were, at one level, 
the least considered issue – but rather the upshot of a sustained campaign to bolster ‘the 
personal interest of either the proprietor or the journalists themselves’ (Jibo and Okoosi-
Simbine 2003, p. 182).  
The second related issue is that the actions of the press against the military back-fired, as Jose     
warned (1975): it paid dearly through harsh decrees, detention, closures and confiscation of 
publications and failed ‘in stopping the excesses of the military’ (Doyinsola Aboaba (later 
Abiola), former Managing Director of Concord Group of Newspapers cited in Uko 2004, p.73). 
This continued into the regime(s) of Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo8 both of whom 
                                                                 
8 The term Murtala/Obasanjo regime arose owing to the assassination of the head of state, General Mohammed 
in a bloody but failed coup of February 26, 1976. His deputy, General Obasanjo succeeded him, but did not alter 
the regime’s programme of action put in place by the late Murtala, particularly the transition programme 
originally scheduled to terminate in October 1979. Obasanjo followed the transition to the letter, hence the joint 
term ‘Murtala/Obasanjo regime’. This also led to Obasanjo becoming an ex-general who, as promised, handed 
over power to civil ians. 
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did not hide their intolerance of the press, ab initio. The regime unleashed a volley of harsh 
policies and laws on the press with the sole aim of subordinating journalists to military rule. 
Barely a month in office, August 31, 1975, the regime compulsorily acquired a substantial and 
controlling sixty percent stake in the influential, widely circulated and profitable Daily Times 
and took over the New Nigeria. To further control the press, a decree, ‘Public Officers 
Protection Against False Accusations’ (No) 11, 1976 was introduced and backdated to 29 July, 
1974 (Uko 2004). The latter meant that any publication which might have offended the decree 
in the previous year could also be sanctioned.  
Even before this decree, in what Uko described as ‘surgical precision of the regime’s 
clampdown on dissent’ (Uko 2004, p. 49), the government attacked the heart of the press, 
deliberately destabilising the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ). Sirajo Sidi Ali, President of 
the Union was barely five months into his second term of tenure when in 1975 whilst on a 
Union assignment to a Non-Aligned Journalists Trades Union meeting in Cuba, he was 
removed in absentia, at what he described as an ‘illegal convention’, with the result that the  
Union fractured. Recounting this low moment of journalism a quarter of a century later, Sirajo 
bemoaned the state of the press: ‘[it] had lost the moral and professional credibility of moving 
the nation forward and the NUJ ha[s] never recovered since this monumental reversal in 
Nigeria’  (Sirajo 1999, p. 19 my emphasis).  
The government also blocked an attempt to enshrine specific constitutional guarantees for press 
freedom. The Constitutional Drafting Committee, set up by the military in 1976 to draft a new 
constitution for the planned incoming civil regime, did not make special protection for press 
freedom. The Committee reasoned that ‘there are no grounds for giving any Nigerian citizen a 
lesser right to freedom of expression than any other person or citizen who happens to be a 
newspaper editor or reporter’ (Agbaje 1990, p. 206). Given Obasanjo regime’s crackdown on 
the press, it might puzzle observers how he was able to implement his transition and hand over 
to civilians. But then, the fact he was implementing the transition programme (fulfill ing 
public’s expectation), meant that the press didn’t matter to him. Perhaps, with the transition 
programme on course, it could be advanced that the press simply tolerated him. 
Thus the press which the newly elected democratic regime inherited in 1979 after thirteen years 
of military rule was bruised and sick: used and discredited by the Murtala/Obasanjo regime, 
factionalised into different political camps, legally curtailed and with a fractured NUJ. 
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The Playing out of Partisanship: Decline of National Interests 
Reminiscent of the period during the war of independence and decolonisation, in the Second 
Republic, further newspapers and magazines were established. But these were titles 
representing individuals and political pressure groups and aimed at promoting sectional rather 
than national political, social and economic preferences (Ogunade 1981; Uche 1989; Olayiwo la 
1991; Agbaje 1992; Oloyede 2004; Uko 2004). According to Uche, about eighteen newspapers 
were established between 1979 and 1983 (Uche 1989, p. 102). It might be thought that with 
the greater freedom of press enabled by the democratic regime, this flowering of titles would 
contribute to a mediated public sphere and strengthen democracy. Paradoxically, the impact 
was to hasten the collapse of the government and a return to military rule. According to 
commentators, the problematic aspect of this burgeoning growth was the intensified press 
partisanship (Olukotun 2002 p. 35; Agbaje 1992, pp. 186 – 198; Olayiwola 1991, p. 39; Uche 
1989, pp. 101-120), and a descent into an anarchic journalism began almost immediately. 
The election that ushered in the new civil regime was keenly contested by five political parties 
– Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP); the National Party of Nigeria (NPN); the Nigerian 
People’s Party (NPP); the People’s Redemption Party (PRP) and the Unity Party of Nigeria 
(UPN) – and marred by irregularities. The declaration was unsuccessfully contested in court 
by UPN’s Obafemi Awolowo and GNPP’s Wasiri Ibrahim, up to the Supreme Court (Agbaje 
1990, p. 211; Uche 1989, p. 104; Onwumechili and Nwokeafor 2000, p.189; Uko 2004, p. 50). 
Following the swearing- in of Alhaji Sheu Shagari, on October 1, 1979, newspapers controlled 
by opposition parties, especially the UPN, immediately reported that his government was 
illegitimate and continued to do so even after the judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court 
affirming the election.  
Both Uche and Agbaje record how this partisanship played out. In his account, Agbaje (1988) 
explains how Nigerian Tribune and Daily Sketch (jointly owned by states controlled by 
Awolowo’s UPN) refused to recognise the legitimacy of Shagari’s government and instead 
battled against his regime. The embarrassment caused to the regime by the papers’ bitter 
opposition was such that Awolowo intervened, asking his editors to accord Shagari respect. 
However, in response, the Managing Director of Nigerian Tribune, Tola Adeniyi, queried the 
statesmanship of Chief Awolowo and resigned over the latter’s refusal to endorse the 
continuation of his column ‘Till Death Do Us Part’. Awolowo believed the latter degraded the 
dignity and honour of the office of the president (p. 621). According to Uche, Chief MKO 
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Abiola, multimillionaire business mogul and prominent member of the ruling NPN (who 
incidentally hailed from the home state, Ogun, of the opposition leader Awolowo), founded 
National Concord on March 1, 1980 explicitly to promote the interests of the ruling party (Uche 
1989, p. 103). National Concord’s investigative activities into Awolowo were so damning that 
his socialist image was marred (Uche 1989). But the launch was also to aid Abiola’s own 
presidential ambition in the 1983 general election (Uche 1989, Agbaje 1992). 
In the event, Abiola’s aim to contest the 1983 presidential election was dashed when the party 
endorsed Shagari for a second term, contrary to the party’s zoning arrangement that allowed 
the other two tribes (Yoruba and Igbo) to contest the election. Abiola withdrew from the ruling 
party, switching camp to support Awolowo, his kinsman. National Concord followed suit and 
attacked Shagari’s policies while praising those of Awolowo. Dele Giwa, editor of the Sunday 
Concord, who had also written articles in praise of Shagari, also joined this new political train. 
In a U-turn article titled: ‘A Clarion call to Arms’, Giwa wrote: 
Having laid a bad foundation for his administration, aided and abetted by an 
unintelligent legislature, President Shagari began to drive the nation along a bumpy 
road. It has been a road strewn with corruption and unimaginable ineptitude that has 
led the whole country down the path until they were swallowed neck-deep in the 
poisoned ocean (Agbaje 1990, p. 215; 1992, p. 181). 
This episode in particular and the intensified partisanship more generally, made evident that 
newspapers were driven by individual interests and party agendas, not by public concerns or 
the national interest.  
 
Complicity with the Military? 
In his assessment of the situation, Uche concluded that the various positions taken by National 
Concord, on the one hand when it was supporting the ruling NPN and on the other after joining 
the opposition UPN, typified the chicanery of its editors. A critic summarised it thus: 
The image of the UPN leader which the Concord sold to the reading public is best 
summarised in the following attitudinal words and phrases which the newspaper used 
to describe Awolowo in many of its editorials: ‘aged and faded; truculent and irascible; 
naked; anarchist; tribalist; dictatorial; holier-than-thou; inconsistent; power monger; 
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illusionist; false image; and mischievous’. After its publisher had left the NPN, the 
image of Awolowo in the Concord changed to the following: ‘farsighted’; dogged and 
principled fighter; democratic; consistent’ (Uche 1989, p. 107). 
An unhealthy rivalry and competition was played out on the pages of newspapers. Though 
some newspapers were ostensibly independent (Adesoji 2010) the accounts of Agbaje and 
Uche above suggest otherwise. As one author confirms ‘the so-called independent newspapers 
were not so independent. They subjected their readers to all kinds of publicity about the politics, 
ideology and culture of their owners or of those who were close to them’ (Olayiwola 1991, p. 
39).  
Scholars have argued that the combined effects of partisanship on the part of National Concord, 
The Punch, Tribune and other newspapers eventually paved the way for another military take-
over of government in 1983. As an insider in the media told Agbaje, the press was also 
complicit in the coup that wrecked the democratic regime:  
We were so much part of the coup to the extent that if the coup had failed, we probably 
would have been implicated... One week to the coup, we got the list of the principa l 
actors. Twenty-four hours to the coup, Aboderin made some changes and told us to start 
working on stories on the assumption that (Major-General) Buhari would now emerge 
as the Head of State after the coup. We became so close to the coup planners that some 
of the data that we used to write anti-NPN editorials during this period were supplied 
by the coup planners (Agbaje 1990, p. 217). 
Though scholars agree that the civilian regime mismanaged the nation’s affairs and the 
elections were rigged by parties, a further disturbing aspect was that the media hastened and 
were often instruments in the military take-over, through their questionable reporting and 
conduct, their partisanship and rigging of election results.  In the build-up to the election 
National Concord’s warehouse was burnt down by suspected sympathisers of the ruling party, 
with the loss of a huge volume of newsprint. News media were involved in releasing falsified 
results in favour of their respective proprietor’s party. Aware  of  such practices  in Ondo State, 
an angry mob burned down the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) station for alleged ly 
announcing fake results awarding victory to the candidate of the ruling NPN (Graf 1985; Uche 
1989; Agbaje 1990, 1992; Olayiwola 1991; Onovo 1997). 
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Such actions by the news media seemed a far cry from the protest press of colonial times or    
the hopes for the press post-independence, but they make vivid the issues related to a 
predominantly ethno-political press in which the separation between politics and journalism/ 
political parallelism is limited; and market orientation and lack of professionalism were made 
manifest. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter engages with some of the key ways scholars and commentators have discussed 
the Nigerian press from its early days under colonialism. Most important is the idea of a 
‘protest’ press. During the war against colonial occupation the press was seen to wear the dress 
of an adversary and understood as paving the way for Nigeria’s independence in 1960. Without 
the press’s agitation, analysts argue, the freedom of Nigeria would have taken longer to 
achieve. In this way the press secured its place in history as a liberal press. This idea of press 
as protest, and adversarial, is also assumed to be necessary for the building of democracy. The 
idea resonates during the period which this thesis goes on to analyse.   
Secondly, however, is a counter idea: that the press developed in Nigeria as an ethno-polit ica l 
press and that it is associated with the lack of separation of journalism and politics which 
(allegedly) characterises a western liberal press. The former is a self-interested press often 
intent on serving owners and political parties, with journalists becoming political players not 
umpires. This press is seen to undermine the processes of democracy and nation building and 
be integral to military power gaining the upper hand. Its ‘reward’ from the military, however, 
is to be disciplined and curbed, further impeding the possibility of serving civil society.  
Evidence for this idea is manifest in the analysis of the press that the thesis goes on to present. 
Nevertheless, in terms of how scholars and commentators have represented press practice, as 
we shall see, it is the more romantic view of press as protest that prevails, in part because of 
the emergence of a so-called guerrilla press. 
What this chapter has also tried to do is offer a historical account of Nigerian developments up 
until 1983, and to make clear the historical parameters framing the press and press-state 
relations at the point the primary research for this thesis begins.  In particular it has highlighted 
the idea of the press at the epicentre of power and a political tool to be used by all sides. The 
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next chapter opens up the methodology adopted to try to refine the arguments scholars have 
hitherto proposed.  
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Introduction 
‘Discovery consists in seeing what everyone else has seen, and thinking what no one 
else has thought’. Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, Hungarian Biochemist, 1937 Nobel Prize for 
Medicine. 
The purpose of this study as explained in the introductory chapter is to revisit the period of 
military rule (1984 – 1999) with a view to unravelling what relationship existed between the 
Nigerian State and the Press in the battle to restore democratic rule. Germaine to this study is 
to contest the optimistic account that a liberal tradition of the press was in evidence and that 
perhaps, the press played a pivotal role in ending military dictatorship. This chapter therefore, 
outlines the research strategy adopted in order to explore this and related issues central to it.  
 
Research Questions 
A research question provides the researcher with a clear path through which the phenomenon 
can be unravelled. As Zina O’Leary puts it, ‘without the articulation of a good question you 
are travelling blind’ (O’Leary 2009, p. 47). Thus, in order to appreciate the central issue of the 
role/s of the press in relation to the restoration of the democratic order in Nigeria, and to guide 
me through the research and writing process, the following research questions have been 
formulated:  
1. Throughout the periods of military rule, did the Nigerian Press uphold the ‘fourth 
estate’ function? 
2. What role did the press play at moments of crisis and regime change? 
3. Were there differences in the relationship between the press and each of the regimes 
under study and at different moments within each regime? 
4. Were there differences in the behaviours of the newspaper titles in one or all of the 
regimes? 
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In relation to Existing Study 
As a key study upon which my study builds, Ayo Olukotun’s 11-year study State Repression, 
Crisis of Democratization and Media Resistance in Nigeria (1988 - 1998) (2002), undoubtedly 
captures historical moments of tensions between the State and the Press. The depth of his study, 
particularly the full account of the extent of state repression of the press is a compendium to 
reckon with. However, there are other issues the author failed to properly scrutinize and which 
renders this highly intellectual study less pungent on the concept of State/Press relations. 
Though the author analysed newspaper contents, mainly editorials and news stories, a detailed 
attention to the linguistic features in the language of the press would probably have resulted 
more in robust findings. This is the major area where my study differs from his. Other critical 
formats which this thesis incorporated, such as photographs and cartoons, but which 
Olukotun’s study did not reckon with, rob his findings of many hidden ideological practices of 
the press. 
The application of critical discourse analysis, (CDA) which my study employed, significantly 
builds on Olukotun’s study and reduced the prominent role assigned to the press, whose protest 
tradition the author insists was ‘in evidence’ during the period of his study (Olukotun 2002).  
Applying CDA approach would probably have led the author discarding or modifying 
Soyinka’s ‘magnificent and heroic’ trophy. I must admit however, that the application of CDA 
on media research in Nigeria is rare. This thesis appears to be a major attempt that pays detailed 
attention to the ideological use of language in media research, and of the role of visual materia ls 
in political struggles.  
Further, the study, by heavily concentrating on ‘calendar of repression’ (Olukotun 2002), not 
only made the press look more or less a victim, but also obliterates the underlying factors 
behind the crackdown on the press. It also waters the long term damage the press did to the 
democratic aspirations of the Nigerian people who bore the direct consequences of the former’s 
constant alliance with the military in subverting the will of the people. For instance, the author 
quoted The Guardian, admitting the press “bent over backwards” (Olukotun 2002, p. 92) to 
accommodate the Babangida regime. Had the press not bent for the military, but stood to 
uphold the ‘Fourth Estate’ function, the latter would probably not have annulled a ‘free and 
fair’ election in the nation’s history (The June 12, 1993, elections). Beyond quoting the 
sentence, a critical discourse analysis of the ‘bent over backwards’ admission, would have 
revealed its meanings and implications on the struggle for democratic order; and led the author 
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into holding the press culpable for the annulment instead of singling out the military. It is not 
in the tradition of a ‘protest/liberal’ press to defer to a military regime, seen as an aberration in 
terms of democratic trajectory. The non-application of CDA meant the author erroneously 
described this admission of culpability as ‘biting and defiant’ (Olukotun 2002, p. 93), Again, 
by not highlighting the fact that the press openly invited Abacha, despite his antecedents, the 
author failed to pinpoint the major defect of a supposed ‘protesting press’, which brought 
significant disruptions to democratic gains already achieved before the advent of Abacha. 
Another gap in the study, which this thesis filled, relates to the differences in the periods of 
study. While this thesis covers the entire period of military rule between January 1, 1984 and 
May 29, 1999 when democracy was established (sixteen years), Olukotun’s study period (1988 
– 99) does not include the Buhari regime (1984 -85),  part of the Babangida regime (1985 -87) 
or that of Abdusalami  (1998-99). The significance of these missing periods is that, the study 
missed out on some salient issues in State/Press relations: such as Buhari’s Decree 4 and its 
fall out; the assassination of Dele Giwa under the Babangida regime and the cloud surrounding 
the role/s of Giwa’s colleagues in his high profile death. Yet, the crucial moments when Abacha 
suddenly died, the intrigues and power-play leading to Abiola’s death, and perhaps the sea ling 
of June 12 annulment and finally the fixing of the transition leading to the emergence of a 
retired General Olusegun Obasanjo and ‘a low quality democracy’ (Diamond 1999) — all 
would have been crucial to the making of an authoritative study on State/Press relations in 
Nigeria. However, I hasten to add that the gaps might be connected to the usual limitations and 
constraints that every researcher encounters. What the author set out to do could also be a factor 
in the gap noticed. Notwithstanding my observations, Olukotun’s work provided me with an 
intellectual shoulder I leaned on to carry out this study. I would conclude that the study is 
powerfully arresting enough to stay permanently in the bookshelf of media research into the 
definitive years of democratic struggles in Nigeria.  
 
The Critical Discourse Analysis Approach 
In contemporary media research, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ (CDA) is one of the many 
qualitative methods, to capture abstract formal structures of news reports and their subtle 
underlying meanings (Van Dijk 1988). According to Norman Fairclough, who developed the 
framework, the method offers communication researchers ‘a framework and a means of 
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exploring the imbrications between language and social-institutional practices’ (Fairclough 
2013, p. V11). Rotimi Taiwo also argues that CDA is concerned with the ideological use of 
language both in speech and written forms, and therefore, ‘analyses discourse to find the hidden 
meanings’ (Taiwo 2007, p. 220). 
CDA, a ‘field of enquiry which employs procedures to identify ideological bias in texts’ 
(Widdowson 1995, p. 157), is highlighted in this study because of its relative approach to 
Nigeria’s media scholarship. Pennycook reinforces its importance suggesting that it goes 
beyond ‘focusing on the relationship between language forms and a limited sense of context 
(immediate surroundings, speakers' intentions, background knowledge, or conversationa l 
rules)’ towards addressing the ‘ideological dimension of discourse’ (Pennycook 1994, p. 121). 
Thus, paying closer attention to textual analysis will reveal hidden ideological meanings 
beyond the sentence.  
Data used for this inquiry comprised of press and interview materials. Across the seven 
newspapers and two magazines used, a total of 1031 press items were analysed. These 
comprised of articles (news reports, editorials, letters to the editor and op ed contributions); 
cartoons and photographs. Items selected were linked to events of national significance in all 
the four regimes studied between 1984 and 1999 – a sixteen year period. The general pattern 
for all the regimes was to first establish the State/Press relations during the first month of each 
of the regime in office. Then the second analysis focuses on the State/Press relations during the 
crisis periods and parting of ways. This enabled me to establish whether there were marked 
shifts in relations during the two periods. Thus, the press materials were narrowed down to the 
two moments.  These sixteen years of military rule, according to Larry Diamond represented 
years of ‘definitive struggles, a period of collapse into praetorianism and a politics virtua lly 
bereft of rules and institutions’ (Diamond et al 1997, p. 1).  
Already marked out in previous studies, these events then enabled the narrowing down of 
newspaper archives research. For instance, the annulled presidential elections that nearly led 
to a civil and ethnic war under General Ibrahim Babangida was held on June 12, 1993 and 
annulled by a presidential fiat on June 23, 1993 (Kwarteng 1996, Olukotun 2002). The civil 
disobedience that followed the annulment lingered on until General Babangida was forced out 
and an Interim National Government (ING) formed on August, 26, 1993. The items were then 
derived from the time Babangida came to power on August 26, 1985 to the end of September, 
1985 (first month in office), and June 1, 1993 to August 26, 1993 covering the periods before 
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the election, the election, the annulment and the crises that followed, leading to Babangida ’s 
exit. This method is replicated in each of the regime. 
 
The newspaper titles 
In exploring the research questions, seven newspapers and two weekly magazines were 
analysed. These are: The Guardian, National Concord, The Punch, Vanguard, Nigerian 
Tribune, Thisday and Champion. The magazines: Tell and TheNews. The newspapers and 
magazines were selected based on knowledge of their historical antecedents (as seemingly 
healthy adversaries of the State) with ‘a capacity for advocacy and adversarial haggling’ against 
those they consider ‘guilty of malfeasance’ (Olukotun 2002, p. 22). Their scholarly assessment 
as ‘independent’ and ‘fearless’ (Oloyede 2004, Adesoji 2010, Alimi 2011) would be useful in 
establishing the degree to which the press was really ‘magnificent and heroic’. 
For instance, with the exception of Thisday and the two weekly magazines established in the 
early 90s and engaged in the alternative media practice, other titles were linked with 
partisanship between 1979 – 1983 leading to the collapse of that democratic regime and the 
enthronement of military rule in 1984. The Nigerian Tribune, the oldest of the selected titles to 
survive many political upheavals was established in 1949, and has been historically linked with 
the politics of its proprietor, the late Obafemi Awolowo, former premier of the western region 
in the 1950s and the opposition leader during the second republic between 1979 and 1983. 
Thisday from its inception has been variously linked with many military generals, suggesting 
it was financed by the military. A particular author echoes this narrative describing its publisher 
as ‘maverick’ (Daramola 2006).  Though the two magazines Tell and TheNews were 
established in 1991 and 1993 respectively, their editors were no strangers to the political press 
of the second republic era. In fact, it was political disagreements with their respective 
publishers during the Babangida regime that led to the parting of ways and the founding of 
their own journals. Significantly, they were selected for symbolising the ‘guerrilla journalism’ 
that held sway particularly during the Abacah regime (Oyediran and Agbaje 1999, Olukotun 
2002). All the newspapers and the magazines share the same similarities – they were at one 
time or another proscribed and or their editors suffered one form of travail or another (arrest 
and detention, with or without trial; manhandling; confiscation of titles and instruments of 
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trade). This political background of the journals and their historical antecedents as papers likely 
to adopt ‘fourth estate’ model enabled me to narrow the sampling. 
Whilst employing critical discourse analytical approach in relation to the content of these 
selected newspapers and magazines, I also engaged in interviews with eight editors and three 
former state officials during the years under study. Quality inherent in interview as a method 
cannot be downplayed. Daniel Hallin’s groundbreaking study of the role of the America’s news 
media in the Vietnam War ‘The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam’ (1989) attests to 
the importance of interview in a research of this nature. Beyond a wealth of news materia ls, 
Hallin interviewed many of the journalists who reported the war. As the study reveals, far from 
being a consistent adversary of government policy in Vietnam, Hallin shows, the media were 
closely tied to official perspectives throughout the war. Divisions in the government itself and 
contradictions in its public relations policies, the study revealed, caused every administrat ion, 
at certain times, to lose its ability to "manage" the news effectively. The media only shifted 
toward a more critical view after public unhappiness and elite divisions over the war were well 
advanced (Hallin 1989). 
Of the eight editors interviewed, five are still currently serving, namely: Sina Oladeinde, Yomi 
Efunnuga (Features editor and Sunday editor of Nigerian Tribune respectively); Felix Abugu 
and Ehichioya Ezomon (Editor, The Guardian on Saturday and Deputy Editor Sunday 
Guardian respectively); and Bisiriyu Olaoye (Deputy Editor, Daily Champion). The three other 
editors are now retired but still maintain a role as columnists: Duro Onabule (former editor of 
National Concord); Mohammed Haruna (Former editor and later Managing Director of New 
Nigerian Newspapers and publisher, Citizen Magazine) and Moshood Fayemiwo (Former 
editor-in-chief/publisher of the defunct Razor magazine) now a Chicago-based author and 
publisher. 
The three former officials interviewed were: General Oladipo Diya, formerly a military 
governor under the regime of General Muhammadu Buhari (1984/1985) and later Chief of 
General Staff (Deputy Head of State) under General Sani Abacha (1993 - 1997) before he was 
arrested for ‘coup plot' against his boss. Interestingly, the two other officials interviewed also 
doubled as editors. They were appointed into governments while in practice. These are: Duro 
Onabule who served Babangida as Chief Press Secretary and Mohammed Haruna, former Chief 
Press Secretary to General Abdulsalami Abubakar. The experience and the views of the duo 
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on the subject of state/press relations, as former editors and later state officials, cannot be 
overemphasised, having been involved in the running of both institutions. 
By analysing the contents of the selected newspapers and magazines, I was able to gather first -
hand insight into what and how ideas and information were presented to the readers, focusing 
on language and visual matter. This enabled a closer exploration of the degree to which 
newspapers and magazines approached issues in the light of their alleged ‘fourth estate' role. 
The interviews with editors provided me with additional information, providing context, but 
also explaining the constraints shaping how a story came to be written in the way it was. 
Through interviews I was able to begin to open up the various relationships between press and 
state and their engagement with each other.   
An editor in a news organisation is the head of the news room who not only assigns reporters 
and correspondents to beats, but who also ultimately determines what material merits 
publication and in which position. By his unique position, an editor is often a known figure to 
state officials, as well as to businesses, and can use his or her position in editing news materia ls 
in such a way to favour some interests rather than others. Thus he may determine the wording 
of a story and in fact ‘doctor’ a reporter's original story to suit specific purposes. Interacting 
with those editors, enabled me to understand how the newspaper title is led from the top with 
the editor often significant in shaping editorial content, selection and framing of stories at 
critical moments. However, an editor can never maintain total control over news gathering and 
reports. 
Similarly, interviews held with the state officials revealed their perceptions of and engagements 
with journalists. More importantly, I was able to explore in a way that news content could not 
possibly open up, the reason/s behind the co-option of journalists into state affairs, their 
disagreements and the ‘parting of ways’ during periods of tensions, particularly under the three 
regimes of Buhari, Babangida and Abacha respectively. 
However, it is also worthy of note that the period of research (1984 -1999) is a long while ago 
and that temporal distance undoubtedly pose challenges to what the interviewees might still 
remember. In addition, it is likely that subsequent events will have shaped the way in which 
they respond to questions about issues in the past. This challenge was an issue I engaged with 
while interpreting the interview materials. 
63 
 
 
 
In order to partly address the issues posed by the lapse of time, I had carried out my library 
study of newspapers first before proceeding to the interview stage. This method described as 
‘Retrospective Panel Design’ (Rufai 2014) was employed. The design ‘uses some recollect ion 
techniques and devices to enable respondents recollect and reconstruct the order and sequence 
of past experiences/activities’ (Rufai 2014, p. 8). In this way, the news analyses provided me 
with a knowledge and familiarity with news stories and political issues in each of the periods 
of research. This then enabled me to draw-up appropriate questions and to be able to refresh 
the memories of the interviewees. I was able to take the interviewees back into the periods of 
the study, by references to specific newspaper coverage, quotes from speeches, mentioning 
individuals and specific events. This method enhanced their recollection and helped them in 
clarifying more clearly, past events, including statements they personally made in the past. 
 
The Field Trip 
With the suggestion from my supervisor that there might be an archive of Nigerian newspapers 
at the British Library, I set out to the British Library in London, where I was registered as a 
researcher. Following this, I proceeded to Collingdale, North London where the Library’s 
newspaper archive is situated. Unfortunately, the Library stopped collection of Nigerian 
newspapers in 1986 or thereabout, but I was fortunate to find both The Guardian and National 
Concord needed for my analysis of General Mohammadu Buhari regime. 
The research at the Library was smooth and stress-free. This was made possible by the 
modernisation of the newspaper archive. Newspapers were archived in microfilm format. Once 
I obtained the details of the publications needed from the Library’s web search, the staff then 
brought out the films containing the publications. The machine was easy to use and self-
explanatory. Notes were taken from page to page and photocopies of necessary pages made. 
Two days were spent at the Library to complete the research. 
Given the unavailability of other newspapers, it was inevitable that I carried out the library 
research in Nigeria. With my knowledge of the Nigerian system, I was able to choose the 
University of Ibadan (the first University in Nigeria) as my choice institution for the research. 
The University holds a newspaper archive dating back to the early nineteen century. Before 
leaving the UK, after approval was granted to proceed on the field trip, as many editors and 
former officials as possible were contacted via emails and phone calls, informing them of my 
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impending visit and the issues involved in the research. The response was encouraging. 
However, immigration issues delayed my trip as planned for late 2010. I eventually left for 
Nigeria in June 2011. 
After registering at the Kenneth Dike Library, University of Ibadan, I faced some problems. 
The papers were still in hard copies (unlike the microfilm format at the British Library) and 
they were piled on shelves across dusty stores. I had two options: to wait for the overwhelme d 
library staff to bring them out for me batch by batch, or to get to work myself, shifting the 
shelves. The first option was to be at the pace of the staff, so I decided to help myself. The first 
week was unpleasant as I suffered the effect of dust inhala tion. That option was abandoned, 
while I waited for the library staff’s assistance. The delays in the UK meant I arrived Nigeria 
during the torrential rain of that year which resulted in severe flooding. The University of 
Ibadan was badly affected, leading to my abandoning the university altogether.  
I then travelled to the National Library in Lagos, but the flooding in Lagos was also severe, 
leading me to journey to the National Library in Abuja. Unfortunately they did not hold many 
of the publications. I settled for the Nigerian Tribune Library, in Ibadan later on, and I 
employed a research assistant to help shift through the shelves. In the midst of all this, I fell ill 
and had to seek intermission (from Sussex) while still in Nigeria. I returned to the UK in 
December 2011 after six months, as my visa did not permit me to stay outside the UK for more 
than that. However, during the six month period, I was able to interview very few editors and 
officials as many were no longer available owing to my delay in arriving Nigeria, As a 
consequence, I returned to Nigeria again in December 2012/ January 2013 to complete the field 
work.  
Of the editors and officials interviewed, two were conducted by phone and email. The security 
situation in the North of Nigeria (Boko Haram terrorism) prevented me from travelling to 
Kaduna to meet the former chief press secretary to General Abdusalami Abubakar, Mr 
Mohammed Haruna. The interview was however conducted via phone on June 20, 2012, while 
I was in the UK. The former editor-in-chief/publisher of the opposition Razor Magazine 
(defunct), Dr. Moshood Fayemiwo, based in Chicago, US, asked for the interview questions to 
be sent to him via an email, which he later responded to. 
Others were interviewed face to face and recorded. Notes were also taken. All the editors were 
interviewed in their open offices while General Oladipo Diya (Abacha’s deputy) and Chief 
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Duro Onabule (Babangida’s chief press secretary) were interviewed in their homes. They both 
have sections of their compounds used to receive visitors. The recordings were transcribed 
using the facilities at the University of Sussex’s School of Media, Film and Music. As a prelude 
to the interviews, all the interviewees first sought to know what the topic of the subject was 
about. They were then availed with brief notes on the research topic and the specific issues of 
interest in each regime. Having been satisfied with the details of the inquiry, agreement was 
then reached and the dates for the interviews set9. The period of the interview also coincided 
with the heightened moment of politicking when issues being investigated became matters of 
public discourse. For instant, Generals Buhari and Babangida were in the news as presidentia l 
aspirants in the 2011 general elections. Buhari, who lost in the 2011 elections, is currently a 
presidential candidate in the February 2015 general elections. Their participation in the 
democratic process brought their pasts into public limelight. General Diya, Abacha’s deputy 
has also granted interviews on issues surrounding his alleged coup plot in 1997 against his 
erstwhile boss, Abacha.  Thus, the periods of the research (1984 – 1999), though a long time 
ago, became topical and as fresh as the periods they represented even in year 2014 when the 
thesis is written. 
As the above reveals, the constraints along the line undoubtedly caused delays in progressing 
the thesis and perhaps in the quality of some of the data. However, I recognized from 
interactions with other PhD candidates that research field work, particularly when it involves 
travelling outside the University base, often means overcoming obstacles and constraints. In 
the end, I felt that the data I acquired was adequate.  
 
Issues with Experiential Knowledge 
My familiarity with some of the news titles sampled both as an activist and a freelance writer 
in some of the years under study, provided me with useful insights into the activities of news 
staff (see Chapter One). Eight of the nine print establishments are located in Lagos while 
Nigerian Tribune is located in Ibadan, the Capital of Oyo State. I was born and raised in Ibadan 
while I had my university education as well as worked in Lagos for a decade. The Univers ity 
of Lagos where I graduated as a journalist is the first degree-awarding institution in mass 
                                                                 
9 All  the interviewees having been satisfied with the details and the nature of the inquiry, agreed to have their 
views and names published. 
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communication in Nigeria, and where a significant number of the leading newspaper and 
magazine editors were trained. I recall a module during my first year in 1996 ‘Writing for the 
Mass Media' (MAS 101), part of which was to write a publishable article in one of the dailies 
with a 10 points for those able to break through it. My piece ‘June 12: How are the Heroes 
Fallen'! was accepted and published by The Punch in January of that year. This background 
and some personal knowledge through the University of Lagos Mass Communication Alumni 
Association gave me access to the majority of the editors. 
Lagos, the former capital of Nigeria, as well as the commercial nerve centre of Nigeria, was 
also the base for the colonialists. Its air and sea ports are said to have been the hubs in Sub-
Sahara Africa (Mabogunje 1964).  On the other hand, Ibadan was the regional, and still remains 
the political capital of the Yoruba people of South-western Nigeria. Further Nigerian Tribune 
established in 1949 in Ibadan remains the longest newspaper to survive many political and 
economic crises in Nigeria. Indeed, no other newspaper of that period exists in Nigeria today. 
Ibadan was where the first television in Africa, Western Nigerian Television (WNTV) was 
established in 1959 (Uche 1989). It is these historical antecedents that earned the two cities the 
sobriquet ‘Lagos/Ibadan axis' of the Nigerian press. 
At this juncture, it is pertinent that I clarify my personal experience with the selected print 
media houses. Traditionally, a researcher has long been recognised as the ‘instrument of 
research’; the researcher’s pre-existing knowledge of the subject being investigated is deemed 
biased and should be separated from the study (Maxwell 1996, p. 27). However, notable 
scholars have differed with this notion. Mills (1959); Strauss (1987); Glesney and Peshkin 
(1992) all allude to the fact that a researcher's background knowledge is valuable to his study 
and should not be discarded. Mills in particular reasons that ‘the most admirable thinkers within 
the scholarly community do not split their work from their lives. They seem to take both too 
seriously to allow such dissociation, and they want to use each for the enrichment of the other’ 
(Mills 1959. p. 195). Maxwell adds that to ask a researcher to discard his work from other 
aspect of his life is to rob him of ‘a major source of insights, hypotheses, and validity checks 
(Maxwell 1996, p. 28). 
Alan Peshkin suggests that: 
The subjectivity that originally I had taken as an affliction, something to bear because 
it could not be forgone, could, to the contrary, be taken as virtuous. My subjectivity is 
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the basis for the story that I am able to tell. It is a strength on which I build. It makes 
me who I am as a person and as a researcher, equipping me with the perspectives and 
insights that shape all that I do as a researcher, from the selection of topics clear through 
to the emphases I make in my writing. Seen as virtuous, subjectivity is something to 
capitalise on rather than to exorcise... (Glesney & Peshkin 1992, p. 104). 
And Strauss, in what he terms experiential data (researchers' technical knowledge, research 
background and personal experience) echoes similar points, alluding to inherent potentials in a 
researcher’s background knowledge. He expatiates:  
This experiential data should not be ignored because of the usual canons governing 
research (which regard personal experience and data as likely to bias the research), for 
these canons lead to the squashing of valuable experiential data. We say, rather, mind 
your experience, there is potential gold there’ (Strauss 1987, p. 11). 
Consequently, my experiential data - knowledge of activities of news staff both inside of the 
newsroom and on beats before and during my university years; and my socio-polit ica l 
backgrounds – have been critically deployed to aid the quality of my inquiry. I also observed 
the useful suggestion by Reason (1988) to guide the use of my personal experience. He uses 
the term ‘critical subjectivity’ to advise researchers not to see ‘experiential data’ as a means of 
imposing their personal views on their research, but rather to critically appraise their pre-
existing knowledge in aid of the current inquiry. Reason describes critical subjectivity as ‘a 
quality of awareness in which we do not suppress our primary experience, nor do we allow 
ourselves to be overwhelmed and swept away along by it; rather we raise it to consciousness 
and use is (sic) as part of the inquiry process’ (Reason 1988, p. 12). 
 
Notes on newspaper formats 
I selected six press formats to analyse, namely: editorials; news headlines (mainly front page); 
news stories; photographs; cartoons; and op-ed articles. The formats that I have chosen are not 
exhaustive of available newspaper items, even as I reason that the possibility of looking at all 
the newspaper items would be a tall ambition. As discussed in chapter one, the bad state of the 
economy during the research period was such that most readers could not afford to by 
newspapers. Alternatively, the newsstand is besieged every morning as people gather to scan 
through headlines and in most cases tip the vendors to check on favourite pages, such as 
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editorial, cartoon or notable columns. This I personally practised on many occasions, and 
leading to a label ‘free readers association of Nigeria’ to mock those who harass vendors for 
free reading. Consequently, from this newsstand perspective arose my interest in the formats 
chosen for this study. It enabled me to narrow down on the aspect of newspapers to focus on. 
 The editorial format was chosen because it is the official position of a news title. The editorial 
is also seen as being more than a ‘word factory' because unlike news items which require 
prompt publication, an editorial is often a reflection after a news item has been published, thus 
providing more time for the editorial board to verify facts and engage in further debate on a 
given issue. A typical editorial board in Nigeria also parades people from other fields such as 
academia, business, religious body…. Perhaps this composition ensures that those in charge of 
the news process, who are propably under political and commercial pressures, are not the same 
people determining the position of the organisation on a given issue. This, it is believed, offers 
a more balanced view from a wider perspective. An editorial is ‘thus the judgement of the 
publication on a given event' (Agoro and Popoola 2005, pp. 26, 27; Hall 1978, p. 8). 
Beyond editorial opinion, insights were also gained from other formats that often add weight 
to reported issues of the moment. For instance, a news headline on the front page confers 
importance and suggests editors consider it prominent in attracting the attention of readers. 
Newspapers and magazines in Nigeria are mostly bought from the newsstand and from 
hawking vendors, and a number of ‘free readers’ (see Chapter One) also converge at newsstand 
to glance at headlines. According to Van Dijk, headlines have ideological implications; they 
are ‘a subjective definition of the situation, which influences the interpretation of the news 
report. Journalists may upgrade a less important topic by expressing it in the headline, thereby 
downgrading the importance of the main topic’ (Van Dijk 1991, p. 51). Scholars such as 
Althaus et al. (2001); Andrew (2007); Leo´n (1997) have also questioned the credibility of 
headlines in relation to articles they represent, suggesting they manipulate readers (Ifantidou 
2009, p. 700). 
The use of a photograph to illustrate a story also adds weight and gives it more prominence. In 
most instances, a news item with a photographic illustration gives the readers a sense of a life 
story. Sidey & Fox opined that ‘editors ... have to fight to hold as much as possible of their 
readers’ time and attention, and among their best weapons are their cameras’ (1956, p. 11). 
Zillmann et al adds that the motivation for the deployment of visual materials is linked to the 
‘presumption’ of their ‘desirable effects’ in the printed matter (2001, p. 302).  
69 
 
 
 
A cartoon is an artistic representation of a given issue often in a caricature form. It often tells 
more than a written story can reveal and has been a major tool in communicating importa nt 
views and emotions to the readers which cannot be said in words without censorship. At 
particular moments, cartoons have been a critical element in journalistic debate. In my research, 
cartoons have provided valuable insights and enhanced my analyses. Lamb (2004, 2007); 
Conners (2007); Eko (2007); Hammett (2010) all agree that political cartoons are used 
variously to criticise certain public figures, institutions and groups as well as to reinforce the 
political interests of others.  Cartoons are also thought to be used during electioneering to 
manipulate the voters’ opinion. In Nigeria in particular, Sani et al affirms the use of politica l 
cartoons to ‘set [the] agenda by mainly encapsulating current and sensitive issues that people 
are much concerned about’ (Sani et al 2012, p. 156) 
Other formats considered are news stories as well as articles by columnists. Articles represent 
the opinions of members of the public, but they are selected and edited by the newspapers. 
These opinions usually provide alternative views to those expressed by journalists on specific 
issues. 
The method of study I have adopted is to investigate in each case, the first 30 days in order to 
measure the press’s reaction in terms of acceptability or contestation of legitimacy. I then went 
on to explore certain key moments in each of the regimes, rather than try to offer a necessarily 
superficial overview of the whole of each regime. These moments represent what Larry 
Diamond termed ‘definitive periods’ (Diamond et al 1997, p. 2) of democratic struggles which 
reversed or delayed Nigeria's developmental efforts towards democracy and when the press 
could potentially play a critical role. For instance, in chapter four the crisis of confidence 
between the press and Buhari’s regime, and which became a public interest issue was the fallout 
of the enactment of Decree 4, which sought to control free speech. The annulment of the June 
12, 1993 general elections — the most credible elections in the nation’s history according to 
many commentators; and subsequent events (see Chapter Five); and the attempt by General 
Sani Abacha to transform from a military head of state to an elected president, without first 
resigning in 1998 (see Chapter Six), all shook the fabric of the Nigerian nation to the point of 
collapse. The death of MKO Abiola (presumed winner of June 12 elections) in detention (July 
1998) under General Abubakar was another moment when anarchy loomed large on the already 
volatile situation in the country. Comparable coups and counter coups also impacted negative ly 
on the integrity of the Babangida and Abacha regimes.  
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In each regime, I consider the military-press relations and how this relationship may or may 
not change during the different crises periods. The analysis reveals a complexity of relations 
between the state and the press.  
Specifically, the focus under General Mohammadu Buhari (1984 - 1985), was the regime's 
Decree 4, 1984 - Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) which resulted in the 
jailing of two Guardian journalists for publishing details of diplomatic postings before their 
official release.  The decree has been described as the most draconian of all anti-media laws in 
Nigeria since independence seriously impacting on the ability of the press to publish, let alo ne 
perform its ‘watchdog’ role (Uche 1989, Ogbondah 1994, Oloyede 2004, Alimi 2011). 
The analysis examines on the one hand, the first month of the regime in office (January 1 - 31, 
1984), after toppling the democratic regime of Alhaji Sheu Shagari on December 31, 1983. 
This is an attempt to analyse how the press reacted to the military takeover of the democratic 
government. I then examined the contents from February to July, 1984, covering the enactment 
of Decree 4, the arrests, detention, trial and subsequent jailing of the two staff of The Guardian. 
The two periods enabled me to establish the differences in the approach to news practice and 
the state of government/press relations before and after the crackdown on the press. National 
Concord and The Guardian were used for my analyses. 
Under General Babangida regime (1985 - 1993), I focused on the annulment of June 12, 1993 
presidential elections presumed to be won by the business mogul, MKO Abiola and described 
by both local and international observers as the ‘freest and fairest' in the history of Nigeria. I 
analysed the contents of two newspapers — The Punch and the Nigerian Tribune, first between 
August 27 and September 30, 1985, capturing the press’s reactions to Babangida coup. On the 
June 12, crisis, the papers’ practice was analysed between June 1, 1993 and September 30, 
1993. This period covered the prelude to the election, the presidential election held on June 12, 
1993 and the events leading to its annulment on June 23, 1993. It also covered the accompanied 
crisis leading to the eventual exit of General Babangida from power on August 26, 1993 and 
the handing over of power to an interim government headed by Ernest Shonekan. 
In the regime of General Sanni Abacha (1993-1998) the focus of my analysis was the attempt 
by the General to transform from a military head of state to an elected president but without 
first resigning. But again, I first analysed the moment Abacha took over from the three-month 
old Interim Government put in place by Babangida between August 27 and November 17, 
71 
 
 
 
1993. This was to measure the reaction of the press to yet, another military coup. The analys is 
of the press during Abacha’s attempt to transform into a civilian president covered a three-
month period from April 1998 when all the five registered political parties were lobbied to 
adopt the General as their ‘consensus presidential candidate' without any other candidate to 
contest the election scheduled for August, 1998. The analysis stretches into May 1998 covering 
the attendant crises on Abacha’s ambition, through to his sudden death on June 8, 1998 (in 
suspicious circumstances) (Olukotun 2002). How the press handled his sole adoption as a 
presidential candidate, his mysterious death and subsequent events were examined in two  
newspapers: Vanguard and Champion. 
Finally, under General Abdusalami Abubakar regime (1998 - 1999), my focus was on two key 
events: The death in detention, of MKO Abiola on July 7 while meeting American diplomats 
and the violent protest that followed. Also examined was the regime's transition programme, 
which culminated in the handing over of the reins of power to a democratically elected 
government. The analysis covered the entire regime from June 8, 1998 when General Abacha 
died to May 29, 1999. I explored whether the press was involved in the 'conspiracy theory' that 
MKO Abiola was murdered by the military and the foreign powers to 'balance the equation' 
following Abacha's death; necessary because it was June 12 and Abiola issues that led to the 
confrontation between the Abacha regime and the press and, almost, the collapse of the 
Nigerian State. Again, I explored whether the press welcomed the fresh military transition 
programme, considering the many failed transitions in the past. The electioneering, the 
election, the hand-over to a democratic government and the place of the press in that final 
moment of military exit from the political sphere were scrutinised. Four newspapers: Thisday, 
Champion, Nigerian Tribune and Vanguard and two weekly magazines: Tell and TheNews 
were used for my analyses. Unlike in the three other regimes where two titles each were used, 
six publications were used for the analysis of this regime. As the last regime that ended military 
rule and handed over to an elected government, a robust evidence of press cooperation or 
absence of it with the regime is germane to the overall conclusions that I draw. It would also 
give a broad representation of the press practice direction during the last struggle to enthrone 
democracy. 
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Limitation of Study 
As is the case with most research endeavours, a researcher is confronted with many choices 
and challenges which necessarily constrain what is possible. The particular methods adopted 
offered a rich approach to the topic but there were also limitations. I focused on a limited range 
of formats partly geared to thinking about the reader at the newsstand the ‘free readers’ who 
scanned through the headlines or tip the vendors to check specific formats such as editorial, 
cartoon and articles of prominent columns for his daily information or entertainment needs (see 
Chapter One). Would more careful attention to a range of news items and features throughout 
a paper have shown the title in a different light for example? I limited the news titles in each 
chapter/period and didn’t use any one title all the way through the years of military regime. If 
I had changed these parameters i.e. using all the titles in each of the regime, the analysis and 
findings might have been different. Talking to participants may seem to prove gold; yet, the 
human factor, the issue of memory and what can be recalled of an earlier time also come into 
play. Whilst I tried to refresh their memories of the events in the specific periods with the help 
of archive materials, including quoting their past statements, the fact that they were ‘players’ 
with certain interests, past and current ideas and identities, inevitably meant that I heard 
‘stories’: in effect, this wasn’t ‘nothing but the whole truth’. In the instance of this thesis, 
interviews with a wider set of witnesses — more editors/journalists and state officials might 
have opened up further issues about this ‘ethno-political’ culture and press relation to the state, 
and would probably offer me a plethora of views to analyse and juxtapose one against another. 
This might provide insights into current crises that still engulf Nigeria and the continuing role 
of the press in creating and transforming (or not) Nigeria into a ‘nation’. 
Since the struggle for democracy during the periods was spearheaded by a number of pro-
democracy and civil rights activists (academics, lawyers, unionists etc) who were neither state 
officials nor practicing journalists, their views perhaps could provide more insight about what 
they know transpired between officials and journalists at these critical moments. Again, since 
security operatives were involved in the arrest and detention of journalists, seizures of 
publications as well as closure of media houses, their knowledge of the intrigues between 
officials and journalists as well as who gave what order/s to them could be value-added as well. 
All these are limitations that cannot be overemphasised. 
Moreover, this thesis focused on the press (newspaper and magazine) for its analysis, to the 
exclusion of the electronic media — Television and Radio. Since they were more accessible to 
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the people than the newspapers, radio in particular, how these two powerful media of 
communications reported events during the periods, what influence/impact they exerted on the 
struggle and whether there were similarities and or differences with the print media philosophy 
is also acknowledged as a limitation to this study.  
 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have outlined the processes involved in carrying out this research: the research 
questions; the methodological approach, in particular Critical Discourse Analysis; the design 
as well as the constraints encountered during the field work. The chapter also outlined the 
limitations of the study which subsequent research could take into consideration. Significantly 
however, the chapter highlights the application of critical discourse analysis approach as a 
major departure from the way in which media research has been carried out in Nigeria. This 
approach, together with other formats that have not been adequately captured before now in 
the Nigerian context (headlines, photographs and cartoons) will assist in establishing the degree 
of validity of Soyinka's claim about the ‘magnificent and heroic’ trophy. The hidden facts 
arising out of this approach as well as the significant contribution to the existing knowledge 
have been pulled out. In this regard, this study will contribute to the burgeoning literature on 
the military-press relations in Nigeria as well as put into perspective, the complexity of social 
struggles in the Nigerian socio-political and economic history. The content analysis and the 
interview materials hopefully casts light on the pressures exercised by arms of the state on the 
press and the complex of factors which gave rise to a press which unevenly took up its role of 
acting as a 'fourth estate'.  
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Introduction 
In a somewhat critical self-appraisal, William A. Thomas, former editor of the New York Times, 
piqued: 
The one thing the Press covers more poorly today than anything else is the press itself. 
We don’t tell our readers/viewers or listeners what we do or how we do it. We don’t 
even admit our mistakes unless we are virtually forced to under threat of court action, 
advertiser, public opinion or public embarrassment. We do not attempt to explain our 
problems, our decisions, our news coverage and presentation, our fallibility, our 
procedures of monitoring governance and making them acceptable to the public. Yet, 
we try to put corrupt public officers on trial (Akinfeleye 2003, p. 27). 
In chapter two, I discussed the flowering of press during the democratic regime of Shagari 
(1979 -1983) and the partisanship and recklessness that went along with it, leading eventua lly 
to the collapse of the regime and a return to military rule. The argument I have made is that the 
individual press titles promoted personalities and party preferences, at the cost of a nationa l 
agenda which was in a state of precariousness. As a consequence, though the military was in 
partnership with the press during the period of planning and execution of the 1983 coup 
(Agbaje 1990), the former was also mindful of the latter’s diabolical role in the crisis that 
rocked the ill-fated civilian regime. On assuming power, the regime’s preoccupation was to 
restore national stability, economic recovery and stem corruption (Idiagbon 1984, Diya 2011). 
In doing this, notwithstanding the leading role played by the press in stabilising the Buhari 
regime, the latter did not shield the press, rather attempted to sanitise its partisanship and 
corruption. According to Oladipo Diya, a military governor at the time, this was to make the 
press ‘straightforward, fearless and unambiguous’ (Interview on October 10, 2011). 
Historically, there were antecedents for draconian laws and extra-legal and administrat ive 
policies to control the press, dating back to colonial and post-colonial civilian and military 
regimes (Omu 1978, Ogbondah & Onyedike 1991, Agbaje 1992, Oloyede 2004), but less than 
two years into power, Buhari attempted to rid the press of its corrupt tendencies.  In particular 
Decree 4 1984, ‘Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusation), which punished any 
journalist who violated its provisions, has been described as the ‘most dreaded’ and ‘most 
repressive’ of press laws in Nigeria (Ogbonda and Onyedike 1991, p. 61).   
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In exploring the relationship between the regime and the press, two newspapers, National 
Concord and The Guardian were analysed. As detailed in the methodology chapter, the periods 
of my analysis cover the first month of January, 1984 when the press heralded the regime and 
rallied the public behind it; and between February and July 1984 when the ‘honeymoon’ was 
said to be over (Oladipo Diya, October 10, 2011). This occurred with the arrest, prosecution 
and conviction of two staff of The Guardian for violating the provisions of Decree 4, when 
they published the ambassadorial list yet to be approved by the government. To aid my analys is, 
I propose four questions: did the press not only collaborate with the military to topple a 
democratic regime but also further legitimise it through its coverage? Was the press 
disingenuous in supporting Buhari’s corruption crusade, i.e. expecting that the press itself 
would be exempt? Similarly, in relation to Buhari, was he perhaps overconfident in trying to 
enforce press responsibility and foist a ‘developmental’10 model on the press? If Decree 4 was 
a violation of press freedom was it also a necessary and inevitable reform of the press?  
My analysis of the relationship of the two papers with the new military regime is geared to 
considering whether the new regime faced a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ in the contestation of 
hegemony between it and the press.  To explore this, I first analysed the one month of press 
coverage of the regime’s activities (January 1st – January 31st, 1984). 106 items were 
examined in The Guardian while 98 items were reviewed in the National Concord, comprising 
editorials, front page news headlines, articles, photographs and cartoons.  
 
Supporting the Change of Government 
In its January 2, 1984 edition (48 hours after the coup), and to indicate the importance of the 
event, National Concord’s editorial: ‘Verdict 83’ appeared on the front page taking up a third 
of the page and continuing on page two where it took up a further half page. It was very critical 
of the deposed democratic regime, and described the sacked government, its officials and 
supporters through the following less than flattering phrases: 
                                                                 
10 The central theme of developmental model is that the press should partner the government in carrying out 
programs for improving economic and social change, particularly in societies beset with obstacles to 
development. For a country as diverse as Nigeria, the case for this model is more a pt. ‘The diversity of Nigeria, 
the self-seeking tendencies of the populace, and the history of ethnic, cultural and religious antagonism could 
easily split the country apart. The country continually has to promote coherence and unity to prevent anarchy. 
A factious press is counterproductive’. See Seng & Hunt ‘The Press and Politics in Nigeria: A Case Study of 
Developmental Journalism’. Boston College Third World Law Journal. Volume 6, Issue 2, 1986. 
77 
 
 
 
Dead government; rosy cheeked flatterers; sycophants; hustlers, ruffians, crass 
ineptitude of leadership; power hungry aides; vulnerable to flattery; a pathetic victim 
of casuistry; megalomaniacs; hoarders; profiteers; shylock middlemen; currency 
traffickers.... (National Concord, January 2 1984, pp. 1 & 2). 
In contrast, National Concord advised the new regime to be dedicated to the cause of the 
common people, unequivocally assuring it of a ‘large reservoir of public goodwill’. In a 
symbolic show of partnership, the editorial went further to set two ‘urgent tasks’ for the mili tary 
regime to tackle: ‘corruption and economy’. In its determination to ensure the military punished 
former officials, the editorial demanded the government ‘track down’ corrupt officials of the 
sacked regime, ensure they ‘disgorge their loot’ and be ‘punished for their crimes’ (National 
Concord January 2, 1984, p. 2). 
Given the scathing phrases deployed to describe the ousted democratic regime, the paper leaves 
an arresting impression in the minds of its readers that, democracy was, after all, bad. Assuring 
the military, without obvious evidence, of ‘a large reservoir of public goodwill’ was to hand 
the military an unqualified and immediate legitimacy. 
In a further twist that seemed to confer credibility on General Buhari’s coup and discredit the 
1983 general elections, National Concord likened the new military regime to a democratica lly 
elected government when it concluded assertively: 
The new government would be right to feel that the verdict it delivered on Saturday 
(December 31, 1983 coup) is the verdict of the people, the authentic Verdict ’83 
(National Concord, January 2, 1984 p. 2). 
The editorial was given further impetus by the rest of the front page which carried news on the 
coup. The major story in a large and bold headline was titled: ‘ILL-GOTTEN MONEY WILL 
BE RECOVERED’ with a rider, ‘Says new regime’. Another small story: ‘SMC members 
named’ carried the names of appointed Supreme Military Council members. The final story at 
the right top corner is the National Concord’s usual ‘Thinking Corner’ short item which also 
tied in to the issue of the moment. It read: 
Time magazine has voted US Ronald Reagan and the ailing Soviet Yuri Andropov men 
of the year. Reason: they are the only two people who possess the key to the peace and 
stability of the world. They are also the men, who if the fancy catches them, can blast 
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the world into pieces. So, there is no place for our own man of peace and stability?  
(National Concord, January 2, 1984, p. 1, my emphasis). 
It would seem that the last statement is referring to the new military Head of State, General 
Buhari as Nigeria’s own ‘man of peace and stability’ who should also be declared ‘man of the 
year’ along with Ronald Reagan and Yuri Andropov. With this declaration a few hours in 
power, and juxtaposing Buhari to the world’s two most notable leaders, National Concord 
appeared to be powerfully convincing Nigerians that the replacement of the democratic regime 
with military rule was epochal, in fact democratic, and to be welcomed.  
However, this antagonistic and negative perception of the deposed regime and the positivity 
attributed to the untested military regime both in the editorial and in all the front page headlines 
fly in the face of historical facts. Retrospectively at least, it seems scandalous reporting. How 
could a coup d’état be described by journalists as the ‘verdict of the people’? How could a 
democratically elected regime validated by the Supreme Court be described in such vilified 
and visceral terms? Such a regime was a world apart from one that came to power through the 
force of arms.  
More disturbing in relation to National Concord’s position, from the historical standpoint, is 
the fact that the press partisanship was linked to the military takeover of the post-independence 
democratic regime (1960-1966) but, also precipitated a civil war (1967-1970) that claimed over 
one million deaths of Nigerians of Igbo extraction and engendered the polarisation of the nation 
along ethnic lines (see Chapter Two above). In the aftermath of this war Nigerians agitated  
against the military regimes for a return to civil rule, leading eventually in 1979, to the hand-
over to a democratic government. Thus, in spite of the comparative recency of hostility towards 
military regimes, the paper set for itself the role of an advocate with the aim of achieving 
stability for the regime. 
Advancing this advocacy, beneath the editorial on page two, is a cartoon showing party goers 
apparently celebrating the take-over, with a sign reading ‘L’AGBO PARTY’ (meaning ‘at a 
party’). Foregrounded amidst the merrymaking is a man with a protruding pot belly, referred 
to in the caption: ‘See what free food has done to Salisu — He never had his belly so full since 
austerity!’  
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Figure 1: Cartoon from National Concord January 2, 1984, page 2 
In line with the editorial which describes the coup as the ‘people’s’ verdict’, the cartoon was 
an effective way for National Concord to ignite celebrations among the people. It reminded 
the populace about the shortage of food under the previous regime: the ’pot-bellied’ Salisu a 
metaphor for food security in the new regime. Even though, the regime had only existed for 
forty-eight hours, that Salisu became so well-fed and a symbol of food security was either 
hyperbole or a symbolic promise for the future.  As Taiwo Sanni et al posits that politica l 
cartoons can serve as a tool for manipulating public opinion (Sanni et al 2012, p. 1); in this 
case, National Concord is attempting to seduce Nigerians into accepting the new order as a 
better one.  
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In effect, the paper sets itself up as a willing agent of stability for the new government, and 
thus formed a pillar upon which the new regime could rely. National Concord had already 
mastered the art of shifting allegiance whenever it was deemed appropriate (Uche 1989). Its 
publisher – MKO Abiola – left the ruling NPN before the 1983 general elections to return to 
the opposition camp, but with the failure of the UPN to win the election, it was no surprise that 
the paper then worked to enthrone military rule, rather than be ruled by those its publisher had 
described as mediocres (Uche 1989). Its incisive first editorial on the first page backed by pro-
military headlines all over the front page and a powerfully arresting cartoon – all designed to 
reinforce a positive image of the new military in which its readers could share. The paper 
provided red-carpet ascension into power for Buhari.  
In The Guardian, the situation was not much different. The paper reflected its preference for 
the new regime by flooding its first edition of January 1, 1984, with news stories highly critical 
of the ousted democratic regime, but very supportive of the new one. Its reporters, who 
travelled round town on the coup day, wrote about the ‘excitements’ among the populace. A 
pertinent analysis of events written by reporter Bayo Onanuga was titled: ‘The futility of 
Nigeria’s elections’. While declaring the outcome of the 1983 elections as ‘a tragic defeat of 
the noble ideals of a people’s government’, the reporter, who later became one of the ‘radical’  
editors (Olukotun 2002) opposing the military, pungently prophesied a long military reign. He 
wrote; ‘the traumatic experience of the elections made some Nigerians conclude that 1983 
might be the end of representative democracy — at least for a while’ (The Guardian, January 
1, 1984 p. 3).  True to this prediction by Onanuga of a long reign, the press then went on to 
‘entrust better governance’ to the military as the only ‘patriotic institution’ capable of restoring 
people’s confidence in governance (Interview with Felix Abugu, editor of The Guardian on 
Saturday, January, 16, 2013) – for the next sixteen years. This paper is often referred to as 
independent and identifies itself as the ‘flagship of the Nigerian press’ (Ogbondah 1994, 
Olukotun 2002)  
The ‘entrust’ Abugu refers to was in response to a question on why the press had historica l ly 
been supportive of the military in spite of the latter seen as an aberration from any democratic 
trajectory. He explained that since the political class failed to show responsibility, the military 
was then ‘entrusted’ with the responsibility of ‘flushing’ out ‘corrupt politicians’ and 
organising another transition to bring in fresh officials. This ‘entrust’ was visible in The 
Guardian in the first week after the coup. The paper ran editorials on a daily basis that were 
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highly suggestive of an alliance with the military. It adopted an advisory role spelling out policy 
directions and the type of personalities to be appointed into government.  A particular editorial 
titled ‘Must not be a mere change of guard’ ran to four parts between Monday, January 2 and 
Friday, 6 1984. While commenting on the malaise of armed robbery (prevalent in the previous 
regime) in the third part, the paper asked the regime to start thinking of a more radical (indeed 
startling) means of dealing with this problem: 
Those who advocate the return of public executions as deterrent may just have a point, 
provided that these executions are not seen as ends in themselves, but rather as part of 
a larger socio-economic programme to stem the problem (The Guardian, Thursday, 
January 5 1984, p. 6). 
Could this be part of why The Guardian preferred the military – the inability of the last regime 
to execute armed robbers? Ordinarily, a military regime by its orientation would tend to be 
punitive in dealing with social problems. But whilst the prevalence of armed robbery was 
undeniable under the past regime, it was perplexing that The Guardian ‘indisputably the best 
newspaper ever produced in Nigeria’ (Omu 2000, p. 60) defended and legitimated ‘public 
executions’ of the perpetrators; especially since in the past such a punishment had been 
opposed by public opinion. Buhari actually implemented this policy with attendant 
condemnation from the civil populace. I personally recall going to a particular field (Polo 
Ground, Ibadan) where robbers were executed by soldiers. Spectators usually screamed at the 
sounds of gun shots. Interestingly, however, as the press and the regime later parted ways, the 
former then latched on to the unpopularity of this policy (among others) to rally the public 
against the latter! 
But to return to the first days of the regime, the paper actively charged Buhari to get going: 
General Buhari must get cracking. The ability to make an impact will depend on the 
discipline which he and his team are able to instil in our nation’s consciousness. And 
he must begin now. The people will make the sacrifice needed to begin to see us through 
(The Guardian, Thursday January 5, 1984 p. 6). 
Like the National Concord’s promise of a ‘large reservoir of public goodwill’ (p. 77 above), 
this editorial promised the regime that the people would make the necessary ‘sacrifice’.  It was 
a classic example of how the press, having installed Buhari, then strove to set the agenda for 
the regime. To The Guardian, it appeared that five days in power, Buhari was slow and 
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indecisive in his dealings with the public. ‘Get cracking’ is, therefore asking Buhari to show 
his military strength. Indeed, the fact that most suggestions to be firm and decisive in tackling 
the social malaise were coming from the press, arguably served as an impetus for Buhari to 
employ military codes of practice in dealing with the nation’s problems. Ironically this included 
tackling corruption in the press. At this stage, however, The Guardian clearly did not envisage 
that such treatment would be applied across the board and without any preferential treatment 
for journalists and the press. It is pertinent to note here that the issue of a partisan press as a 
factor in the rationale for Buhari’s ‘rigid’ rule and draconian measures has been largely ignored 
by scholars who too simply regarded Buhari as ‘dreadful’ (Ogbondah & Onyedike 1991). 
Again, in what seemed like a celebration of the ‘gun’ over the ‘ballot box’, a cartoon 
humiliating and mocking ousted President Sheu Shagari and the members of the disbanded 
national parliament appeared on The Guardian of January 9, 1984. It showed a soldier with a 
barrel frog-matching a hand-cuffed Shagari out of the State House, parliamentarians out of the 
National Assembly and some senior civil servants out of the ministries. A member of the public 
stood at a distance, mocking the officials: ‘At last’; ‘That’s it’ and ‘verily, no condition is 
permanent’. 
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Figure 2: The Guardian, January 9, 1984, p. 6 
In portraying the officials of the sacked regime as criminals, the cartoon legitimates the military 
action taken by the new regime, and arguably makes whatever happens to them acceptable to 
readers. (This communication parallels that in National Concord’s editorial of January 2 in 
which the officials were described in unflattering phrases. Further it echoes the front page story 
which called on the military to ‘disgorge’ the loot from the officials). By representing ex-
president Shagari in handcuffs The Guardian cartoon also communicates directly to Buhari: 
the officials were guilty, they should be severely punished thus foreclosing any fair trial for 
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them. Again, Buhari latched on to these suggestions by the press, sentencing some politic ians 
to as high as 200 years in prison after trials at special courts.This attempt by The Guardian and 
other media on the question of the Shagari regime without sound evidence or with allegat ions 
that were sometimes ‘inane’ (Jibo 2003, p. 222), is a common semiotic device adopted by 
cartoonists to communicate a viewpoint. Ray Morris remarks that ‘caricaturists sometimes 
claim to substitute inner for outer appearance, revealing by exaggeration and distortion the 
"true" character of the person portrayed. In doing so, they implic itly claim access to inside 
knowledge and a position that the person skimming their cartoons in the daily paper lacks’ 
(Morris 1993, p. 196). Thus, in this cartoon, but also in The Guardian more generally, 
democracy under Shagari was ‘fraudulent’ needing to be done away with, along with its 
characters. Given the opposition of The Guardian and other ‘largely southern based’ 
newspapers to the 1983 re-election of Shagari (having preferred Awolowo to win, see Chapter 
Two), it was a ‘no win situation for Shagari’ (Interview with Duro Onabule, October 7, 2011). 
Historically, it has been a common feature for political cartoons to attack political leaders. In a 
pertinent feature story from a Nigerian daily, National Mirror, its head of Judiciary desk, 
Francis Famoroti, traces the use of cartoons as a tool of political struggles. He refers to a 1961 
libel case involving the West African Pilot owned by president Nnamdi Azikiwe and three 
opposition leaders, Obafemi Awolowo, Ladoke Akintola and Rotimi Williams [cited as Hon 
Rotimi Williams & others v. West African Pilot, 1961] (1961) 1 All NLR 886). Ten cartoons 
ran between February 2 and April 7, 1959, depicting the leaders as ‘unworthy characters’. 
Awarding £3,500.00 damages to each complainant, Justice Olujide Somolu of the High Court 
of Western Region declared: 
It is culpable enough if these charges are levelled against any citizens, but it becomes 
very much reprehensible when they are laid at the door of highly placed public men 
without just cause and against men in the foremost places of their professions as is 
agreed even by the defence (National Mirror, Monday 24 March, 2014, p. 1). 
Whilst The Guardian in 1984 was trailing a similar political path to discredit Shagari’s 
democratic regime and portray the military as the messiah the country needed, its actions were 
without legal redress – at least at the time. This political affinity or alliance between press and 
certain governments has troubled the Nigerian press since the colonial days and continues to 
haunt what ought to be its umpire role in the nation’s affairs. Golding and Elliot both note that 
‘the separation of politics and journalism has remained incomplete and the dual allegiances of 
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journalists to professional and political goals have created conflicts whose resolution in daily 
practice underpins much of contemporary Nigerian journalism’ (Golding and Elliot, 1979, 
p.31).  
To continue with the January 1984 coverage, in a further series of editorials, cartoons and news 
both papers were unrelenting in their efforts to encourage the regime to take more drastic 
measures, notwithstanding the fact that the recommended measures could result in the use of 
extra-legal means and breach human rights of the citizens. For example, with the mass arrests 
that followed the coup, some senior figures in the sacked regime escaped abroad. The papers’ 
line was to induce the new government to go after them. National Concord’s half page editorial 
of January 14, 1984, on page two titled: ‘Concern over escapees’, lamented that their 
‘continued freedom hampers the task of retrieving the stolen funds’ and asked the military to 
‘employ whatever means are necessary, and pay whatever price is possible, towards bringing 
the fugitives to book’. Another editorial on January 18, 1984, page two titled: ‘The fugitives’ 
advised the government to initiate legal and diplomatic processes with the foreign countries 
hosting them, with a view to extraditing them home for trial. Sensing that many countries might 
not be willing to hand over the officials to the Nigerian government, due to concerns over 
human rights, the editorial chillingly recommended that:  
If all such measures prove ineffective towards achieving the desired goal, the 
government should feel no compunction in embarking on extra-legal and extra-
diplomatic approaches towards ensuring that justice is done, and seen to have been done 
(National Concord January 18, 1984, p. 2). 
These ‘extreme’ recommendations by the press symbolically highlight their rejection of the 
previous democratic regime and their alliance with the military. 
Strikingly, and in what strongly suggested collaboration among the newspapers in their defence 
of the Buhari regime, both The Guardian’s and National Concord’s editorials attacking foreign 
media appeared on the same day, January, 17, 1984. Given the position of Nigeria as the most 
populous black nation in the world as well as being a ‘strategic partner’ of the western powers 
in terms of oil supplies to the global markets, as well as peace-keeper in Africa (Clifford 1984, 
Baregu and Landsberg 2003), it is not surprising that the coup and its aftermath attracted the 
attention of the international community, drawing stringent criticism from foreign media.  
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However, in turn, as they consolidated their advocacy role for the government, The Guardian 
and the National Concord criticised the foreign media positing their judgments on the coup as 
unnecessary interference. In a hard-hitting editorial, which took up a half page, National 
Concord picked holes in the Western media’s negative reactions to the coup. Specifically, it 
accused The Times, London, of ‘abysmal ignorance’ about the terrible situation of Nigerians 
under the deposed regime. The Time’s magazine story, which argued in support of democratic 
governance in Nigeria, was described by National Concord as an attempt to defend the sacked 
regime – a ‘western ally’. The editorial declared:  
Beyond their betrayal of crass ignorance and their hypocritical lamentations over a 
democratic paradise lost, the reactions of the Western media properly perceived 
actually mirrored the grief of their home countries over the demise of a government in 
which they saw a faithful ally (National Concord January 17, 1984 p. 2). 
On its part, The Guardian railed against what it called ‘alarmist editorials’ of some western 
media, querying what the West meant by ‘failure in Nigeria’ and accused the Western press of 
ignoring the ‘farcical exercise’ that the 1983 elections typified. The paper also suggested that 
the West was supporting a ‘democracy’ in which a ‘chunk of the nation’s wealth looted by the 
former officials has been transferred to the safe havens of Western Europe and North America’. 
The editorial concluded bitterly: 
We are left at the end with a patronising and mischievous western interpretation of 
‘democracy’ as it has affected the Nigerian situation: a footloose license by a nationa l 
ruling class to steal and export a country’s wealth in active co-operation with ever-
prosperous western companies (The Guardian, January 17, 1984, p. 6). 
While the above editorials might have been aimed at preventing foreign interference in 
Buhari’s regime, the United Kingdom’s perceived interest in Nigeria’s democracy and 
criticism of military rule, is pertinent given that the majority of the officials of the former 
regime escaped to London and attacks on the Buhari regime were mobilised from there. Among 
the escaped top officials in London were the Transport Minister, Umaru Dikko, the Attorney-
General and Minister of Justice, Richard Akinjide, the ruling party’s national chairman, Adisa 
Akinloye and several governors. The ease with which they all escaped to London despite a 
heavy security cordon at the Nigerian boarders, suggested that British diplomatic cover was 
thrown around the escaped officials. Therefore it may well be that in advancing the idea of 
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unofficial state ally status, The Guardian and National Concord were gatekeeping for Buhari 
against external interference. But the key issue here for my argument, hinges on the propriety 
of the press in calling on a military regime to employ ‘extra-legal and extra-diplomatic’ means 
in dealing with foreign countries — a clear case of aggression outlawed by internationa l 
conventions. Indeed, the regime later abided by the press suggestion by organising the 
kidnapping of one of the escapee ministers, Umaru Dikko on the street of London in a Nigerian-
Israeli operation, crated him and attempted to smuggle him out of the country, but for the eagle 
eye British security personnel who foiled the plot at the Stansted Airport. This damaged 
diplomatic relations between the two countries for years. 
In continuation of its self-imposed task to further legitimise military rule there were more 
provocative editorials particularly in National Concord. The editorial of January 21, 1984, 
which took up half the page, discussed the fundamental human rights of citizens under the 
military: ‘The military and fundamental rights’, the paper noted that while the military style of 
governance by way of decrees and edicts, with all the trappings of ‘dictatorial proclamations’, 
may appear detrimental to civil liberties, they may however be ‘justified if necessary’. 
Referring to the officials of the former regime, National Concord insisted that, having 
mismanaged the country, the officials had ‘forfeited their rights’ for any form of constitutiona l 
protection. Setting the stage for government to introduce whatever decree it deemed 
appropriate to run its administration, the paper pronounced: 
We have no doubt whatsoever that sooner or later, issues will arise which would force 
the administration to resort to decrees. This is perfectly in order and it would never lack 
the support of Nigerians. No one would begrudge the administration such powers 
(National Concord, January 21, 1984, p. 2). 
In its clever appraisal of the law courts under the previous democratic regime, the editorial 
which asks the military to give the judiciary a chance inspite its ‘imperfections’, also invoked 
the powers of the government to bypass the courts if necessary: 
The judiciary, in spite of its imperfections and proven mistakes in the last government, 
must be given the benefit of the doubt. This of course, does not divest the government 
of powers to make special laws, if it deems fit to contend with some special offences 
(National Concord January 21, 1984 p. 2). 
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As the analysis below goes on to reveal, it would appear as if National Concord was in 
negotiation with the military on the use of decrees and special courts to push its policies 
forward. Having discredited the political class, the paper went further to undermine the 
judiciary which might properly interpret human rights laws if political detainees were found to 
be denied proper rights. Again, and perhaps naively, the paper did not realise that the military 
would not only enact decrees and establish special courts, but also apply them to all Nigerians, 
including journalists. It was thus, an irony that the press also became one of the victims. 
In another feature, the paper disagreed with the agitation by civil society around when the 
regime intended to hand-over power to a democratically elected government. Its half page 
editorial of January 22, 1984: ‘Future of Politics in Nigeria’ affirmed the conventional wisdom 
that military governments are an ‘aberration’, but went ahead to make a special case for the 
Nigerian situation. It argued that the sort of ‘misrule’ experienced under the previous 
democratic regime made it the aberration not the current military regime, suggesting that 
military intervention might actually be ‘proof of our political maturity and sophistication’. It 
concluded: ‘to wish a hasty return to politics against the background of the distraught and 
disheveled state of the economy is to live under a fatalistic delirium’ (National Concord 
January 22, 1984 p. 2). 
While it is disturbing to make such unconventional and anti-democratic suggestions – denying 
in effect the right of the people by foreclosing a return to democratic rule – these views are 
consonant with Bayo Onanuga’s reasoning that the December 31, 1983 coup might be the end 
of ‘representative democracy’ (The Guardian, January 1, 1984 p. 3). The adoption of this 
position  – ‘no to democracy’ – by the press was perhaps inadvertently underplayed by scholars 
who simply listed as one of Buhari’s sins, his lack of clarity on when the nation would be 
returned to democratic rule (Agbaje 1992). 
From the foregoing discussions, it is evident that the first month of General Buhari in power 
saw a beehive of media activities aimed at rallying the populace behind the regime so that it 
could consolidate its grip on power. From the two hundred and four items sampled, the 
preponderance of evidence suggests that there was an overwhelming support for the Buhari 
regime by these two titles. But notwithstanding the solid foundation the press laid for Buhari, 
subsequent events proved that it would not be treated as a ‘sacred cow’, as it had confidently, 
albeit naively, assumed. 
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Decree 4: The Gathering Storm 
While Decree 4 was actually enacted on March 29, 1984, the momentum for its birth started a 
month earlier. In  ‘60 minutes with Buhari’, an interview conducted by three National Concord 
editors, Ray Ekpu, Dele Giwa and Yakubu Mohammed, part of which was published in the 
February 16, 1984 edition, Buhari, in unmistakable terms, spoke of his regime’s intentions to 
curb the media excesses which he insisted threatened the nation’s socio-political and economic 
progress. But I should add that even before the interview in February, Buhari’s general 
disposition and utterances did not suggest he was going to treat the press differently from the 
rest of the nation. It could well be that the press saw this but decided to carry on in the hope of 
winning Buhari’s heart. 
The interview which took up almost the entire front page, and running into page eight was 
presented under a large banner ‘PRESS FREEDOM? BUHARI: NO!’ It quoted Buhari as 
saying: ‘I am going to tamper with that [press freedom]. It’s because I know Nigerians very 
well’. In the interview, Buhari dwelt extensively on a previous allegation against him while in 
charge of petroleum ministry in the Obasanjo regime - the 1979 ‘N2.8 billion missing money 
hoax’. He said:  
If there was no judicial inquiry in 1979 when I was in the US War College, I would 
have been brought up and lynched because somebody just got up one day and said this 
money was missing. It would appear Nigerian intellectuals and those who know 
economics would never work out whether it is possible for that amount to be missing 
(National Concord February 16, 1984, p. 1). 
From the above declarations, it was evident that Buhari was not in any mood to court the press, 
even though its coverage of him by The Guardian and National Concord in particular, the press 
more generally, had been generous. However, honest as Buhari may have sounded – not hiding 
his intentions – his hard-line posture, particularly his open declaration to ‘tamper with press 
freedom’, appeared hasty and undiplomatic to the press.  
Viewed in the context of establishing legitimacy for his regime, his major preoccupation was 
how to win over the populace and stabilise to gain a hegemonic hold on power. Given the 
press’s influential role in shaping the direction in which a society goes (Schramm 1964, p. 20, 
Bryant and Zillmann 2002, p. 121), it is surprising that Buhari did not see the press as the 
vehicle through which to articulate the regime’s objectives. More surprisingly, as The 
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Guardian and National Concord’s news practices in the first month indicated, the press so 
readily offered the regime the platform it needed to establish stability, even as Buhari was 
planning to attack it.  
Agbaje observes that legitimacy as a panacea to stability has to be worked out among the 
competing interests, and a compromise reached. He notes that: 
Legitimacy is basically a measure of the extent of consent and acquiescence in 
governance and is, therefore, a first and basic step in the construction or contestation of 
hegemony: the extent to which the use of power is successfully rooted in consent or 
challenged by dissent is indicative of the first step toward the social construction of or 
challenge to popular consensus and, therefore, hegemony (Agbaje 1992, p. 14). 
Given this line of thought by Agbaje, did General Buhari anticipate that once he declared open 
war on the press any incipient hegemony would be dissipated resulting in an immed ia te 
legitimacy crisis for his regime? Did his commitment on gaining leadership, to uphold nationa l 
interest, rising above personal aggrandizement and political or ethnic group allegiance 
(Idiagbon 1984, Interview with Oladipo Diya, October 10, 2011), perhaps override this 
concern?11 Could it be the case that the introduction of the Decree ‘was intended to stave off 
adverse criticism of the government’ (Ogbondah & Onyedike’ 1991, p. 62) and thus in some 
way to protect hegemony? 
Known as Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) Decree No 4, 198412, and 
drafted on March 29, 1984, the Decree was regarded by many scholars, media practitioners and 
commentators as the most draconian of all media laws in Nigeria since independence in 1960 
(Ogbondah and Onyedike 1991, Uko 2004). The Decree was also regarded as ‘unique’ in the 
sense that it provided the ‘shortest route to discipline erring and indolent journalists’ as well as 
serving as a form of ‘spiritual purification’ for the ‘extinguished fire of purposeful journalism’ 
(Onyebadi, National Concord  July, 28 1984, p. 3). 
                                                                 
11  Others disagree, however that this ever happened. Agbaj e for instance argues that part of Buhari ’s sins was 
the lopsidedness in the appointments of officials which largely favoured his core Muslim North to the detriment 
of the Christian South (Agbaje 1992). 
12 Section 1, sub-section 1 in particular states that, any person who publishes in any form, whether written or 
otherwise, any message, rumour, report or statement, which is false in any material particular or which brings 
or is calculated to bring the Federal Military Government or the Government of a state or a public officer to 
ridicule or disrepute, shall  be guilty of an offence under this Decree”. See Supplement to Official Gazette 
Extraordinary NO 18, Vol. 71, 4th April, 1984, Part A). 
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The law was introduced to punish authors and journalists who made false statements and wrote 
reports exposing the Buhari administration or its officials to ridicule or contempt. Among other 
provisions, the Decree provided a two year jail term for offenders without the option of a fine, 
and in the case of a media corporation, the Decree provided for a fine of not less than N10, 
000.00. The law further empowered the Head of the Federal Military Government, when 
satisfied that a paper’s continued circulation was detrimental to the State, to ‘prohibit the 
circulation of that newspaper for a period of twelve months’. And in order to facilitate the trial 
of would-be offenders (in line with earlier suggestions by National Concord and The 
Guardian), a provision was made under the Law for the establishment of a ‘Tribunal’ whose 
members were to comprise of a ‘serving or retired High Court Judge as its chairman and three 
members of the Armed Forces’. The most controversial aspect of the law was that the judgment 
of the Tribunal was not subject to any further appeal (Supplement to Official Gazette 
Extraordinary NO 18, Vol. 71, 4th April, 1984, Part A; Uche 1989; Ogbondah and Onyedike 
1991).  
 At the same time, however, I argue, partly through analysis of news coverage, that Buhari’s 
seeming ‘nationalism’ turned out to be more of a political suicide. He seemed to fail to consider 
the impact of his actions on the media. Indeed, this battle for Nigeria became the survival of 
the fittest: Buhari or the press. 
 
End of the Honeymoon 
From the moment General Buhari issued his threats to curb the press’s ‘excesses’, The 
Guardian and National Concord signalled a gradual shift from their initial pro-military stance 
to a more critical one. Once the decree was eventually passed and journalists were being 
arrested, the tone of coverage wholly changed gear. Further, subsequent editorials and news 
reports were antagonistic of the regime and this heightened the suspicion and tensions between 
the regime and the press. This shift typifies the culture of the press when its interest is at stake. 
If Buhari had limited his war against corruption and indiscipline to other Nigerians, the press 
would have cooperated. Mvendaga Jibo characterises this prevailing culture: ‘in Nigeria, the 
media only complain when its corporate interests are at stake, or when an individual journalist 
is jailed and manhandled by the government’ (Jibo 2003, p. 224). 
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The Guardian was first to react to General Buhari’s ‘surprising’ declarations, but still in a more 
conciliatory tone. In its editorial of February 16, 1984 titled: ‘Government and the press’, the 
paper picked up on Buhari’s reaction to the N2.8 billion alleged to have gone missing while he 
was in charge of the Petroleum ministry, wondering why he was still referring to it when a 
Government enquiry had ‘repaired’ the damage done to him. Pleading with Buhari to allow the 
press do its job, The Guardian claimed that ‘what the Nigerian public needs now is greater 
openness in government’ and not a ‘further constriction of the people’s right to know what is 
going on in the affairs of their nation’. Courting Buhari further, and to show it was ready to be 
responsible if spared the impending purge, the paper admitted some press irresponsibility: 
This is not to say that the press has always been informed by the purest of motives nor 
governed by the highest of standards in purveying information. The press is, after all, a 
human institution and is bound to commit errors of judgment and inaccuracy in its 
reporting and commentary on events (The Guardian, February 16, 1984, p. 6). 
Explicit as this editorial was in terms of admitting wrong doings (though in the abstract rather 
than citing specific instances), it raises, however, another issue in claiming that the press as ‘a 
human institution’ was bound to ‘commit errors’. While urging Buhari to overlook its wrong 
doings, the press did not apply the same logic to Shagari, whose government could also be seen 
to have committed ‘errors of judgement’. Rather than accepting the fallibility of human 
institutions and that democratic checks and balances would have ‘corrected’ Shagari’s regime, 
the press leapt into bed with a military regime (thus, some might argue, losing its right to ‘press 
freedom’). The admission of what could be termed a ‘recklessness’ in the editorial – ‘the press 
is not always informed by the purest of motives nor governed by the highest of standards in 
purveying information’ – appears to justify Buhari’s attempt to address the issue. This is 
consonant with Oladipo Diya’s remarks that Buhari wanted the press to be ‘straightforward, 
fearless and unambiguous’ (Diya 2011), a position variously echoed by Buhari’s deputy, 
General Idiagbon: the regime was not against free speech but wanted the press to be purged of 
its sensationalism and outright fabrications (Idiagbon 1984). Many scholarly accounts have 
suggested that Buhari was ‘concerned about the effects unrestricted press criticisms’ posed to 
his regime (Ogbondah & Onyedike 1991, p. 69) and for this reason ‘curbed’ the press. But in 
not emphasizing this possibility and admitting the press’s own guilt this editorial perhaps  
tempers and complicates such a view.  
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National Concord’s editorial was more defiant in tone than The Guardian’s. Presented as a 
front page comment to underscore its importance, the editorial was headlined: ‘A Campaign of 
Intimidation’ (The style of the front page presentation was similar to the ‘Verdict 83’ editorial 
which greeted the regime on January 2, 1984). The paper lamented Buhari’s threats to ‘tamper 
with press freedom’, and highlighted that the press was ‘justifiably worried about the unearned 
anger that it had attracted from the authorities’, warning that it would be ‘overkill’ to enact 
fresh laws. Reeling out the names of editors already in detention, the editorial asked 
rhetorically: ‘Is it a crime to be a journalist? Is it a crime to be an editor?’  
With reference to the journalistic sine qua non of the press as the ‘fourth estate’, the editorial 
insisted that it was a matter of right rather than of privilege for Nigerians to know how their 
affairs were being run. Declaring the press as a substitute for parliament in certain contexts, it 
claimed: 
In a situation where the parliaments are dead, all forums are absent, the press is about 
the only forum on which they can hang their hopes, and any attempt to hamper the 
performance of that public function cannot be in the interest of the people, nor even of 
the government (National Concord March 2, 1984, p. 2).    
However, a concerned reader of this editorial might put the press on the spot. Between January 
2, 1984 when the paper dismissed the 1983 general election and declared Buhari’s coup as the 
people’s verdict and this editorial in March 2, 1984, it appears that the paper suffered a 
profound loss of memory or tried to shift the blame solely on Buhari. Having collaborated with 
the military to truncate a representative government, it is at best two-faced, a breathtaking 
hypocrisy that the paper then turns round to write about ‘death of parliament and absence of 
forums’.  
Between the time Buhari threatened to ‘tamper with the press’ and the time the decree was 
eventually enacted, the two editorials presented above demonstrate a marked shift from the 
uncritical and friendly disposition towards the regime in its early days to an arguably healthy 
adversary of the regime. In order to show their defiance of the impending crackdown, news 
reports by The Guardian and National Concord tended to whip-up sentiments against the 
government. Once journalists were arrested and detained, grave concerns were expressed by 
notable personalities and veteran journalists with such events regarded as a bad omen for the 
future of the country. However, the concern expressed was not entirely based on critical 
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analysis or evidence related to the situation, but simply to offer support for the abstract notion 
of ‘press freedom’. 
Buhari’s attempt at reforming the press was not just to shield himself from scrutiny since he 
not only targeted private media practitioners but also the state-owned media both at the federal 
and state levels. National Concord carried a front page story under a bold headline: ‘AXE 
FALLS ON 296 NEWSMEN’, with a follow-up rider ‘176 others affected in Federal 
parastatals’. It reported that 267 staff were sacked, dismissed or retired from the Nigerian 
Television Authority (NTA), Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN), New Nigerian 
Newspapers (NNN) and the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN), all state owned media outlets 
(National Concord May 19, 1984, p. 1).  
The implication of the above is that if Buhari was out to gag the press against criticisms of his 
regime, as alleged by critics of Decree 4, he probably needed the publicly- funded media 
organisations. Rather than sack journalists, one would have expected him to brief them through 
these organs of the State. That he moved against journalists in the State-run media showed 
perhaps that he was putting national interest before any other consideration. It could thus be 
argued that this commitment challenges claims of Buhari’s ‘vengeance’ against the press (Uko 
2004). 
A cartoon in The Guardian plays to the theme of Buhari against the press.  Both Buhari and a 
journalist (the press) are seen exchanging views on the propriety or otherwise of the reform. 
While the journalist (self-indicts himself) claiming he ‘fought’ the Shagari regime to ‘pave the 
way’ for Buhari, an unimpressed Buhari insists that notwithstanding, he will go ahead with the 
reform (Decree 4) in order to prevent unrest that press partisanship can engineer (apparently 
referring to the killings and arson that trailed the 1983 elections) . 
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Figure 3: The Guardian February 19, 1984, p. 6 
At one level, this cartoon reinforces National Concord’s editorial invoking the press as an 
‘alternative parliament’ (see p. 93 above). At another, reflecting on the past, it offers evidence 
that the press worked against the democratic aspirations of the Nigerian people for its own 
interest. ‘I Fought Shagari regime’ i.e. the press wrecked the nation’s democracy; to ‘pave the 
way for Buhari’. 
From March 1984, journalists were being arrested and detained for sundry offences, while 
operations of certain newspaper titles were suspended. An editorial in the National Concord of 
March 18, 1984: ‘A sign of the times?’ decried the suspension of the Nigerian Statesman, by 
the Imo State military government, on the grounds that the editorial statements of the 
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newspaper were ‘not in tune with the objectives of the military administration’. The edito rial 
further claimed that although the paper was reopened eight days later, its managing director, 
the editor, features editor and Sunday editor were dismissed. In a tone that contradicted its 
earlier stance – justifying the regime’s use of military ‘fiat’ if it ‘deemed fit’, in order to get 
things done the editorial lamented: 
We are not entirely appreciative of the fact that the military, given as they are to the 
culture of the barracks, do not particularly care for criticisms. But having made the 
decision to come out of the barracks, they must come to terms, and quickly too, with 
the fact that out here, it is a different ballgame altogether (National Concord, March 
18, 1984, p. 2). 
Another editorial of April 20, 1984: ‘Set the Journalists free’, listed journalists from a number 
of newspapers, such as The Guardian, The Punch, Nigerian Tribune and Premier, who were 
in detention and called for their immediate and unconditional release. This time, the paper 
appeared to capitulate insisting that the press was ready to cooperate with the government. It 
noted: 
It is not as if we are craving any special indulgence for the press. Rather, we note this 
unhealthy development because we are convinced that the government needs the active 
co-operation of the press to achieve its just ends — not the type of acquiescence you 
obtain by the big stick (National Concord April 20, 1984 p. 2). 
As the foregoing reveals, the press could be seen manoeuvring to repair its damaged reputation 
and desperate to get a reprieve from the military. Having spelt out the punitive measures the 
military could employ in dealing with the exigencies of the time, it appeared that the press 
realised it had boxed itself into a corner. The Guardian captured something of this in a self-
appraising editorial, ‘Government and the press’, where it bemoaned the fate of the press while 
admitting recent errors of judgment: 
Such errors are the sometimes flight of fancy reporting of events after the heady days 
of the coup. True, some media organisations over-reached themselves and allowed 
popular enthusiasms to affect the sobriety which should attend their news judgments 
(The Guardian, Tuesday February 21, 1984 p. 6). 
Whilst the two editorials above were bolder attempts at halting the reforms, Buhari’s agenda 
to engender a culture of press responsibility stayed on course. But from the moment of his 
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proclamation that he would tamper with ‘press freedom’, the pattern of coverage of the 
regime’s activities did change gear in the press. According to Oladipo Diya, this change in 
relationship may be owing to the fact that ‘their expectations were not met by the government 
and then the dinner was over’ (October 10, 2011). Press expectation that they would receive 
preferential treatment and somehow be placed above society, turned out to be a serious 
miscalculation. 
 
The Test Case: Buhari v press 
When Buhari said he was going to tamper with the press, he did not mean he will just 
tamper unjustifiably, maybe the wrong ones. Like this issue about the list of the 
ambassadors which The Guardian published, but which the government had not 
released. I felt the whole situation could have been averted if the efforts were made to 
confirm from the government if the list was correct or publishable. If they say it’s 
correct/publishable, go ahead. If they say it’s not, you are not going to lose anything by 
deferring to the government. The question of press freedom is so elastic that you can 
manoeuver comfortably without getting into trouble. If the list was not published on 
that day, The Guardian would still sell (Duro Onabule, former editor of National 
Concord, October 7, 2011). 
In spite of intense media criticisms of Decree 4, the Government seemed determined to purge 
the media of its ‘recklessness’. While many journalists were being arrested and detained, the 
arrest of two staff of The Guardian and their eventual arraignment became the first test case 
under Decree 4. This event was the rallying point for the showdown between the press and the 
regime. The Guardian journalists, Tunde Thompson and Nduka Irabor were arrested for their 
story reporting that the military government planned to shut down some ‘Nigerian missions’ 
and for being responsible for publishing the yet to be approved shortlist of foreign envoys 
(Ekpu 1984, p. 3). Tunde Thompson, The Guardian’s senior diplomatic correspondent, was 
arrested on April 11, 1984, Nduka Irabor, the Assistant News Editor, six days later. The 
Guardian’s story on its front page, April 18, 1984: ‘NSO still keeps Thompson’ and 
accompanied with a passport size photograph of Thompson, offered a rationale for his 
detention and was written to invoke readers’ passion. The paper informed its readers that it 
believed the ‘security agents wanted Thompson to divulge the source’ of the diplomatic story, 
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a practice the paper claimed offended the ‘code of journalism’. National Concord also 
published a story of the arrest on its front page, April 25, 1984: ‘Guardian staff still being 
held’. Stories on the detention of the two men continued to appear on a daily basis, particula r ly 
on The Guardian’s front page.  
By continuing to place the story of the two men on the front page regularly accompanied by 
their photographs, both papers sought not only to draw public sympathy to the plight of the 
men but also to register the issue at stake. It became an emotionally wrought campaign. A front 
page story reaches more readers from both traditional newspaper readers and headline gazers 
(passersby and shoppers). In the particular story above, the ‘still being held’, without stating 
‘why being held’ in the headline, connotes an illegal detention of innocent journalists. Those 
who follow the story on a daily basis are more likely to be ‘subliminally’ sympathetic to the 
men, wondering why they are ‘still’ being held and not set free, and forgetting perhaps the 
alleged offence and reason for their detention. Whilst those coming across the story for the first 
time are also likely to draw the conclusion that the men were victims of military repression. 
The headline ‘hides’ the offence for which they are being held.  
Blake Andrew’s 2004 study of the effect between the headlines and full stories on Canadian 
general elections has relevance here. He established that there was a knowledge gap between 
those who read the full stories and those who glanced at the headlines. He concluded: ‘voters 
who scanned headlines were supplied with a different set of heuristic cues than those paying 
closer attention’ (Andrew 2007, p. 24). Given headlines may be part of an ‘emotion-induc ing 
strategy, with hidden ideological meanings’ (Taiwo 2007, p. 218), as is the case with this news 
story, it is likely that readers who glanced at  The Guardian and National Concord  headlines 
would sympathise with the newsmen and see the government as punitive. Those who read the 
whole story and have the facts may be less sympathetic or think of the men and the government 
differently. 
The impact of photographs may be more powerful. Working with the headlines, the 
photographs of the men in this story, both confirm its authenticity, but also personalise and 
emotionalise the story, (especially when they are family photos as they were in later stories) 
rendering the journalists as fellow humans in detention. Iyengar (1991), Graber (1990) 
establish that visual images can influence public knowledge and also enhance viewers’ recall 
of news stories hence, their ‘ability to transcend textual limitations and convey emotions in 
addition to factual evidence’ (Rogers et al 2007, p. 120). 
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In the face of public outcry and intense campaigning in the newspapers, the Government 
arraigned both journalists in Lagos on Monday, June 4, 1984 before Justice Olalere Ayinde’s 
‘The Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) Tribunal'. The trial lasted exactly 
one month with both men found guilty and jailed for one year. Throughout the trial, The 
Guardian and National Concord’s coverage followed a similar pattern: they adopted a critical 
stance in relation to the military government. 
The first day of the trial appeared as a major story on the front page of both The Guardian and 
National Concord with photographs of scenes at the trial splashed across the page, in what was 
a personalisation and dramatisation of key players. Boldly headlined ‘THE HISTORIC TRIAL 
BEGINS’, the lead story was accompanied by three others, complemented with four 
photographs. One photograph showed the Tribunal Panel members, the second and the third 
featured the accused journalists alighting from the Black Maria that brought them from 
detention and the fourth photograph showed the journalists’ lawyer emerging from his Range 
Rover jeep. 
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Figure 4: The Guardian, Tuesday June 5, 1984 
It is clear that the stories but particularly the photographs were strategically positioned to attract 
the attention of not only the newspaper buyers but also the passersby or shoppers, following 
the precept that photographs tell stories far better than words and are effective in attracting 
readers (Zillmann et al 2001, p. 302). Two photographs show the journalists alighting from the 
prison trucks, an image likely to evoke public emotion and draw sympathy towards the accused, 
as well as stir up public anger against the government. Many readers with little or no knowledge 
of security operations, and seeing these men alighting from the truck, will immediately regard 
them as victims of injustice or repression: a Black Maria to most uneducated Nigerians signifies 
‘dramatic event’ and the ‘punitive hand of the state’. Similarly, publishing the photograph of 
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Tribunal members, to reveal their identities  – an unusual event since photographs of a court in 
session were usually off limits – renders them the subject of public attention, if not potential 
attack, if they make the ‘wrong’ decision. Presumably this was a self-conscious tactic by The 
Guardian to intensify pressure on the Government. 
The story in the National Concord also appeared on the front page, June 5, 1984 under another 
bold headline ‘NEWSMEN’S TRIAL STARTS WITH HITCHES’. The story reported two key 
issues: that the representative of The Guardian (as a corporate entity), charged alongside two 
of its staff, was absent; and that tight security within the premises of the court led to lawyers 
and journalists complaining of harassment. The paper reported that the first day of the trial 
ended without the plea of the accused being taken and that both were denied bail. The story, 
which took up two-thirds of the page, continuing on page eleven, was fleshed out with a 
photograph of family members of Tunde Thompson, The Guardian’s diplomatic 
correspondent. By publishing the photograph of the men’s family members, the paper raises 
the emotional plane to a new level: these are the extended victims whose breadwinner is being 
taken away by the State. Those who may not have been bothered by the plight of the newsmen 
before now are drawn into the anti-state sentiment, making it appear that many people, beyond 
the newsmen are being punished by the Buhari regime. Family photographs in the daily press 
may serve as a post-memory of the event long after. Giving insight into family photographs in 
newspapers, Linda Devereux notes that the images become ‘cultural artefacts, censored and 
mediated by dominant social discourses. They will echo popular tropes and reflect the 
historical, cultural and political influences of the time’ (Devereux 2010, p. 124). Thus, to the 
family, a material evidence to be kept as a reference for future purposes is made. 
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Figure 5: National Concord, Tuesday June 5, 1984, p. 1 
The news story set out to suggest a lack of seriousness on the part of the prosecution and, 
possibly, to discredit the trial from the start. It is a common judicial practice that a case listed 
for hearing may for one reason or another be postponed, either at the behest of the parties to 
the case or the court. In this case, the absence or non-appearance of the representative of The 
Guardian stalled the full start of the trial, giving rise to the headline: ‘Newsmen trial starts with 
hitches’. The story points to the prosecution who, not fully ready for the trial, failed to bring 
the defendants to court. In this way the headline sows the seed of doubt about the trial.  
Likewise, it is a common practice in a high profile trial to provide extra security measures to 
control the unusual crowd and protect the court. National Concord’s representation of this 
security measure as ‘harassment’ of lawyers and journalists is another means of undermining 
the trial. As already noted, typically, headlines are not mere summaries of news stories but 
construct ideological and emotionally loaded meanings geared towards achieving preconceived 
goals. As Rotimi Taiwo argues, ‘headlines are an emotion-inducing strategy in the hands of the 
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editor used to initiate, sustain discourse and shape the views of the readers’ (Taiwo 2007, p. 
218). In this way National Concord and other papers opposed to the trial of their colleagues, 
cast their headlines to discredit the trial and win readers to their side.  
Following a month of legal fireworks, on Wednesday July 4, 1984, The Tribunal, found the 
two journalists guilty of false publication against the Federal Government. They were 
accordingly sentenced to one year imprisonment each, while their employer, The Guardian 
Press Limited was fined N50, 000.00.  In what appeared as the Government wanting to deal a 
huge blow to the press in general and The Guardian in particular, the judgment coincided with 
The Guardian’s first anniversary. Again, The Guardian played an emotional hand in its 
editorial: ‘A guarded birthday’. The paper drew on a strong metaphor whilst adopting a 
diplomatic mode as it touched on the trial: ‘neither the government nor the press can advance 
very far in a situation whereby the one perceives the other as cancer’. Promising to continuing 
serving the nation, the editorial then appealed to the public: 
As we step into our second year, we intend to let the country enjoy the best of our 
resources and our good intentions. Nigeria is our country, we therefore have a stake, a 
stake equal to any other patriotic individual’s or group’s, in the ordering of her affairs. 
May Nigeria prosper like palm trees in the rain forest (The Guardian, July 4, 1984 p. 
6)  
Perhaps more than any other, this particular editorial was pitched at a high emotional level, 
invoking nationhood and the country’s future verdant growth which was intended to embrace 
paper and people alike. ‘Nigeria is our country’ persuaded the readers that the paper had a stake 
in advancing Nigeria’s interest, just as Buhari claimed to be doing, and the people themselves. 
So, Nigeria is not only Buhari’s, it is all Nigerians. In addition the editorial makes a spiritua l 
incursion, almost praying for the nation, ‘may Nigeria prosper like palm trees in the rain forest’. 
Atoning for its sins or acting as pastor or imam in the court of public opinion, readers might be 
moved to rally round the apprehensive paper and its journalists, and become ‘believers’ before 
the day of judgment. In other words, by the time the verdict was delivered later that day, the 
paper hoped that most readers would have been touched by its ‘patriotic prayer’ for the nation. 
This campaign and others like it, formed part of the strategy to make Buhari look like a monster: 
the press as victim of his highhandedness. 
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The following day as expected, both papers did their best to ensure the event was registered in 
the consciousness of the reading public with catchy and sympathetic headlines. With the 
exception of a small advertisement on the front page of The Guardian, the rest of the page was 
devoted to the judgment. The lead story in bold type was headlined: ‘Our birthday jail shocker!’ 
with two photographs showing the jailed journalists in a show of defiance, laughing and waving 
as they climbed onto the prison truck. There was also a whole photo-page engendering more 
affect to the story of the moment. Two of the six photographs showcased the young families of 
the journalists. One featured Thompson’s young son, with a caption: ‘Courageous Thompson 
junior watches his daddy going away’, the other, Thompson’s wife with two of her younger 
children and some sympathisers.  
 
Figure 6: The Guardian Thursday July 5, 1984, p. 1 
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Figure 7: The Guardian Thursday July 5, 1984, p. 5 
Similar to The Guardian, National Concord reported the judgment on its front page with a bold 
headline: ‘Decree 4: Thompson, Irabor in for 1 year’ (July 5, 1984). This was followed by: 
‘…NLC, NUJ reject verdict’. The news story reported that the Nigerian Labour Congress 
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(NLC) and the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) both rejected the court’s verdict and 
described it as ‘too harsh’ and a ‘disappointment’. Published alongside the two stories were 
two photographs, one showing the two men in the court with Tunde Thompson (standing), 
again defiantly laughing and waving to the crowd after the verdict. His colleague, Nduka Irabor 
seated and looking dejected, apparently confused or shocked by the outcome of the trial. The 
other shows Mrs. Thompson holding up her little daughter amidst a crowd of relatives, wa ving 
‘bye-bye’. Both stories occupy two-third of the front page, continuing on pages eight and 
sixteen and taking a further quarter of the page each. Bringing innocent children to the court 
and publishing their photographs drew public attention to the fact that the jailed journalis ts 
were leaving behind young families, accentuating further the Government’s heavy-handedness. 
 
Figure 8: National Concord, Thursday July 5, 1984, p. 1 
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The conviction of the two journalists undoubtedly marked a new era in government-press 
relations at this time. On the part of the military regime, a strong message was sent to the press 
that it would not condone further ‘irresponsible journalism’ (Mohammed, National Concord, 
May 22, 1984, p. 3). For the journalists, it was a time of regret that the regime did not live up 
to their hopes but also a wake-up call to what lay ahead. 
 
Conclusion 
Fourth Estate or Fifth Columnist? The Press Plays Russian Roulette 
Contrary to the liberal notion (to which many journalists are quick to lay claim) that the press 
as the ‘fourth estate’ holds the government accountable to the governed, the excessive and 
somewhat cheerleader journalism exhibited by National Concord and The Guardian at the 
collapse of the democratic regime of Alhaji Sheu Shagari renders this notion irreparably 
damaged at this moment of Nigerian history. Like the proverbial game of Russian roulette – a 
dangerous game of chance – the press’s negation of democratic values in favour of a military 
ethos, in the risky hope, that it would become an (unelected) branch of Government became its 
major undoing.  
Admittedly, the 1979 N2.8 Billion hoax was still fresh in the memory of Buhari at the time he 
became Head of State, and may have inspired his determination to check the press’s penchant 
for political scoops to bring down officials. But far from being on a vengeful mission (Uko 
2004, p. 90), it is instructive to note that the involvement of the press in the planning and the 
execution of the coup that ended the democratic regime of Alhaji Sheu Shagari (Agbaje 1990, 
p. 217) meant for some, including Buhari, that the press exposed itself as an institution that 
could not be trusted. If the press was part of the coup that ended the former regime, then it 
followed that the same press could also work with other interests to end Buhari’s regime, if it 
saw fit.  
The other important issue raised by General Buhari’s relatively early hostility towards the press 
relates to hegemony. As Gramsci points out: 
Undoubtedly, the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests 
and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a 
certain compromised equilibrium should be formed – in other words, that the leading 
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group should make sacrifices of an economic/corporate kind. But there is also no doubt 
that such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the essential; for hegemony is 
ethical-political, it must also be economic, must also be necessarily be based on the 
decisive nucleus of economic activity ( Gramsci 2006 p. 86). 
Buhari did not bother to develop or lay any foundation for his government’s legitimacy. 
Perhaps, he did not believe in hegemony and hoped to survive as a Government by repressive 
force rather than ideological force (Althusser 1971). However, it is pertinent to note here that 
previous military regimes did try to uphold Gramsci’s cooperative strategy as a means of 
sustaining hegemonic rule by collaborating with the press. That the press made manifest such 
collaboration which Buhari rejected is puzzling. The early support from the press could have 
been an opportunity for the regime to achieve some legitimacy. Instead Buhari destroyed the 
civil political class with influence and impact on institutions at home and abroad, with obvious 
implications for the regime; he also instilled fear in the minds of ordinary people with his 
corrective War Against Indiscipline (WAI); and finally he irrevocably antagonised a press 
which had supported him. Having lost the chance of hegemonic rule, it was then only a matter 
of time before Buhari lost the ability to hold onto power. 
Conceptually, this chapter raises two issues bothering on professionalism and lack of separation 
of politics from journalism. As discussed by various scholars, the fact that most journalists lack 
basic knowledge of the roles expected of them gave rise to a situation where the press assumed 
the role of ‘adviser’ to the military regime, reeling out policies and programmes for the military. 
This manifested in the share volume of editorials, new stories, photographs and cartoons which 
both the National Concord and The Guardian deployed in their alliance with Buhari 
immediately the democratic regime of Shagari was toppled. A truly ‘fourth estate’ press does 
not collapse its own estate with the other estates, but works independently of the other estates 
as much as possible. This is not the case as the facts in this chapter can reveal, and it suggests 
a lack of professional ethos as a bane (Coker 1960, Golding and Elliot 1979, Hallin and Mancini 
2004). The other important issue is that the press sees itself as a stakeholder in the politica l 
process — the sort of stake holding that merge journalism with politics, rather than journalism 
being a midwife of politics. This high level of ‘political parallelism’ (Hallin and Mancini 2004) 
between journalists and politicians means the press could not rise above partisanship, and thus 
incapable of behaving professionally. As Golding and Elliot (1979) espoused, the nationalis ts 
who engaged the colonial powers for the battle of independence were also press barons who 
109 
 
 
 
successfully mobilised their papers to tackle the colonialists. This historical foundation of press 
and politics or ‘double allegiances’ (Golding and Elliot) continued to hunt and harm the 
political role of the press in post-independent years and still being carried forward to the 
contemporary journalism practice. 
Contrary to scholarly assessment that Buhari ran a ‘dreaded’ regime and ‘abused’ human rights 
(Ogbondah and Onyedike 1991; Mohammed 2003; Uko 2004; Soyinka 2007), my argument in 
this chapter is somewhat different. I argue that the press, as represented by The Guardian and 
National Concord welcomed the coup. They criticised the ousted democratic regime for its 
many failures, believing that the Buhari regime would arrest the problematic economic and 
political situation in the country. Indeed the papers took it upon themselves to rally the 
populace behind the military regime, saving the regime itself from having to convince the 
nation about the legitimacy of subverting democracy. In short, the preponderance of evidence 
linking the press with the coup and their work of legitimacy on behalf of Buhari, were such 
that any public dissent against the coup and military rule was subdued. As I further established, 
Buhari’s ‘reform’ of the press went beyond the private media to include the publicly funded 
media where hundreds of staff were laid off in so-called ‘reorganization exercises’ (National 
Concord, May 19, 1984, p. 1). This is perhaps compelling evidence that he was not attempting 
to silence the independent press alone. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the press suggested many of the draconian policies Buhari 
implemented, the fact that he applied his policies across board  and did not treat the press as a 
sacred cow led to what I have argued was a hypocritical war mounted against the regime. 
Indeed, the press succeeded in misinforming the public claiming that Buhari was out to 
suppress the public’s right to know. Unfortunately for Buhari, ‘misinformation’ won public 
support. Though his regime fell, it was not as a result of Decree 4’s corrective provisions, but 
rather by another coup supported by an increasingly manipulative and politically corrupt press, 
as I explore in the next chapter. 
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Introduction 
Up till now it has been thought that the growth of the Christian myths during the Roman 
Empire was possible only because printing was not yet invented. Precisely the contrary. 
The daily press and the telegraph, which in a moment spread inventions over the whole 
earth, fabricate more myths … in one day than could have formerly been done in a 
century. 
Karl Max, 1871 (cited in Stanley Cohen & Jock Young (1973) The Manufacture of 
News: Deviance, Social Problems and the Mass Media) 
General Ibrahim Babangida as the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) in the Buhari regime was, by 
1983, already an established political personality in uniform.  Though he remained apolitica l 
and held only military posts before he toppled Buhari, Babangida’s name had been registered 
in the consciousness of the nation as a prominent figure in previous military take-overs. It was 
his bravery that led to the foiling of the 1976 bloody coup against General Murtala 
Mohammed’s regime — a feat that earned him the image of a gallant and patriotic officer 
(Mohammed 2003, p. 69). 
Babangida’s eight year regime, (August 27th, 1985 – August 26th, 1993) the longest of the 
four regimes studied, presents a case study of a ‘shared understanding’ between the press and 
the regime about the need for a liberal press. This agreed liberalism, by which I mean, an 
amicable working arrangement to get around tensions but allowing the press to do its job, 
offered a way out of the Buhari regime’s perceived hostility which had undoubtedly created an 
atmosphere of fear after the jailing of the two staff of The Guardian. In this subsequent ‘cosy’ 
arrangement, Babangida was to restore the dignity of a bruised press in exchange for press 
cooperation. While for a period Babangida kept his side of the bargain by fully restoring the 
honour of the press and promoting it as ‘fourth estate of the realm’ (to the latter’s delight), the 
press also kept its side of the bargain, by supporting and even becoming an extension of the 
regime, with some of its notable members becoming active participants in state affairs.  
However, starting in September, 1985, when the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) debate 
got underway13 there were a series of allegations against the regime. For instance, it was 
                                                                 
13 The IMF debate centered on revamping the dilapidated infrastructures in the country, particularly university 
education, and whether the Government should accept the IMF’s monetary package. The public rejected the 
loan owing to the age long suspicion that the IMF and other Bretton Wood monetary policies impoverish poor 
nations. 
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accused by a section of civil society, of offering monetary inducements, government 
appointments and choice Government plots of land to opposition figures, media executives and 
notable rights activists, with a view to silencing them and leading to what was termed a 
‘settlement syndrome’ (Uko 2004, p. 104; Mohammed 2003, pp. 69 & 70; Olagunju et al 1999, 
p. 248). There were also many failed attempts at transitioning to civilian rule — the banning 
and unbanning of political parties and certain politicians, with the most controversial being the 
aborted June 12, 1993 Presidential election which nearly led to a civil war (Kwarteng 1996, 
pp. 185, 187, Diamond et al 1997, Uko 2004, p. 103). Specifically in this chapter, I investiga te 
the annulment of this election which put strains on the ‘shared arrangement’ between the 
regime and the press.  
In order to do this, I draw on two popular dailies, the Nigerian Tribune and The Punch in 
addition to interviews with some editors and relevant State officials at the time. The period of 
my analysis covers the first thirty days of the regime, in order to gauge the mood of the press 
after the collapse of the Buhari regime. I then discuss the ensuing ‘cat and mouse’ game 
between government and press over the eight years. Finally I focus on the significant period of 
June 12 election; this was not only the first free and fair election in the history of Nigeria 
(Oloyede 2004, p. 71, Alimi 2011, p. 62), but also one in which Nigerians bridged the 
north/south and religious divides. However, its annulment by the military became a defining 
moment for Nigeria as a nation, with the crisis that followed leading to a forced exit of 
Babangida from power and an intervening 3-month interim government (discussed in the next 
chapter). This period thus offers an opportunity to study the Nigerian press in a crisis situation 
when the ‘liberal agreement’ broke down and the deafening voice of the Nigerian people took 
centre stage. 
This chapter is arranged in three parts. I first analyse key moments in the newspaper coverage 
of the opening thirty days of the regime. After the collapse of the Buhari regime, and apparent 
relief post-Decree 4, both papers demonstrated an acceptance of Babangida while demonis ing 
the ousted Buhari. I also explore how the press may have been involved in the coup that toppled 
Buhari, and probably struck a deal with Babangida on how the regime and the press could work 
together. This is evident in Babangida’s coup broadcast in which he cited ‘human rights’ 
violations, particularly Decree 4, as a key reason for his coup. He demonstrated this further 
with the ‘immediate repeal’ of the decree and the ‘unconditional release’ of jailed journalis ts. 
The Punch also confirmed this ‘deal’ in its editorial on the ‘Death of Decree 4’, four days after 
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the coup, when it ‘welcomed the change of guard’ and the ‘new attempt at forging a cooperative 
link’. This line of prior knowledge of the coup was strengthened by a Nigerian Tribune editor, 
who described Babangida’s emergence as ‘timely and a relief’ (Interview with Sina Oladeinde, 
Features editor, Nigerian Tribune, October 18, 2011). 
Next, I discuss the ‘negotiated friendship’ between the regime and the press, which enabled the 
former to emerge unscathed from many stormy issues. This is the period from late 1985 when 
the regime witnessed a public backlash – a result of economic policies aimed at revamping the 
economy, but which impacted negatively on standards of living – and a series of transition 
initiatives and accompanied crises until late 1992 when the transition to civil rule was, for the 
second time, postponed.  
In November, 1985, the refusal of the public to allow the Government to take further loans 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), led to a ‘home grown’ (Olagunju et al 1999) 
economic package — the Structural Adjustments Programme (SAP). This policy, which 
proposed belt-tightening measures, resulted in the rise of food prices and other essential 
commodities and snowballed into riots. This development, coming barely three months into 
the life of the regime, put the press, which was in a ‘cooperative agreement’ with the 
Government, in an awkward situation the upshot of which was that it did not fulfil its much 
touted ‘fourth estate’ role. 
In 1989, there was another litmus test to the working relationship of the Government and the 
press. This time, Dele Giwa, editor of a Lagos weekly magazine, Newswatch was killed by a 
parcel bomb marked ‘from the office of C-in-C (Commander-in-chief)’ (Oloyede 2004). 
According to many interpretations, the editor may have been killed for his investigat ive 
activities. Notwithstanding the potential implications of this also being a murder of press 
freedom, the reaction of the press against the murder was at best wimpish, with accusation of 
a possible conspiracy within the press. Ndaeyo Uko, a former editor, now an academic in 
Australia suggests that many leads were ‘overlooked’ by the Nigerian and international press. 
He concludes that, Giwa’s unresolved death reveals the ‘effect of the intimate relationship 
between the press and a silky military government on the treatment of key national issues’ (Uko 
2004, pp. 104 - 107). 
In the final section, I focus on the period June 7 to August 26 1993, in particular the Presidentia l 
election (12 June) and the heightened political activities created by a pro-military group, the 
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Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) (Kwarteng 1996, p. 187), the days before the election, 
followed by the annulment of the result (23 June) and subsequent crises, plunging the nation 
into violence which took on an ethnic dimension. As the political climate deteriorated, 
surprisingly perhaps, the press was still unable to break its eight-year long allegiance with the 
regime. The Nigerian people, however, simply bypassed the press and stoutly resisted military 
dictatorship by demanding a restoration of the electoral decision. This resistance, in the form 
of general strikes, forced sit-at-home (by ordering commercial activities to shut) and outright 
violent demonstrations, started soon after the annulment was announced and developed into an 
unmanageable situation for the military. By this time, forced by the popular uprisings, the press 
eventually, but again reluctantly, joined the struggle until August 26, 1993 when Babangida 
stepped down. 
During this short period, the generous coverage of the activities of civil society organisat ions 
rattled the military leading to a renewed crackdown on the press. There followed more anti-
press measures, both legal and extra-legal than witnessed under the vilified Buhari regime. 
Journalists were arrested and detained without trial, media houses proscribed, copies of 
thousands of offending publications confiscated or bought off (from distributors before 
reaching the newsstand) and decrees enacted.  
However, notwithstanding this belated attempt by the press to break away from the regime, 
overall, Babangida appeared to have gained enormous power over it, in ways which might be 
described as hegemonic (see pp. 23, 90 & 107). The regime successfully built alliances among 
various forces including the press, earning legitimacy and achieving stability over its eight year 
rule. While it may be an exaggeration to say that the news practices of a ‘fourth estate’ were 
non-existent under the Babangida regime, its ‘management’ of any press criticism until the 
very end of its rule was striking. It might also be argued that while this working relationship 
between the regime and the press may have benefitted both parties, the latter’s abdication of 
press responsibility cost the Nigerian people: it took a longer period to establish democracy 
and there was unnecessary death and destruction. In short what played out during the regime 
can be likened to what Van Dijk referred to as a ‘strategy of journalistic distancing’ (Van Dijk 
1991, p. 152) that allows journalists to play safe while preserving a vested interest. 
In order to explore and explain this ‘cosy’ relationship between press and regime, I turn next 
to analysis of the Nigerian Tribune and The Punch in the first 30 days of Babangida regime. 
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A Timely Intervention 
When Babangida came in, it was a relief. If you recall the policies of Babangida, there 
was no way the press would not have gravitated towards him. As a student of 
Machiavelli, Babangida understands how to manipulate power, and the press. He 
understands power. To get power, you have to get the people who wield that power. 
Once you are able to bring those who wield the power under your influence, then you 
are the absolute controller of power. So he understands fully that if there was going to 
be problems at all, it will come from the media, so why not hand pick some people from 
the media? (Sina Oladeinde, Associate Editor, Nigerian Tribune, October, 18, 2011). 
In the Nigerian Tribune, 125 items were analysed while 140 items were sampled in The Punch. 
The analysis of the two newspapers provides insights into the early relationship between the 
new military regime and the press. 
Given the jailing of ‘The Guardian Two’, it was not surprising, as Oladeinde claims (above) 
that the press welcomed Babangida’s rescue intervention as a ‘kind of relief … a soothing 
balm’ to Buhari’s ‘inglorious Decree 4’ (Oladeinde, October 18, 2011).  
In effect, a pact was established between General Babangida and the press. After ousting 
Buhari, in his broadcast to the nation Babangida cited human rights violations as one of the key 
reasons for staging the coup. Published in The Punch (August 28, 1985 pp. 1 & 7) titled: ‘Why 
we struck’, it is highlighted on page one with the full broadcast given generous coverage on 
page seven. Specifically, Babangida suggests that Decree 4 has ‘generated a lot of controversy’ 
and cautiously assures the press: 
As we do not intend to lead the country where individuals are under the fear of 
expressing themselves, the Public Officers — Protection Against False Accusation 
Decree 4 of 1984 is hereby repealed with immediate effect. Those who have been in 
detention under this decree are hereby unconditionally released. The responsibility of 
the media to disseminate information shall be exercised without undue hindrance. In 
that process those responsible are expected to be forthright and to have the nation’s 
interest as the primary consideration (The Punch, August 28, 1985, p. 7). 
At the bottom right of the same page was a short news story on the issue titled ‘Obnoxious 
DN4 Abrogated’ containing no new information but presumably intended to flaunt and 
showcase that the main reason behind the take-over of power was, precisely, the press. The 
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victory is there for all to see:  the ‘unconditional release’ of jailed and detained journalis ts as 
well as the ‘immediate repeal’ of Decree 4. In this way, the press boasts about, and boosts, its 
own power: it had effected the change in governance. 
Interestingly, while Babangida rescued the press from the jaw of Decree 4, he nonetheless still 
acknowledged its recklessness, not mincing his words in sounding a warning in his broadcast. 
The granting of ‘undue hindrance’ came with the expectation of the press being ‘forthright’ 
and acting in the ‘nation’s interest’. Here, I want to engage with these three phrases and the 
issues underlying them – ‘undue hindrance’, ‘forthrightness’ and ‘national interest’.  The threat 
here was clearly that if the press was not ‘forthright’ and jeopardised ‘the national interest’, 
intervention by the military government, and in whatever manner, would become justified 
(‘due hindrance’). Intriguingly, implicit in Babangida’s conditions is exactly the same issue 
Decree 4 sought to solve. Was Babangida (like Buhari) also being honest from the outset by 
not promising his rescued friends an unfettered press freedom? So what, if anything, had 
changed? 
Throughout the 30-day period both newspapers were awash with news reports justifying the 
intervention of Babangida by referring repeatedly to the Buhari regime as ‘arrogant’ and 
‘insensitive’ while welcoming Babangida’s positive proclamations. Interestingly, there were 
also instances where the press criticised the previously toppled democratic regime of Shagari; 
perhaps indicating to Babangida that the press was not in a hurry for another democratic 
government. This is consonant with the position of both The Guardian and National Concord, 
rejecting a hasty return to civilian governance (see Chapter Four).  
 Thus in its editorial of 28th August, 1985 (the day following the coup) titled ‘Cautious 
Optimism’; The Punch lamented the nation’s woes since independence (in the first three of a 
thirteen-paragraph editorial) and described the coup as a ‘mere change in leadership structure, 
not a fundamental structural shift’. The editorial appeared on the front page in a designed 
rectangle and in bold capitals, attracting attention, stressing its importance and continuing on 
page four. Challenging Babangida, it urged him to convince Nigerians that he could lift the 
nation out of its woes. The remaining ten paragraphs were devoted to spelling out policies 
which the paper felt the regime should adopt. Reinforcing its hard-line stance on democratic 
government, one paragraph insisted that Babangida arrest and prosecute the key actors in the 
deposed democratic regime, particularly ex-president Sheu Shagari and his vice-president, 
Alex Ekwueme: 
117 
 
 
 
We call for the immediate trial of the key political actors (Sheu Shagari, Alex Ekwueme 
etc.) of the Second Republic. Our experience with the Shagari regime and the Buhari’s 
military junta had shown that one was a logical extension of the other, and by simple 
inference, deduced from 20 months of silence on these key political actors, we would 
never expect a fair justice under a decadent rule of law (The Punch, August 28, 1985, 
pages 1 & 4). 
Given the bitter experience of the press under the regime of Buhari, it might be expected that 
if the press wanted any form of revenge, it would be against the regime of Buhari not the 
democratic regime of Shagari when newspapers ‘flowered’ (Uche 1989). Yet twenty months 
after Shagari was ousted, The Punch still wanted his regime to be sanctioned. The 
contradictions were understandable. The paper may have realised the futility of asking 
Babangida to punish Buhari, his former boss, since military tradition forbids querying a 
superior officer, at least in the Nigerian context. Criticising the Shagari regime suggests some 
semblance of a liberal tradition of holding public officials to account, providing a respectable 
cover, whilst the paper simultaneously supports the new military regime.  
However, a more significant imperative for calling for Shagari’s head probably lies in the fact 
that The Punch was one of the opposition papers rejecting the result of the 1983 general 
elections: its preferred candidate, Obafemi Awolowo, lost to incumbent Shagari. Indeed, as 
Adigun Agbaje noted, The Punch was deeply involved in the planning of the coup that toppled 
Shagari, to the extent that editors knew that Buhari was going to be head of the new government 
(Agbaje, 1990). I assume, therefore, that the editorial, calling for Shagari’s head is a 
continuation of the ‘double allegiances to political and professional goals’ (Golding and Elliot 
1979) that had become a permanent feature of the press since post-independence. Inferentia l ly, 
the editorial’s call on Babangida to revisit and punish political actors of the Second Republic 
acts as signal to Babangida not to be in a hurry to transit to democracy. This ‘no to democra cy’ 
stance, was also reminiscent of National Concord’s opposition to a ‘quick’ return to 
democracy, and The Guardian’s wish for a ‘long military rein’ at the inception of Buhari’s 
regime (see Chapter Four). 
Also on the front page is a story of the coup: ‘Buhari’s govt falls after 605 days’, with a full 
length photograph of Buhari and Babangida, taken at an occasion before the coup. Both are in 
their military uniforms, discussing issues as they walk, Buhari, with his hands folded behind 
his back, lowers his head, as he talks with his army chief Babangida, now the new head of state. 
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The latter’s arms swing freely, he strides confidently, head turning in the direction of Buhari. 
Buhari’s image is that of a subdued and dejected superior while Babangida appears dominant 
and queries his overthrown boss. Though Buhari is taller than Babangida, the latter’s confident 
features in the photograph more than compensate for his diminutive stature. Put succinctly, The 
Punch appears mocking the ‘rigid and uncompromising’ Buhari.  
 
Figure 9: The Punch, Wednesday August 28, 1985, p. 1 
The impact of news photography and other visual aids in news stories cannot be 
overemphasized. Matthew Shulman contends that ‘print editors know that readers are drawn to 
photos and artwork before the printed word’. Shulman further notes that editors will go after 
‘well-composed photographs if they illustrate the assertions in a news analysis, or portray the 
human condition described in a feature article’ (Shulman 1994, p. 25). It is thus not surprising 
that The Punch finds the photograph in Fig 9 perfectly fitting to illustrate the story of the fall 
of the ‘arrogant’ Buhari and the ‘victorious’ Babangida in whom the press is pleased.  
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Not surprisingly, an editorial attacking the ‘unpopular and draconian’ Decree 4 soon appeared. 
Titled ‘The Death of Decree 4’ (Saturday August 31, 1985, p .4), the paper declared the decree 
(albeit short-sightedly as it turned out) ‘dead and buried along with the characters that came up 
with it’14. It lamented the arrogance of the Buhari regime for squandering the ‘fruitful romance’ 
offered his regime by the press. In a subtle revelation that the press may have been part of the 
plot, to oust Buhari from power, the editorial states that Babangida was right for not ‘allowing 
the decree to survive a day longer once it was obvious that the change of guard at the nationa l 
level was a fait accompli’. Confirming its alliance with the regime, the editorial assured 
Babangida: 
The Punch welcomes the repeal by President Ibrahim Babangida. Indeed, we are more 
inclined to welcome the new attempt at forging a cooperative and nationally beneficia l 
link with the press because the new government has gone all out to assure the nation of 
its respect for the wisdom and supremacy of the people even within a non-democratic 
setting as a military regime.  
In this editorial the choice of language arguably suggests that the press was not a bystander in 
the coup, but that there may have been some bargaining prior to the event. This is what I earlier 
termed ‘agreed liberalism’ between the regime and the press. The editorial declares firstly: ‘it 
was obvious that the change of guard was a fait accompli’ and secondly points to ‘forging a 
cooperative and nationally beneficial link’. The question arising is who was aware of the 
‘obvious’ change of guard as ‘a fait accompli’? Could The Punch be referring to the fall out of 
Decree 4 as a sign that Buhari regime would inevitably fall? (i.e. a fait accompli).  It might 
therefore be deduced that during the campaign against Buhari, the press struck an accord with 
Babangida, on how they could work together in a ‘beneficial manner’. This was obvious 
immediately Babangida seized power when he cited in his broadcast: ‘human rights violations’ 
of the Buhari regime particularly Decree 4 as key reasons behind his coup (see pp. 115, 116 
above). 
Alongside this editorial was a cartoon showing Babangida holding what looks like the gazette 
of Decree 4 while a journalist (judging by the caption) excitedly sets it ablaze with a lighter. 
The caption, referring to a bewildered Buhari reads, ‘With all pleasure. We have self-
                                                                 
14 Rather than ‘dead and buried’, Decree 4 resurfaced later in different ways in the course of Babangida regime.  
120 
 
 
 
censorship’. The cartoon is straight to the point — mocking Buhari and telling him his 
‘draconian’ Decree 4 is gone.  
 
Figure 10: The Punch, Wednesday August 31, 1985 p. 4 
As already noted (see Chapter Three above), the role of cartoons in political struggles cannot 
be downplayed. Eko (2007) and Hammett (2010) stress their particular importance in power 
struggles, as effective tools both in dissenting against unpopular regimes and in stabilising and 
reinforcing hegemonic powers. They are ‘powerful spaces in which negotiations of power and 
resistance are expressed’ (Hammett 2010, p. 4). Here, The Punch cartoon setting ablaze Decree 
4, demonises the Buhari regime, while simultaneously promoting Babangida’s ‘civility’ that 
allows freedom of expression (self-censorship). In chapter four, I established the leading role 
the press played in the collapse of the democratic regime of Shagari and the work of 
legitimation done to stabilise Buhari regime. In figure 10, the press follows a similar pattern: 
mocking the deposed Buhari and celebrating the untested Babangida. 
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Such cartoons have helped give credibility to the ‘liberal’ stance of the Nigerian press, without 
analysing their implications on the democratic struggles. For instance, Ayo Olukotun, 
reviewing five years of Babangida’s regime (1988-1999), argues that the press, building on the 
protest tradition of the colonial period, ‘carried the struggle against the military class to a new 
pitch’ (Olukotun 2002, p. 1). I will return to this issue later. Suffice to state here, that we might 
question this view.  
Throughout the first 30 days were public relations type news reports in The Punch purporting 
that Nigerians accepted Babangida’s coup, with ‘endorsements’ from notable professiona l 
bodies and associations, as well as individuals. A sample of such stories includes: ‘Mass 
support for Babangida’ (Thursday August 29, 1985, front page); ‘ASUU supports change of 
Govt’ (ASUU is the influential Academic Staff Union of Universities) and ‘NUJ hails death of 
DN4’ (Nigerian Union of Journalists applauding the repeal of Decree 4) (Thursday August, 29, 
1985); ‘A long day indeed for the President’ (a photo splash showing Babangida’s many events 
of the day such as swearing-in of officials and meeting with diplomats) (Saturday August 31, 
1985); and ‘Babangida born under the sign of wisdom’ (Monday, September 2, 1985). There 
was also an article by a notable media figure and columnist, Tola Adeniyi in his column ‘Tola 
Adeniyi’s Third Coming’, titled ‘The collapse of arrogance’. He dissected the 20-month old 
regime of Buhari and declared that the regime’s collapse was owing to its arrogance and 
insensitivity (The Punch, Tuesday September 3, 1985, p. 7). Further critical stories included 
revelations by freed detainees, editorials lamenting the harsh conditions under the regime, as 
well as articles and letters to the editor. In many ways in his first month in office, Babangida 
received a golden hello from The Punch. 
The Nigerian Tribune also offered editorials and news reports about violation of detainees’ 
basic rights under Buhari, as well as stories boosting Babangida’s popularity. The first editorial 
after the coup was on Sunday September 1, 1985, on the front page for more effect, and 
continuing on page 3. Titled in bold ‘Buhari’s torture chambers’ and framed to stand out, it 
lamented the ‘gross abuse of human rights and desecration of the human person by the fascist 
and tyrannical regime of Buhari’. The editorial was accompanied on the front page by 
supporting news stories: ‘Students rule NSO “den”’ reports on the activities of detained student 
activists in the facility of National Security Organisation (NSO), a state secret service holding 
alleged offenders and in contrast, ‘Detainees: Prison gates open’, reports that prison gates were 
flung open and detainees were released following an order by Babangida in his coup broadcast. 
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In these ways the ousted Buhari regime is exposed and Babangida’s take-over of power 
justified. 
A further interesting cartoon appeared on page three of Tuesday September 3, 1985 edition of 
Nigerian Tribune (Fig 11). A woman in a designer top with the inscription ‘press’ and a 
handbag marked ‘Accord’, was seen covering herself with an umbrella. Accompanying her is 
Babangida who throws his arm across the woman’s shoulder. Both seem excited and are 
laughing. On their left hand side, to the right of the cartoon, drenched in the rain, is Buhari with 
his mouth wide open and a finger placed between his upper and lower teeth, suggesting 
bewilderment. He looks in the direction of the woman and Babangida, apparently querying the 
‘Accord’ in the caption beneath: ‘Beautiful bride again?’ 
The ‘lovely couple’ highlights the new ‘romantic’ alliance between the press and the Babangida 
regime. In the downpour (difficult times), the woman chooses to share her umbrella with 
Babangida, leaving Buhari to endure the elements (and his fate) alone. Given Buhari had 
previously enjoyed a relationship with a woman (the press) this rejection implies that he is 
being punished for his past demeanours. By openly sheltering the new man (cosying up) to 
Babangida, the cartoon represents the press as mocking the ‘arrogant and insensitive’ Buhari 
(see p. 123 below). Looking at the cartoon in another way, it might be seen as a criticism of the 
press on par with a woman being mocked if she jumps from one man to another in traditiona l 
Nigerian society. The caption ‘Beautiful bride again?’ appears to doubt whether the press 
(woman) will in the long run establish a long term relationship. It is a warning to Babangida 
that the ‘Accord’ may not after all be a genuine one and that the press will jump to another 
regime (man) if things go awry. 
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Figure 11: Nigerian Tribune, Tuesday September 3, 1985 p. 3 
This idea of a ‘marriage of convenience’ and shifting of allegiances on the part of the press 
was aptly captured by various media and state personnel I interviewed. Specifically on the 
crisis of confidence between the military and the press during the period, Chief of General Staff 
under the Abacha regime and a former military governor under Buhari commented: 
It is an irony of event because I have never seen any military regime that was not 
heralded/supported by the press at the beginning, but along the line, the ovation was 
over. May be the expectation of the press starts falling short of what they had in mind, 
and then the dinner is over (General Oladipo Diya, October 10, 2011). 
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General Diya’s view was echoed by Mohammed Haruna, former Managing Director of New 
Nigerian Newspapers and erstwhile chief press secretary to ex head of state, General 
Abdusalami Abubakar. When I asked him about this behaviour of the press, he submitted : 
‘There is nothing complex about it… it is contradictions that we see everyday. In the press, 
what we do is to say one thing and do another thing… we pontificate, we moralise, but we do 
something else’ (Interview on June 20, 2012). 
In many ways this analysis of the first thirty days of Babangida reveals a similar pattern to the 
same period of the Buhari regime — campaigns in support of military rule and a demonisat ion 
of democratic governance, a perspective consonant with Francis Nyamjah’s view that ‘media 
that genuinely advance democratisation in Africa are rare’ (Nyamjah 2005, p. 272). 
However, there is some difference in how the press welcomed the Babangida regime: it was 
devoid of the flamboyance associated with the Buhari regime. The reason was, perhaps, the 
upshot of the sanctions and ‘discipline’ imposed on the press by Decree 4. The press’s fear and 
anxiety under Buhari arguably moderated its behaviour so that the response to the Babangida 
coup was more reflective than reactive – fear of the impact of ‘professional misconduct’ still 
haunting it. 
 
Riding Through the Storm, Negotiating Friendship 
In line with Babangida’s promise to run an ‘open’ administration, a number of national issues 
emerged early in his regime that tested his relationship with the press. The first was a decision 
by the regime to take further loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to revamp the 
ailing economy in September, 1985. Babangida had thrown the debate open by setting up a 
Presidential Committee on IMF Loan Debate to allow Nigerians the opportunity to be part of 
the decision making process. Tunji Olagunju quotes Babangida as saying: “it is important that 
the choices inherent in the IMF conditions be fully explained to our people” (Olagunju et al 
1993, p. 82). This decision, according to Ndaeyo Uko, a former journalist with The Guardian 
was ‘a brilliant stunt that captured the essence of the press — openness and debate’; it was 
Babangida’s way of keeping his side of the bargain with the press (Uko 2004, p. 95). 
Though opinions diverged on the Loan Debate, the overall report of the Committee did not 
favour the IMF loan. Scoring another PR goal, Babangida deferred to this opinion and rejected 
the IMF loan as the “only part of honour” (Olagunju et al 1993, p. 83). It was significant, 
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however, that during the debate, the press’s disposition was neutral. Given the public hostility 
to the IMF issue, it might be expected that the press would lead the debate, but conscious of its 
obligations under the ‘agreed terms’ not to antagonise the regime, the press’s involvement the n 
was ineffectual. Further, even after Babangida opted for a home grown economic solution 
under the Structural Adjustments Programme (SAP) (which led to cuts in public services, later 
snowballing into riots), the attitude of the press toward Babangida was still lenient.  
There were other pressing issues that led to the arrest and detention of journalists and 
proscription of media houses up until 1992, in what can be described as a 'cat and mouse 
game'15 game between state and press. Yet the relationship with the regime remained cordial. 
One significant issue referred to above (p. 113) was the assassination of Dele Giwa, editor of 
the popular weekly magazine Newswatch in 1986. According to various accounts, Giwa was 
close to elites in power, business and diplomatic circles (Uko 2004, Oloyede 2004). He 
received a parcel bomb marked ‘from the office of the President’ which exploded and killed 
him. It is suggested that Giwa might have been killed by the Babangida regime for a series of 
investigative activities embarrassing to the latter. More disturbing perhaps was another lead 
pointing to conspiracy within the press and involving Giwa’s own colleagues (Uko 2004, 
Oloyede 2004). To date, Giwa’s death remains unresolved but at the time there was no 
concerted effort, either by the Babangida regime and the police or the press, to resolve the 
crime, pointing to a possible state-media conspiracy.  
The suspicion of an ‘enemy within’ over Giwa’s murder was further strengthened when 
Newswatch awarded Babangida ‘Man of the Year’ in 1989, and in 1990 the latter appointed 
Newswatch director, Alex Akinyele as Minister of Information. Yet in spite of these signs of 
camaraderie, the editor succeeding Dele Giwa, Ray Ekpu denied his team had a ‘chummy  
chummy’ (Ekpu 1992, p. 27) relationship with the regime. Further, Ekpu added: ‘All of us were 
worried about what happened [in relation to Giwa’s death], particularly because the details 
were not clear and still aren't clear’ (p. 27). Nevertheless these events do encourage the idea 
that the relation between military regime and the press was deeply problematic.  
As in the Newswatch case, several other editors who were either arrested or whose media 
houses were closed down became beneficiaries of Babangida’s ‘generosity’ (Uko 2004, pp. 99 
                                                                 
15 By cat and mouse, I mean a situation where the regime and the press pretend there was no love lost between 
the two. A contrived game of constant pursuit, captures and escapes. Whereas, while the public may sympathise 
with press and blame the regime for stifl ing free speech, both actually engaged in symbiotic relationship in which 
one assists the other resulting in mutual benefits. 
126 
 
 
 
– 106), including, interestingly, Nduka Irabor, one of ‘The Guardian Two’ jailed by Buhari 
regime. He was appointed as the chief press secretary to Babangida’s Vice President, Augustus 
Aikhomu. Babangida also succeeded in wooing critics, like Professor Wole Soyinka, appointed 
as Head of the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC). This co-option has been criticised as 
a ‘show of avuncular geniality –— a form of positive censorship aimed at silencing people 
through amity’ (Uko 2004, p. 98). It is not surprising therefore that despite the fact that by 
1993, Babangida had surpassed Buhari’s records in terms of the number of journalists arrested, 
detained and media houses closed there was little or no resistance from the press. Even when 
some of those co-opted realised they were being used, they felt paralysed to speak out. As Wole 
Efunuga, Editor of Sunday Tribune retrospectively highlights:  
When some of our colleagues took up the appointments, they thought they were doing 
it in the interest of the masses, but soon discovered what they had in mind was not in 
tandem with the military’s. Wole Soyinka was appointed to head the Federal Road 
Safety Commission to project its image, but discovered he could not cope with the 
situation. Likewise, late social critic, Dr Tai Solarin was appointed to work for the 
People’s Bank of Nigeria, but discovered when he got there that what he had in mind 
was not in agreement with what those who appointed him had in mind. Some people 
who were appointed would have been given a rough idea of what they were going to 
do, but as soon as they got there, they discovered the situation was different from the 
initial briefing. So, some of our colleagues who went there later regretted it. Some did 
not get the clearer picture of what they were appointed to do, and later regretted it 
(Interview on October 18, 2011). 
One might argue though that Efunnuga’s comments, like Ekpu’s denial of a ‘chummy 
chummy’ relationship and Uko’s charge of ‘positive censorship’ by Babangida, demonstrate a 
degree of disingenuousness, given the evidence from earlier historical moments. Babangida’s 
offering of carrots to the press was hardly a new game. With the exception of Buhari, previous 
military regimes had been in the habit of first wooing the press at inception for legitimacy and 
acceptability only to pounce on the press once stability was established (Agbaje 1993). 
Similarly, Efunnuga’s reasoning that his colleagues were not in the know of Babangida’s ‘game 
plan’, and therefore could not be held to account, is undermined by the fact that there is no 
proof that those ‘lured’ into government, particularly media executives, resigned their positions 
after becoming aware of the ‘game plan’.  
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In the end it was events around the June 1993 elections and a frustrated and unhappy electorate 
who disrupted and transformed this ‘game’.  
 
The run-up to June 12 
Any newspaper that values its freedom and believes sincerely in the liberty of the 
citizens of this country must wield the cudgel heavily, fearlessly and relentlessly against 
the oppressor and the budding dictators in our midst. 
Obafemi Awolowo (1981) ‘The Press in the Service of the State’  
By late 1991, the regime’s phased-elections had produced Local Government and State elected 
officials as well as Members of the Federal House of Representatives and the Senators from 
the two Government-sponsored political parties – Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National 
Republican Convention (NRC). The presidential election was scheduled at the end of the 
transition timetable (Olagunju et al 1993, pp. 172 – 173). This meant that a form of diarchy 
was in place from January, 1992 when the elected officials took office16. However, following 
the failure of the political parties to keep faith with the Transition timetable, and the ensuing 
crisis (see Chapter One) the transition, originally scheduled to terminate on January 2, 1993 
was extended to August 27, 1993. Further, in order to convince his critics accusing him of a 
hidden agenda, Babangida set up a Transitional Council to handle the remaining phase of the 
transition, while he remained in the background. The team was headed by Chief Ernest 
Shonekan, a former boss of the United African Company (UAC) and a holder of the Order of 
British Empire, (OBE) whom Babangida believed would be regarded as a respected public 
figure (Olagunju et al 1993, pp. 244 -247; Lewis 1994, p. 325; Oyediran and Agbaje 1999, p. 
152). 
The National Electoral Commission (NEC) introduced a new voting system after October 1992, 
termed ‘Option A4’ — an electoral system where candidates emerged through a series of party 
primaries from ward to national levels (Lewis 1994, p. 325) – with a nation-wide Revised 
Transition to Civil Rule Committee set up to implement this process and elect the executives 
of the two political parties. The plan was that if the method was successful, it would be used to 
                                                                 
16 Diarchy is a form of double governments — a system in which two systems can be practiced. Here, I refer to 
military/civilian arrangements under Babangida. 
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elect the presidential candidates for the two parties and, subsequently, the president itself. This 
was an attempt by Babangida to make the process transparent and produce a credibly elected 
president. As discussed in chapter one, I was in fact appointed to one such Committee in my 
Local Government and a witness to this process which gained widespread support. The stage 
was then set for the presidential primaries and the election on June 12, 1993. By February, 
1993, the Committee had concluded its national assignment and handed over the next stage to 
party executives (Olagunju et al, 1993, pp. 220 -224, Oyediran and Agbaje 1999, pp. 154 -
155).  
During these periods of fine-tuning the transition between November, 1992 and March 1993 
and in spite of the ongoing tensions between the regime and the press, the latter continued to 
give full coverage to the transition activities. With the emergence of MKO Abiola and Bashir 
Tofa as the flag bearers of SDP and NRC at the Jos and Port Harcourt party conventions (March 
27 to 29, 1993), analysis of both The Punch and Nigerian Tribune from June 1, 1993 shows a 
steady rise in political reporting, as well as advertisements placed by both candidates and their 
parties. 
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Figure 12: The Punch, Thursday June 10, 1993, p. 1. 
The Punch’s lead story headlined in bold type: ‘3 days to go: NEC, party leaders meet on 
Security’ (Figure 12) occupies considerable space suggesting its importance and is illustra ted 
with the photograph of the Electoral Commission’s Chairman, Professor Humphrey Nwosu. 
The Punch engaged readers, first by reminding them that the all-important June 12 Presidentia l 
election was 3 days away. Since this date was already well known, this was a call by The Punch 
for the electorate to prepare themselves for their civic responsibility. Importantly, the headline 
mentions two strong partners in the election: the electoral commission ‘NEC’ and the ‘party 
leaders’ (whose cooperation would be needed for the success of the election) ‘meeting’ on 
another important issue in the election — ‘security’. Thus reassuring the public that the major 
figures connected with the election were acting to ensure its success. 
The photograph of the electoral chief with his head slightly edging forward, his right arm raised 
and pointing (as if to stress a point) and an expressive face, all add meaning to the headline. 
130 
 
 
 
He appears to be presiding over the meeting and in a serious mood to conduct the business. 
Arguably the attributes of the headline and the photograph work together to capture the mood 
of the public in relation to the elections. The Punch is promoting the transition by engaging its 
readers in what Cohen and Young called ‘comparative recency’, by presenting the election 
story as a ‘dramatic performance’ in which the subject matter of the election unfolds, through 
the actions of central characters. In this manner, the readers become ‘spectators encouraged to 
participate vicariously in the performance through projecting themselves into the situation or 
identifying with the major characters’ (Cohen and Young 1973, p. 165). 
 
Figure 13: The Punch, Wednesday June 9, 1993 p. 9  
In contrast, Fig. 13 is a political advertisement placed by the SDP, ‘leftist party’ whose flag 
bearer is MKO Abiola. The ‘eagle’ mentioned in the advert is the logo and symbol of the rival 
NRC a ‘rightist party’ (Olagunju et al 1993, p. 217) and is used to represent the party’s 
presidential candidate, Bashir Tofa, while the ‘horse’, the logo of SDP is used as a metaphor 
for MKO Abiola. Thus, by comparing the smaller eagle to the larger and more powerful horse 
the advert insinuates that NRC’s Tofa will be unable to meet the daunting task of turning 
Nigeria around, while SDP’s Abiola will engage in the hard work needed to lift Nigeria out of 
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its socio-economic crisis. The TV interview referred to is the Presidential Debate in which 
press accounts suggest Abiola ‘floored’ Tofa. The declaratory: ‘Nigerians Beware!’ (In bold 
capitals) hyperbolically warns Nigerians not to vote for a less capable candidate — Tofa. The 
similarly declarative strapline: Don’t be deceived. Vote MKO (in bold capitals) again 
reinforces the idea that the electorate should not vote for the eagle but for MKO, the man with 
the horse power, who is also the subject of the advert. 
In the week leading to June 12, 1993 presidential election, a dangerous twist that later put the 
eight-year transition in jeopardy, surfaced. In its Tuesday June 8, 1993 edition, The Punch 
reported on the front page that two dangers might threaten the election. The lead story was that 
staff of the state-owned oil corporation, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), 
had commenced a nationwide strike that might halt fuel supply (see Figure 14 below). The 
headline in bold lower case was titled ‘6 days to polls: Fuel crisis returns’. The paper reasoned 
that the strike could disrupt the election, just four days away17. The other story, under the 
headline ‘…court ruling may stall election’, reported that the Association for Better Nigeria 
(ABN) had approached an Abuja High Court to ‘halt the election’ and ‘compel Babangida to 
extend his tenure till 1997’. The two stories were complemented with a photograph of General 
Babangida. Overall this front page creates a sense of unease about the upcoming election. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
17 Given the date of the edition of the newspaper, June 8, 1993 and the date of the election, June 12,  1993, it 
was 4 days to the election and not the 6 days reported by the headline. The current editor noted the error and 
regretted it was a miscalculation. 
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Figure 14: The Punch, Tuesday June 8, 1993 
I focus particularly on the photograph of Babangida to consider The Punch’s management of 
this unease and its support for the Babangida regime. In the photograph, Babangida dresses in 
a white traditional robe with a white head dress to match. He is seated gazing to the left with 
his left arm raised, fist clenched and touching his chin. There is something out of place about 
this photograph. Using a photograph where the leader dresses in a civil white robe (in 
traditional Nigeria, white colour symbolises purity), shows a worried frown (or maybe it’s an 
expression of disapproval), the paper leads the readers into a realm where he is seen as a man 
of peace looking as bewildered as any other concerned Nigerian at the new developments: the 
NNPC strike and the ABN court case. The ‘why all these confusions’ or ‘I am innocent of these 
developments’ suggested by the photograph, disabuses the populace of any suspicions they 
might harbour that he is not sincere about the transition. Given the anxiety provoked by the 
headlines and stories, the positive attributes of Babangida’s photograph alleviate or soften the 
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sense of disruption and potential chaos the news invokes.  The civil dress equates Babangida 
with the civil populace and renders him ‘innocent’ and maybe apart from the confused 
situation, whilst a photograph showing him in his official military uniform, looking tough and 
authoritative might have aroused anger, warning readers that current developments were 
incited by the military and that Babangida might not want to leave the stage (as indeed it 
emerged later). A wider shielding of the regime by the press over the longer period of 
Babangida’s regime was reinforced by Tunji Belo, a former editor of the National Concord 
who suggested: 
Of Nigeria’s past heads of state, Babangida remains the most astute in courting the 
friendship of top journalists and media practitioners. This could be part of his method 
at seeking legitimacy or popular acclaim like the human rights bogey. Whatever it was, 
it worked as many of these journalists soon became gatekeepers against attack on 
governments from critics (Olukotun 2002, p. 79). 
Nigerian Tribune also reported the threats to the election on its front page, Wednesday June 
10, 1993. There were three stories: two were slightly different from The Punch’s reports while 
the third was similar. The lead headline in bold capitals was titled ‘72 hours to June 12: FG 
cries sabotage’ with a rider in bold lower case: ‘orders NNPC to provide fuel for election’. The 
first part of the story reported the Transitional Council alleging sabotage by the striking oil 
workers, describing the latter as ‘ill-timed and illegal’ and with a directive to the management 
of the NNPC to take ‘immediate and appropriate steps to handle the situation’. Unlike the 
provocative report in The Punch, warning of ‘worst fuel crisis’, Nigerian Tribune’s report was 
reassuring, quoting an official promising that the strike would not affect election preparations, 
as ‘funds’ had been advanced to electoral officers to stock ‘petrol, engine oil, gear oil, and 
brake fluids’. Since there was to be a restriction of movement on Election Day, except for 
electoral and security officials, the story may have served to calm the nerves of a public 
wondering how the former would transport the necessary materials to and from the polling 
stations. The second, also a more upbeat story, was headlined in bold lower case, ‘NNPC 
workers to call off strike’ and reported that the striking workers were directed to ‘resume work’. 
The third report, ‘Court may stop election’ was consonant with The Punch’s story, speculating 
on the judge’s threat to grant the prayers of the ABN ‘unless parties to the case show cause 
why it should not be granted’. 
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Overall, these stories on the two from pages might present a confusing situation to readers: a 
declaration of a strike and the threat from the court to halt the election. But the positive  
attributes of Babangida’s photograph and ‘the strike to be called off’ (Nigerian Tribune), and 
equivalent aspects in The Punch, soften the tension. Both papers, if in slightly differently ways, 
actually highlight the dangers, but cleverly subdue the anger that might erupt with other more 
‘positive’ reports. This suggests an awareness on the part of the papers but the upshot is that 
the regime is shielded by the press, for the umpteenth time. 
Nevertheless, on June 10, the Abuja High Court made a wholly unexpected move: it stopped 
the election. The Punch on its front page Friday June 11, 1993, under a large banner: ‘Ikpeme’s 
court stops election’ reported that Justice Bassey Ikpeme of an Abuja High Court granted the 
prayers of the ABN. He declared: 
It would be wrong of me with my hands chained to encourage the National Electoral 
Commission to carry on an act of illegality in the name of presidential elections which 
had been tampered with by politicians. Given the evidence before me, it is the greatest 
shame that has happened to Nigeria and the entire political process and something must 
be done for NEC to sit up. 
On the question of jurisdiction, particularly Decree 13 of 1993, which bars courts from 
entertaining suits relating to the election, the report quoted the judge as citing another Decree, 
No. 27, 1989, which states that ‘it shall be the duty of all arms of government to ensure that 
democratic processes are not tampered with’ (The Punch Friday June 11, 1993, p. 1). 
The Nigerian Tribune also carried reports of the court’s ruling under the headline in bold 
capitals: ‘Court stops election’. Above this lead story, seemingly to alert the readers that the 
court might have trampled on the law, is a small quote from the section of the decree that bars 
courts from adjudicating on any matter pertaining to the election: ‘what the decree says’. 
Another story: ‘Who is Justice Ikpeme?’ reported that the judge had been on the bench for only 
two months, perhaps suggesting he was inexperienced for the job assigned to him. Clearly, the 
two reports put the court on the spot, but went short of overt criticism. It was more a question 
of putting the facts out and asking the readers to ‘judge’ for themselves – which could be 
regarded as an abdication of the press’s responsibility to offer a critical assessment of the 
situation in the public interest.  
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From the strike of oil workers to the court action, it is difficult to establish the motives behind 
this turn of events. But given the transition had been postponed three times (Olagunju et al 
1993, Ihonbere 1996) with widespread accusation that Babangida was sitting tight, 
retrospectively it is feasible to suggest that the regime was behind the emerging sabotage. Was 
Nzeribe’s association (ABN) acting as a conduit for Babangida, to derail the transition so that 
Babangida could stay in power? Was the strike by the NNPC a ploy to cause problems for the 
election? And if so, on whose behalf?  Was the court intimidated into making the order? Given 
Babangida’s preparations to insulate the election from challenges, it is difficult to point an 
accusing finger. For instance, one of the transition Decrees already signed into law was Decree 
1318, 1993 which ousted the jurisdiction of the law courts from engaging with any matter 
relating to the election (Sesay and Ukeje 1997, pp. 32 – 33). Bearing this in mind, the papers 
did not allude to any threat to the election at this point, perhaps still ‘trusting’ that Babangida 
was sincere (Interview with Felix Abugu, editor of The Guardian on Saturday, Tuesday 
January 16, 2013). Apart from quoting the judge, neither paper offered any analysis either 
condemning or supporting the ABN’s move, nor was suggesting the regime behind it. They 
preferred to let the readers decide for themselves. This might suggest they were aware of what 
might have been going on behind the scenes but did not want to ruffle any feathers, given their 
hitherto ‘cosy friendship’ with the regime.  
Nevertheless, with the election stopped less than twenty four hours before polling on June 12, 
it was to be expected that political tension would rise. Were the judge’s hands truly ‘chained’ 
by the evidence of electoral corruption during the presidential primaries, as made available to 
the court by the ABN? Was ABN acting alone or in concert with the Babangida regime?  
Certainly, electoral corruption had been evident at earlier moments, as demonstrated by my 
own experience of politicians offering me cash to declare certain candidates when they were 
not the successful ones (see Chapter One above). The presidential primaries of both parties 
held in March, 1993, were also marred with heavy use of cash to ‘buy’ delegates. Historica l ly 
too, Nigerian elections have always been fraught with crisis (Uche 1989, Lewis 1994). So the 
judge may well have been confronted with evidence of corruption. In a retrospective analys is 
of these events and corroborating my experience, the newly introduced ‘Option A4’ balloting 
system was switched to ‘Auction A4’ at the conventions, leading many politicians to call for 
                                                                 
18 Section 19, sub-section 1 of the Basic Constitutional and Transition Decree 13, 1993, gave the Electoral 
Commission (NEC) the exclusive right on matters relating to the conduct of the election. This was why NEC 
flouted the court order in the first place and went ahead to conduct the election. 
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the cancellation of the primaries (Oyediran and Agbaje 1999). Thus since the primaries, a range 
of problematic aspects were not scrutinised or revealed by the press,  only for the time bomb 
to be detonated at the eleventh hour by Babangida using the ABN as cover.  
 
June 12: Election Day 
Notwithstanding the June 11 court order to stop the election taking place, the National Electoral 
Commission (NEC) insisted on holding it, citing Decree 13 which insulates the commiss ion 
from court interference. The Punch on its front page story of Saturday June 12, 1993, under the 
headline: ‘Despite Ikpeme: Nigerians vote today’, reported that the Chairman of the electoral 
commission, Professor Humphrey Nwosu had told a press conference the previous night: 
By the virtue of section 19 (1) of Decree No 13 of 1993, the said order of the 
Honourable Court shall have no effect on the day or time of the holding of the 
presidential election coming up tomorrow. The election will therefore go as scheduled 
(The Punch, Saturday June 12, 1993 p. 1). 
 ‘Despite Ikpeme: Nigerians vote today’ projects a ‘defiant regime’ holding its own as the 
executive branch of Government, not under the apron string of the judiciary, thus, fulfilling its 
obligation to the public. An appointee of the president reporting directly to the president, the 
chairman might be seen by the public as demonstrating courage to press ahead. This firm hand 
again contributes to subduing public anger. However at the same time, the negative predicate 
‘despite Ikpeme’, reminds the public of a court order, but fails to alert readers that going ahead 
with the election ‘despite’ the order could create more problems. Given this was also not 
addressed in the news story, the public were provided with no means of understanding the 
significance of going ahead with the election. This was arguably an abdication of press 
responsibility19. The Punch was again shielding the regime from public anger. To make the 
point more clearly, a headline such as: ‘Danger! NEC to hold election despite court order’ or 
‘NEC violates court order, to hold election’ might have helped trigger a debate influencing the 
electoral body to stop the election, lodge an Appeal with subsequent court intervention. 
Belatedly the NEC did act in this way but the military stalled the process. 
                                                                 
19 This was shortly evident (June 16) when another court null ified the election on the basis that the election was 
held in defiance of a subsisting court order, and therefore was  i l legal (see below).  
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In a variety of ways then, the press covered up for the regime with half-truths and sometimes 
outright concealment of the real situation. The use of the passive voice or of nominalizat ion, 
as Van Dijk observes, is the way through which the newspapers ‘conceal responsibility’. 
‘Playing down an event by referring to the event in a lower (less prominent) embedded clause 
or conversely by putting it in first position when the event needs extra prominence, is a 
syntactic style of implicitness or indirectness’  (Van Dijk 1991, p. 188 ). As Roger Fowler also 
suggests, since ‘people are not in general trained to see through the veils of media 
representation’ (Fowler 1991, p. 12), it means readers are unsure of what position to take.   
According to Oyediran and Agbaje, the election was held amidst a ‘peaceful atmosphere’ 
(Oyediran and Agbaje 1999, p.157), and by June 15, 1993 results from sixteen States and the 
Federal Capital, Abuja, were released, showing MKO of SDP had won in thirteen States and 
the Federal Capital, with Tofa of NRC winning in three States (The Punch Tuesday 15 June, 
1993 p. 1). However, the following day another mine was thrown onto the path of the transition 
programme: a second court injunction suspended further announcement of the results. The front 
page of The Punch’s edition that day (Wednesday 16, 1993) was full of election reports. But 
my focus is on two prominent news stories. The first, ‘Another Abuja Court stops NEC…from 
announcing results’ and ‘NEC studies order’ (i.e. the electoral commission weighs its options). 
A similar story was also carried by the Nigerian Tribune: ‘Court stops election results’. Both 
papers reported that an Abuja High Court presided over by the Chief Judge of the Federal 
Capital City, Justice M.D. Saleh, granted an ex-parte motion brought by ABN to halt further 
announcement of the election pending the full hearing of the initial case instituted to stop the 
election.  
This decision by the electoral commission, which earlier disobeyed a court, established for the 
first time that trouble was indeed brewing.  In its Thursday June 17, 1993 edition on the front 
page, under a big banner, The Punch reported: ‘Presidential Polls, NEC suspends election’. As 
earlier, aside quoting the Court order and the decision of the NEC to ‘study’ the order and 
suspend further announcement of the election, the paper did not reveal any connection between 
the regime and the ABN; and there was no indication that the paper asked the NEC boss why 
he was now deferring to the court. No critical editorial or cartoon appeared either. This lull was 
perhaps further continuation of the press’s ‘abiding faith’ under the ‘terms’ of its cooperation 
with the regime.  
138 
 
 
 
Yet, confirmation that the press was aware of events behind the scenes was manifest in a 
compelling front page news story also in Thursday June 17, 1993 edition headlined: ‘Nwosu 
offered to resign?’ Quoting a foreign news agency, AFP (Agency France Press) it reported that 
the electoral commission boss had offered to resign, but Babangida refused his resignation. The 
paper further disclosed that efforts by its reporter the previous day to reach the professor or any 
of the Commission’s staff to confirm the story failed. By hiding behind a foreign news agency 
to break this news, the paper again did not take direct responsibility for reporting what was 
increasingly becoming public knowledge: the regime was behind the plots. By quoting a 
foreign news agency on the tension between Babangida and the NEC boss, the paper indirect ly 
informs its readers of the link between the regime and the electoral crisis, but without incurr ing 
the anger of the regime. This mode is what Van Dijk referred to as a ‘strategy of journalist ic 
distancing’ (Van Dijk 1991, p. 152) allowing journalists to make a point but preserve vested 
interests. 
Still, in spite of this ‘distancing’, some observers, including Bayo Oloyede, believed the press 
was still performing its liberal role. He suggests that the situation could have been worse ‘but 
for the traditional resoluteness, great courage and defiance of a large section of the press, 
particularly the private news media and their journalists who insisted that the truth must be 
published’ (Oloyede 2004, p. 153). However, this frame of ‘courage and defiance’ seems 
misplaced given the cautious coverage by the private titles The Punch and the Nigerian Tribune 
where ‘resoluteness’ is absent. For Ayo Olukotun it was The Guardian and National Concord 
at the frontline of private media opposing the regime, though he shows how during this crisis 
The Guardian admits in an editorial headed ‘In bad faith’ that the press ‘bent backwards to 
accommodate the Babangida regime’ (Olukotun 2002, p. 89) which orchestrated the crisis. 
Enjoying a beneficial relationship with the regime during this period, they were unable to break 
ranks. The result was a failure to critically appraise the political situation in the public interest.  
 
The Gathering Storm: The Annulment of the Election 
From this moment on, tension flared as civil society organisations rose to challenge the 
establishment. Meanwhile, the electoral commission was still trying to get the High Court 
orders withdrawn through the Court of Appeal so that the election results could be released. 
However, in a move that seemed to pre-empt the Court of Appeal’s intervention, the regime 
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announced the annulment of the presidential elections and all matters pertaining to it. Bizarre ly, 
the release announcing the annulment – ‘on a plain paper, unsigned and without a title’ (The 
Punch, Thursday June 24, 1993) – was distributed to State House Correspondents by the Chief 
Press Secretary to the Vice President Augustus Aikhomu, Mr. Nduka Irabor, The Guardian 
staff member previously jailed by the Buhari. The release clearly put an end to the transition 
programme by suspending all court proceedings as well as repealing the Decree in which the 
transition processes were anchored. Ironically, the election which united Nigerians on June 12, 
1993 had, by June 23, 1993 when it was annulled, became the source of divisions amongst 
Nigerians (Kwarteng 1996, pp. 190, 194). 
As people poured onto the streets, in spite of troops deployment, the press responded to the 
pressure and from June 15 and through July and August, critical stories against the annulment 
emerged. These stories expressed the angry reactions of notable rights activists and pro-
democracy campaigners, as well as critical reactions from the international community. Front 
page headlines included: ‘Voters oppose fresh polls’ (Sunday Tribune, July 4, 1993, p. 1); ‘IBB 
disgraces the Army, Danjuma’ (a former chief of Army staff berating Babangida for the 
annulment) (Sunday Tribune, July 4, 1993, p. 1); ‘Soyinka backs sanctions’ (Wole Soyinka 
backing the proposed sanctions by certain countries) (Friday August 6, 1993, p. 1) and ‘MKO 
meets US VP’ (Abiola meeting US vice president during his global tour) (Wednesday August 
11, 1993, p. 1). There were similar headlines in The Punch: ‘Soyinka, Solarin spit fire’ 
(Soyinka and another notable figure heaping pressure on the military) (Sunday Punch June 20, 
1993, p. 1); ‘Britain restates calls for release of polls result’ (Tuesday June 22, p. 1); ‘EC may 
impose sanctions on Nigeria20’ (Saturday June 26, p. 1) and ‘US recalls her citizens from 
Nigeria’ (Monday June 28, p. 1). In this context of critical press coverage and mass 
demonstrations, the military lashed out arresting and detaining campaigners and journalis ts, 
proscribing media houses (illegally, without court warrants). In turn these measures led to 
‘guerrilla’, ‘suicide’ or ‘underground’ journalism and media ‘terrorism’ — a journalist ic 
moment when proscribed media began operating underground and printing outside their 
premises in order to remain in circulation and keep the heat on the military dictatorship 
(Oyediran and Agbaje 1999, p. 119, Olukotun 2002, p. 132). 
According to Olukotun, this underground phenomenon was made possible by the civil 
populace, who had pressured the press to break its allegiance with the regime, and who 
                                                                 
20  EC, the European Commission, preceded the EU, European Union  
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provided logistic support to the hiding journalists (Olukotun 2002). Interestingly, disenchanted 
members of the security apparatuses sympathetic to the popular cause also shielded the 
underground press and passed on information of impending operations to journalis ts 
(Adebanwi 2011). In the midst of violent demonstrations, the regime made further efforts, 
ostensibly to placate the situation, by announcing a new presidential election (without Abiola 
and Tofa) and a promise to step down from power on August 27, 1993. However, campaigners 
rejected all proposals and demanded a revalidation of the annulled election results. During this 
period, the press’s coverage was more critical and an alliance formed between civil society and 
the press, but it did not wholly adopt an oppositional voice, an indication perhaps, that the press 
was still cautious in dealing with the regime. This tempering of criticism is evident even in 
cartoons.  
In one example from The Punch (Fig 15), the man refuses his dinner, telling the wife his 
‘hunger strike continues until Professor Nwosu announces the winner of the June 12 election’.  
In the Nigerian Tribune (Fig 16), a father and child exchange views on the concept of power 
transfer in the developed and the developing nations. The conversation goes thus: 
 
FATHER – IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, THERE’S A PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF 
POWER  
SON - HMMN! DADDY THAT’S DEMOCRACY 
FATHER – BUT IN AFRICA, IT’S USUALLY A TUG OF WAR 
SON – OOH-OO! DADDY THAT IS DEMOCRAZY 
Both cartoons suggest a problematic situation: the ‘hunger strike’ in The Punch, the linguist ic 
turn of ‘democracy’ into ‘democrazy’ (demonstration of craziness)21 in the Nigerian Tribune. 
But both, arguably, underplay a serious matter of national importance, manifest in the struggle 
on the streets, by displacing into the domestic sphere and reducing to a quotidian exchange. 
Perhaps such an approach would have greater appeal, including to women, than a more overtly 
                                                                 
21 Fela Anikulapo Kuti, a Nigerian-world renowned Afro-beat musician cum critic, coined the words 
‘demonstration of craziness ’ (democrazy or dem all crazy) to criticise the manipulation of democratic process 
globally. This particular track is in his 1987 album ‘Teacher don’t teach me nonsense’. See also Tejumola 
Olaniyan’s (2004) ‘Arrest the Music: Fela and his Rebel Art and politics’. Indiana University Press  
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political format. In contrast to the earlier cartoons supporting and legitimising Babangida in 
power, these seemed devised to temper criticism, to barely ruffle the regime’s feathers, and 
thus provoke no sanctions  
 
Figure I5:  The Punch, Tuesday June, 22 1993 p. 1 
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Figure 16: Nigerian Tribune, Friday July 2, 1993 p. 9 
Likewise, editorials on the issue of the moment were scant, and when they appeared, they were 
non-committal, even apologetic in relation to the regime, displacing criticism onto other 
parties.  Nigerian Tribune’s editorial (Saturday June 19, 1993 p. 3), titled ‘Judicial Anarchy’ 
occupied approximately half a page. As the caption suggests, it wholly places blame for the 
electoral crisis on the judiciary, accusing it of ‘incoherence and contradiction’. In the paper’s 
view, the various High Court injunctions ‘erode the authority of judiciary, drag it into disrepute 
with the potential to lead to public anarchy and mass lawlessness’. Not surprisingly, given what 
had become enduring support, the seven-paragraph editorial did not mention either the 
Babangida military regime or the association at the centre of the ‘judicial anarchy’, the ABN, 
as possibly responsible for the crisis. The electoral body, NEC was mentioned once while the 
judiciary and Courts were mentioned seventeen times. Negative phrases were deployed to 
describe the judiciary/courts, but the NEC was not attacked and Babangida and ABN were out 
of the picture. By this method of ‘journalistic distancing’ (Van Dijk 1991), removing 
Babangida and the ABN from the political impasse, Nigerian Tribune tries to transfer public 
anger from the regime to the courts and judiciary. In fact the so-called ‘judicial anarchy’ of the 
editorial, constituted little or no problem to the transition, since a single pronouncement of the 
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higher Court of Appeal could override any high court decisions. It is thus, curious that the 
Nigerian Tribune shielded the regime from any agency in the crisis but since this editorial 
appeared on June 19, it might be suggested that the paper was creating a soft landing for 
Babangida before the announcement of the annulment on June 23 – let the judiciary rather than 
Babangida take the blame.  Perhaps the paper was in some form of agreement with the regime 
on how to prepare the minds of the public for the impending coup against their electoral wishes.  
Notwithstanding this position adopted by Nigerian Tribune, it is interesting that some scholars 
have proposed that the press at that time was leading the people. Writing on the crisis 
occasioned by the annulment of June 12, election result, Ayo Olukotun insists the ‘independent 
media defied censorship and repression, and continued to harp on the restoration of civil will’ 
(Olukotun 2002, p. 90). Sina Alimi in his study on the role of Nigerian Tribune during the 
period, also argues that in spite of MKO Abiola using his National Concord to pull down 
Obafemi Awolowo (Nigerian Tribune publisher) in the 1980s, Nigerian Tribune did not see 
the annulment as an opportunity to pay Abiola back, rather ‘protected and sustained’ the ‘gains’ 
of the election, as well as ‘launch open criticism’ of the Babangida regime (Alimi 2011, p. 62). 
Alimi’s position sits oddly with the analysis above which reveals how the paper shielded 
Babangida.  
It seemed as if the press was not in a hurry to ditch ‘a friend in need’. Rather, any critical 
reporting of the escalation of violence was triggered by popular revolt by the people. In the end 
it was public support and public demonstrations that forced the press, or at least gave it a 
strength it had hitherto not had, to abandon the regime, at least in part, and once again defend 
liberal claims.  
As late as 30 June, The Punch is still engaging with Babangida. In the second part of a two-
part editorial, in the form of a front page ‘commentary’, also taking up the whole of page two 
to stress its importance, the paper comments: ‘IBB’s place in history (2), asking Babangida to 
respect the wishes of the people. One paragraphs reads ‘one thing we beg of General 
Babangida, though: he should leave for us what he met us with — one country, strong, united, 
peaceful. We plead with him, in the name of Allah, in the names of Maryam and Halimat  (wife 
and daughter), in the name of anything he holds dear, not to leave us a Yugoslavia’ (my 
emphasis). The paper concludes: 
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Time will surely heals the wounds of the Nigerian people, and when the present 
ominous cloud clears, General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida will be accorded his 
rightful place in history. Babangida holds the aces. What use he makes of them will 
determine his place in history. 
As in the cartoons above (Figures 15 and 16), Babangida was not directly held responsible for 
the crisis, but treated like a statesman standing by, potentially able to act responsibly, as crisis 
engulfs his community. ‘Time will surely heals the wounds of the Nigerian people’ and ‘when 
the present ominous cloud clears’, are phrases which avoid linking Babangida or ABN to 
causing the ‘wounds’ of the people or the ‘ominous cloud’. By not explicitly holding Babangida 
and ABN responsible, the paper left the mass of uncritical readers to guess or search further 
causes. In this way, by constructing sentences in the passive voice (Van Dijk 1991) The Punch 
perfectly conceals both Babangida and the ABN as agents responsible for the political crisis. 
Further, unlike the expletives poured on Buhari, when Babangida took over eight years earlier 
(‘arrogant’, ‘insensitive’, ‘fascist’), language in  The Punch and Nigerian Tribune during this 
crisis period was very different. To some of the press, the annulling of the result of an election 
adjudged the ‘freest and fairest’ in history (Kwarteng 1996, Ihonvbere 1996, Oyediran and 
Agbaje 1999) was still not a decisive enough event to totally break the cord tying them to 
Babangida. However perhaps it would have taken some strength and independence for a 
newspaper to fight the currents. After all, the arrests and proscriptions of media houses by the 
regime, demonstrated that even though their coverage was never explicitly critical of the 
regime, Babangida was still unhappy with the coverage.  
With violent demonstrations continuing and ethnic clashes in Lagos, between Hausa and 
Yoruba in particular, and others fleeing, it was increasingly impossible for Babangida to hold 
the nation together. Yet he continued to unleash further conditions on the press for their 
reporting on the crises. On Monday August 16, 1993, the regime signed into law a new decree 
which required all newspapers to register afresh. The Newspaper Decree No 43 of 1993 also 
established the Newspaper Registration Board22. Under its provisions, newspapers and 
magazines were expected to re-register with this board. Failure to comply meant a convict ion 
                                                                 
22 A replica of the colonial regime’s Newspapers Act of 1917, Decree 43, 1993, mandated all  newspapers 
published and circulated in Nigeria to register annually with the Board via a written application. The Board is 
vested with the powers to register or refuse a given application. 
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and fine, to the tune of Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira (N250, 000.00) or a seven year 
jail term, or both (Oloyede 2004, pp. 69-71). 
If Babangida thought the Decree would reduce the coverage of the crisis or temporarily cripple 
the press, the opposite was the case as the anger and defiance of the protestors on the street 
rose. Indeed, the situation was becoming a no-win for Babangida, not as a result of media 
pressure but as a result of intense violence, international pressures and descent into ethnic war. 
Although, Babangida remained fully in charge, there was sign of division among the military 
chiefs – some officers favoured a revalidation of June, 12 election results, others objected – but 
no sign of a military coup. Babangida no doubt commanded the loyalty of the majority of his 
fellow senior and middle rank officers through patronage, and so many people had benefit ed 
from Babangida’s eight year rule that a coup would have been a suicidal move (Kwarteng 1996; 
Ezeani 2005; Omotosho 2006). 
Nevertheless, with no clear way forward, Babangida appeared to accept that the game was up. 
He addressed a special joint session of the Parliament on August 17, 1993 where he declared 
his intention to ‘step aside’ on August 26, and relinquish power to an interim nationa l 
government. He also denied the speculations that he wanted to hang on to power. Nigerian 
Tribune quoted him: 
Following lengthy deliberations with my service chiefs, I offered, as my own personal 
sacrifice, to voluntarily step aside as the President. Our stewardship would always be 
available for posterity having been convinced that the present regime had scored first 
to have ran (sic) the most documented administration in this country (Nigerian Tribune, 
Wednesday August 18, 1993 p 1). 
 ‘Stepping aside’, on August 26, 1993, he relinquished power to a Interim National Government 
(ING) headed by the Head of his Transitional Council, Chief Ernest Shonekan23 (who midwifed 
the failed transition). Babangida retired, and along with him all service chiefs, with the 
exception of General Sanni Abacha, his long-time military colleague and coup veteran, 
appointed as Secretary of Defence in the new Interim Government, which in some ways can 
be seen as an extension of the Babangida regime,.  
                                                                 
23 Incidentally Shonekan is MKO Abiola’s kinsman — both are from the Egba division of Abeokuta, the capital of 
the Yoruba state of Ogun. Presumably, this was in an apparent move to divide Abiola’s homestead and weaken 
the agitation for the revalidation of the result of the annulled June 12, election. 
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Conclusion 
I would argue that in the context of debates about a ‘liberal’ press, the Babangida regime 
offered a new vista in the relation between media and government. Unlike under Buhari, 
Babangida faced many difficult issues of national importance: the parcel bomb killing Dele 
Giwa which was linked to the regime; the IMF/SAP debate; and the many adjustments to the 
transition timetable. All these events should have been critical moments when the press acted 
and commented independently of government. But the bond between the two was so strong 
that their relationship became inseparable and their voices merged. 
The Babangida coup which toppled Buhari rode on the crest of a press war against Buhari. In 
my analysis of the first thirty days of Babangida, I establish a strong link between the latter and 
the press. The link enabled a working arrangement between the two sides, which I have referred 
to as an agreed liberalism. This was evident in the way the press reported the regime in news 
reports, editorials, cartoons and other sections. Practically Babangida also demonstrated the 
alliance by releasing detained journalists and reopening closed media houses; he also ensured 
that an ‘inclusive’ government included the press. Thus, for the first time in the history of 
Nigeria, a government was run with the active participation of media personnel. As a 
consequence arguably, there could be no fourth estate of the realm. 
With the annulment of the result of the first ever peaceful and fair election (June 12, 1993), it 
might have been expected that the press would break its seven year old alliance with Babangida. 
But it could not, even as it tried to criticise the regime.  Ndaeyo Uko confirms as much, 
suggesting that in the face of all Babangida’s failings, the press ‘lowered its voice’ (Uko 2004). 
In explanation of this ‘lowering’ of the press’s voice, it has been claimed that the press was 
vulnerable to military tactics in Babangida years, but this appears less credible when juxtaposed 
with the fact that the press wittingly rejected Buhari and enthroned the Babangida regime.  
Did Babangida study the culture of the press to know how to deal with it or simply offer 
‘carrots’ with the aim of buying up the press? Ndaeyo Uko offers such an insight proposing 
that he had studied the causes of frictions between the press and various regimes so that he 
knew how to handle the press (Uko 2004). Nigerian Tribune’s editor claiming that Babangida 
was a ‘student of Machiavelli who understood that for him to have absolute power, he needed 
to court the press (Interview, October 18, 2011), poses a related view. Whatever the reasons 
offered for the umbilical tie of press and government, it is clear that ‘lack of separation of 
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journalism from politics’ (Golding and Elliot 1979) or ‘political parallelism’ (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004) was responsible for the cooperative strategy adopted by both the regime and the 
press. I aver that the understanding of the Nigerian press during this period depends on seeing 
itself as a part of the state and not a distant estate keeping watch over the affairs of the state.  
This is contrary to the optimism expressed by some scholars about the press’s touted advocacy 
role and outspokenness.  
Therefore, argument can be advanced at this point, that the Nigerian press collaborated with 
Babangida for its own interests. The collusion with Babangida regime was at the cost of 
democracy for the Nigerian people. It also led the people into the darkest era as the press sacked 
the interim government Babangida put in place in favour of yet another military strongman, 
General Sani Abacha, as the next analysis will reveal. 
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Introduction 
If Abacha succeeded in emasculating the press, it was not because he was too powerful 
or dictatorial but because the press had deliberately weakened itself. It had left the 
people confounded. The public was no longer sure whose cause the press was fighting 
or, indeed, what the press stood for: truth or falsehood, integrity or duplicity, democracy 
or dictatorship. With a morally bereft and selfish press to contend with, the Abacha 
regime won an easy victory.  
Romancing the Gun: The Press as a Promoter of Military Rule (Ndaeyo Uko (2004) 
In spite of the many dramatic and violent scenes that characterised Babangida's last days in 
office, for many people the subsequent Interim Government was a relief: Babangida did not 
revalidate the June 12 elections results, but nonetheless on August 26, 1993 he handed the reins 
to a civilian Interim National Government (ING) headed by Ernest Shonekan. As a successful 
entrepreneur and former boss of United Africa Company (UAC) it was anticipated that his 
handling of the crisis would differ from that of a military man.  With the exit of Babangida, it 
might have been expected that the press would then align itself with a civilian polity, 
reappraising democratic struggle. Instead, however, it contributed to the precariousness of the 
Interim Government, leading to another full blown military rule. 
No sooner was the Interim Government formed on August 27, 1993 than Lagos and other cities 
were embroiled in violent demonstrations trying to force the Interim Government out of power, 
and calling for the installation of Abiola presumed to have won the annulled June 12 election. 
While grappling with street demonstrations, on November 10, 1993, a Lagos High Court 
Justice Dolapo Akinsanya declared the ING ‘illegal’ and ordered machineries be put in place 
for instituting a democratic regime (Olukoshi 2002, p. 234, Aiyede 2010, p. 177, Ogbeidi 2010, 
p. 50). At the same time the press grew more ‘combative, militant, aggressive and antagonised’ 
(Malaolu 2004, p. 77) towards Shonekan as a Babangida ‘lackey’ (Felix Abugu, January 16, 
2013) and what they saw as the ‘lame-duck’ (Alimi 2011, p. 62, Olukoshi 2002, p. 234) 
government. In response Shonekan attempted to bring the situation under control by releasing 
some detained journalists, announcing the establishment of a commission of inquiry to probe 
the June 12 crisis, and indicating his intention to appeal the judgement declaring it illega l. 
However, these potential ways forward were stoutly rejected by the press (Daily Champion, 
Tuesday November 16 1993). 
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With battle raging on the streets, and the Interim Government under intense press criticism, on 
November 17, 1993 General Sani Abacha, defence secretary and veteran coup plotter (he was 
part of the two previous coups – 1983 and 1985 – as well as responsible for aborting the  bloody 
1990 coup against Babangida) ‘forced Shonekan to resign and announced himself the Head of 
State’ (Mahmud 1993, pp. 88, 89) thus instituting the most ‘brutal and sadistic’ regime 
(Olukotun 2010, p. 168) since independence in 1960.  
Opinions diverge on why Babangida let Abacha stay on with the Interim Government. Some 
believed he was left to protect military interest and stabilise the regime, given the precarious 
situation at the time, while others opined that the motive was that he should take the reins 
(Interview with Ehichioya Ezomon, Deputy Editor of Sunday Guardian, January 16, 2013) as 
master of the game and having played ‘John the Baptist’24 in previous coups. Or as Ndaeyo 
Uko quoting Babangida described him as the ‘Khalifa’ (the prince in waiting) (Uko 2004, p. 
112). 
But whatever the reasons, it is clear, as I go on to explore, that Abacha's easy ride to power 
was, again, the making of the press. Had the press learned lessons from the previous two 
regimes of Buhari and Babangida and embraced ‘fourth Estate’ journalism, it was possible that 
Abacha’s efforts to ‘take his turn’ might have been aborted. But so intensive was the press 
chorus for Abacha to come and clear up the mess that he didn't need troops and weapons to 
seize power (Uko 2004). Again, Abacha did more than his callers expected: in his maiden 
broadcast on Thursday, November 18, 1993, Abacha dismantled all the democratic structures 
already in place. Specifically, he ‘dissolved the Interim National Government; sacked the 
National Assembly and state governors and assemblies; dissolved local governments, the 
electoral commission and the two political parties; banned political meetings/gatherings and 
established a Provisional Ruling Council'  (Daily Champion, Friday 19 November, 1993 pp. 1 
and 3). With these announcements the nation returned to full blown military rule.  
Yet in his broadcast, Abacha also cynically (and contradictorily given his other 
announcements) appealed to what Uko later refers to as the ‘naïve’ press (Uko 2004, p. 117) 
by promising to respect human rights and uphold press freedom. He released detained 
journalists and de-proscribed media houses closed by the Babangida regime.  For this, Abacha 
                                                                 
24 John the Baptist is one of the Biblical Twelve Disciples of Jesus Christ in the New Testament, who announced 
the coming of Jesus Christ. Abacha similarly announced the take-over of powers in two previous coups of Buhari 
and Babangida, and perhaps, he felt it was time for him to be in the driving seat, rather than somebody else. 
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received press support, but as in previous regimes, the press’s ‘good’ relationship with Abacha 
was short-lived, the ‘honeymoon over’ (Interview with General Oladipo Diya, October 10, 
2011).  It was followed by the harshest treatment in Nigeria’s history, climaxing March 1995 
with the trial and imprisonment of journalists, for coup plotting (Jibo 2003, p. 229, Kraxberger 
2004, p. 416). 
Thus six months into his regime when Abacha had clearly delineated his authoritarianism the 
press changed its tune. Felix Abugu, editor of Guardian on Saturday, claims that the press 
invited Abacha to sack Shonekan’s Interim Government, on the basis of the ‘agreement, though 
not written’ that he would revalidate the June 12 elections result and hand over to Abiola, once 
the Interim Government was dissolved.  Abugu lamented that regrettably the ‘trust the press 
has in the military to do the right thing was betrayed’ when Abacha reneged his promise to 
hand over to Abiola (Interview on January 16, 2013). This ‘betrayal' then led to the press 
attacking the regime. As General Oladipo Diya, Abacha's deputy, reflected: the press supported 
the regime initially, but ‘along the line the dinner was over, may be because press expectations 
from the regime fell short of what they had in mind’ (Interview on October 10, 2011).  On the 
eve of the first anniversary of the annulment of June 12 elections (June 11, 1994), Abiola, who 
had declared himself president at Epetedo play-ground, Lagos (Ogbondah 2000, p. 233) was 
arrested and placed in detention.   
In the course of Abacha regime, political and financial corruption became endemic; there were 
assassinations of known opposition figures, including journalists and Abiola's activist wife 
Kudirat killed on the street of Lagos by agents25 of the regime (for her outspokenness over June 
12 and Abiola’s detention (Lewis 1999, Olukotun 2002, p. 122, Adebanwi 2012, p. 247). There 
were also two coups (1995 and 1997), alleged by the opposition to be arranged, aimed at 
reining- in those standing in the way of Abacha (Alimi 2011, Uko 2004, Malaolu 2004, 
Olukotun 2002, Ogbondah 2000).  
With this background in mind I analyse the news practices of Vanguard and Champion as 
discussed earlier in methodology chapter. I first dissect the Interim Government Babangida 
                                                                 
25  Subsequent trials lasting a decade at a Lagos High Court in 2011, found some agents of the regime guilty of 
the assassination of Kudirat Abiola, including Abacha's chief security  officer, Major Hamza Mustapha. The 
suspects were finally discharged and acquitted by the Court of Appeal in August 2013, while the Lagos State 
Government has appealed to the Supreme Court. 
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hurriedly put in place in August 1993, particularly the 17 days preceding the Abacha take-over 
of power (November 1 – 17, 1993 in order to properly understand the genesis of the Abacha 
regime. I then pay attention to Abacha's actions in returning the country to a full military rule, 
investigating what he considered to be ‘home grown' Nigerian democracy and his attempt to 
transform himself into a civilian president (though without first resigning from the milita ry). 
His adoption as the sole presidential candidate by the ‘five fingers of a leprous hand’26 (Lewis 
1999) was also examined; and in particular how the press feasted on the moment27 unwittingly 
promoting the presidential ambition of the man it claimed to be fighting against. Further, the 
chapter explores how from 1994 Abacha and the press parted ways with the latter demanding 
a return to civil rule. Finally I engage with the sudden, but suspicious death of Abacha on June 
8, 1998, thus ending a five-year long ‘catastrophe’.  
In the last part of the chapter, the focus is on Abacha's succession agenda. Between April and 
June 1998, he had succeeded in taming press opposition such that his plans to succeed himse lf 
almost became a fait accompli. With notable opposition figures, including some editors, either 
on death row or serving long jail terms for coup plots (Olukotun 2002, 2010); Nigerian society 
was gripped with a fear of Abacha 
 
Interim Government: The Press opted for the military 
The imposition of Shonekan by Babangida was insulting and contemptuous, and that 
robbed Shonekan of press support. The stance we [the press] took on Shonekan was 
because, it was a sad reminder of the insincerity of Babangida regime that we didn't 
want to have anything to do with anymore.  
Interview with Felix Abugu, editor of Guardian on Saturday, January 16, 2013.   
                                                                 
26  The late Nigerian Attorney-General and Minister of Justice and a notable opposition figure during Abacha’s 
regime, Chief Bola Ige, mocked the five parties that declared Abacha their sole candidate, dismissing them as 
‘five fingers of a leprous hand’ - a nomenclature that went viral in the media. 
27  As the five parties endorsed Abacha, there was a media frenzy as the press jostled to sell space to the regime's 
agents who wanted to congratulate Abacha and promote his presidential ambition. 
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As already indicated, Ernest Shonekan inherited a political and social crisis from Babangida. 
Yet the regime delicately sought to undo the annulled election by setting up a commission of 
inquiry and was diplomatic in trying not to humiliate or stir up anger in the military, whose top 
brass were said to be opposed to an Abiola presidency (Omoruyi 1999). Yet Shonekan’s 
constructive steps were rebuffed by the press.  
As reported in the Daily Champion, in his broadcast to the nation General Abacha in fact 
attested to Shonekan's courage in taking up the leadership of the Interim Government at: 
A most trying time in the history of Nigeria when there were lots of uncertaint ies 
politically, economically and socially. However, driven by a belief in himself, his 
countrymen and love of his country, he accepted to face the challenges of our time and 
showed great courage to take on the daunting task’ (Daily Champion Friday November 
19, 1993, p. 3).  
Indeed, Abacha's tributes to Shonekan could not have been more apt, in that it was an 
achievement that a civilian without a military background who had spent decades in the 
corporate world would shoulder such a precarious post in a difficult situation where he was 
surrounded by over-ambitious military politicians. Surprisingly, in spite of this courageous 
move, the press vigorously undermined Shonekan, alleging he was a military stooge (Alimi 
2011, Abugu 2013). As I discuss below, rather than a ‘sad reminder of the Babangida regime’, 
as Abugu alleges in my opening quotation of this section, the press’s opposition to Shonekan 
regime, was in fact, in carrying out a press/military organised coup that would see Abacha 
become the new head of state. This press/military agenda, denying Nigerians civilian rule, was 
a replica of Buhari’s 1983 coup against the civilian regime of Shagari. Adigun Agbaje confirms 
that this was carried out with the connivance of the press, such that top editors were already 
aware Buhari would lead the new government before it happened (Agbaje 1990, p. 217).  
Initially, from the moment Shonekan was sworn-in, on August 26, 1993, the press did not 
recognise him as a legitimate leader. Shina Alimi, a historian at Obafemi Awolowo Univers ity, 
(OAU), Ile-Ife, Nigeria, acknowledges that the Interim Government upheld human rights, but 
noted that the press considered it a ‘lame duck institution’ (Alimi 2011, p. 62) or ‘a bad 
Babangida joke’ (Uko 2004, p. 113) imposed on the Nigerian people. As such, the regime was 
not accorded any credibility. For instance, the Interim Government announcement of the 
removal of fuel subsidies early November, 1993, incited negative reporting and increased press 
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attacks on the regime, notwithstanding sound economic reasons advanced by the regime for 
the removal of subsidies. While not totally denying the press’s link with the Abacha coup, 
Abugu (cited at top of this section) insists that the press’s opposition to Shonekan was echoing 
others’ views that the military was better placed to solve the crisis it created: ‘The leadership 
of the people believed the military was better in terms of organisation and integrity to help us 
cleanse the augean stable and bring us back democracy’ (my emphasis) (Interview on January 
16, 2013)28. 
Analysis of some specific headlines makes the antagonistic approach by the press clearer. But 
I first suggest some more generic qualities of headlines. Daniel Dor in his analysis of the role 
of headlines contends that ‘functional definition positions the headline as a textual negotiator 
between the story and its readers’ (2003, p. 696). But more than  being a negotiator, headlines 
from another perspective, should be seen as ‘autonomous texts rather than faithful 
representation of the story they introduce and that unless one reads the actual news report, a 
distorted or incomplete account of the story is received’ (Ifantidou 2009, 702). Taiwo further 
notes that headlines ‘have hidden ideological meanings reflecting the views of those whose 
interest is being served and those whose interest is being undermined’ (Taiwo 2007, p. 218). 
Similarly, Van Dijk's highlights that newspaper headlines ‘not only globally define or 
summarise an event, they also signal (their) social or political opinions of the event’ (Van Dijk 
1991, p. 53). In this light, I refer to some pertinent stories and headlines. 
Supporting anti-ING interests, the Vanguard edition Friday 13th November, 1993 carried on its 
entire front page, stories that mounted pressure on the regime. The major headline in a very 
large font was on the threat of a general strike issued by the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) 
to the Government: ‘NLC gives ING 72-hr ultimatum’. Under the story was a similarly large 
photograph showing a bonfire made by protestors who barricaded the major Ikorodu Road in 
Lagos. Here, even before the ultimatum expires, Vanguard amplifies the strike threat implied 
in the headline with the photograph showing protestors making bonfires and barricading the 
road, and thus letting the Government realise that the people already oppose it. As a participant 
myself then, I can recall that reading such headlines and stories of our street activities (which 
                                                                 
28 By the ‘leadership of the people’, Abugu was referring to a coalition of civil society groups (pro-democracy and 
human rights groups) at the time, but including the National Union of Journalists (NUJ); The Guild of Editors and 
Newspaper Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN). As my earlier discussion has established (see Chapter 
Five above), some notable members of the press and other civil right groups, served and collaborated with the 
Babangida regime. Whether this ‘leadership’ was a true representative of the people and was working towards the 
revalidation of June 12, mandate was a most question. 
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were not in short supply) only spurred us on and increased street protests.  Another headline : 
‘Protests spread over fuel price hike’ gave accounts of the protests spreading into other states 
beyond Lagos. Such threatening language – ‘ultimatum’ and sign of escalation – the ‘spread’ 
of protests implies that we the protestors were on top of the situation and a sign that the 
government was unpopular.  
More specifically, on the same front page, was a story suggesting that the ING was arrogant 
and insensitive to the crises of the moment. The story is titled: ‘ING forges ahead despite 
obstacles – Shonekan’. The headline was taken from Shonekan’s state-of-the-nation address to 
the joint session of the National Assembly. I reproduce below the particular quote relating to 
the headline and as published by the paper, which gives insight to the tenor of his address. 
Despite all legal and political obstacles being put in our way, we are determined to 
succeed within our mandate for the sake of Nigeria; for the sake of democracy and for 
the sake of our children to whom we should bequeath a united, strong and viable nation 
(Vanguard, Friday 13th November, 1993 p. 1). 
The quote is a positive statement of reassurance to Nigerians that the Government will succeed 
in its efforts to find solutions to the crises notwithstanding the many challenges. And the fact 
that the ING actually took constructive steps, such as the commission of inquiry on the annulled 
June 12 elections results, attests to such an interpretation. 
However, since the press saw the regime as ‘lame duck’ (Alimi 2011), or ‘a joke’ (Uko 2004) 
and it was pushing for the military, in the manner Dor (2003) and Ifantidou (2009) suggest 
above, Vanguard presented the speech in a manner that suggested the ING was ‘defiant and 
insensitive' to the crises. The headline ‘ING forges ahead’ could be read as signalling to 
protestors that the Government was not deferring to their legitimate demands, was not letting 
anything get in its way; in this way it increased the tempo of violence. Whereas the tone of the 
speech actually reassured the people that the Government was attending to the obstacles to 
peace and affirmed the regime's resolve to overcome the challenges: ‘we are determined to 
succeed’. Since a headline is first and foremost a means to attract readers (in part a ‘textual 
negotiator between the story and its readers’ (Dor 2003), the majority of whom may not buy 
the newspapers – as we call it in Nigeria ‘free readers association’ – many readers were likely 
to hold on to in this way, rather than pay close attention to the actual statement made by 
Shonekan. 
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In other circumstances, it might have been possible for Vanguard to have carried headlines 
making the same points but less provocatively, e.g. ‘Despite obstacles, ING optimistic of 
peaceful resolution' or ‘Political Crises: We will overcome our obstacles - Shonekan'. Though 
as Fowler notes, the use of language by newspapers ‘does not have to be particula r ly 
melodramatic or ominously metaphoric’ (Fowler 1991, p. 165), i.e. to be hyperbolic, but 
Vanguard's choice of words in its headlines, as Van Dijk (1991) points out, clearly manifes ted 
the paper's political stance on the Shonekan regime.  All the stories align with the headlines : 
they reinforce what can be interpreted as provocative phrases in the headlines.  
In another instance, shortly after the ruling of a Lagos High Court had declared the ING as 
illegal (in a suit instituted by MKO Abiola) the Government filed an appeal at the Appeal Court 
in Lagos. Both papers reported the story on Tuesday November 16, 1993.  
On the court case, Daily Champion’s headline reads: ‘ING goes to appeal court’. The headline 
was displayed in red font over a white background making it strikingly different from the usual 
headlines so that it stood out as an issue of national importance. In Vanguard, the headline 
read:       
ING 
Appeals 
Court ruling  
The headline was tiny, squeezed and hidden; it was written in white ink over a black 
background, arranged in a deck, as above and swallowed up by a large banner on the 
Government-Labour negotiation: ‘Govt-NLC talks deadlocked…. and strike continues’. A 
large photograph of a highway, showing an almost empty road with commuters walking to 
their destinations (and thus evoking the impact of the strike), was placed under the headline. In 
this way, readers' interests have been guided towards the stand-off meeting with labour. The 
very important judicial issue of the appeal court case was downplayed. In arguably 
sensationalising events, Vanguard engaged in an ‘engineering of content and manipulation of 
public space’ (Owens-Ibie cited in Popoola 2011, p. 108) to suit its agenda i.e. the military 
agenda. The public is then led to see Shonekan as a leader not to be trusted. 
In contrast, the Daily Champion's headline: ‘NLC govt meeting adjourned – Labour's CWC 
meets today’, used less combative language: ‘adjourned' rather than ‘deadlocked'. As with the 
headline on the court issue, this one was displayed conspicuously in red ink over a white 
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background. It added a rider reporting that Labour's Central Working Committee (CWC) would 
be gathering after the meeting with the Government, suggesting that the negotiations were 
productive and on-going. Vanguard's rider, ‘and strike continues', gives an impression that the 
Government is unyielding and the situation a battle between two equally unyielding parties. 
Another story on the strike which appeared on the front page of both papers on the same date 
further reveals the disposition of the Vanguard towards the regime. ‘Labour strike paralyses 
business nationwide’. Thus it is the labour strike which is actively ‘paralysing' the latter, 
invoking a dramatic and widespread ‘nationwide' impact – a complete standstill or immobility. 
Compare this with the Daily Champion's headline: ‘Strike Stalls Business’. Here the agency of 
labour is not highlighted and the phrase ‘stalls' suggests the strike is slowing down business or 
that there is a temporary lull in business activity, which can be restarted. It is clear that 
Vanguard attempted to raise the emotional level of people's response thus piling up more 
pressure on the Government. Without the ascription ‘nationwide', for example, the event seems 
less serious.  
There were cartoons, mostly in Vanguard that also amplified the emotional level of the conflict 
between the public and the government, as one appearing in Vanguard 
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Figure 17: Vanguard, Sunday November 14th, 1993, p. 6 
The cartoon shows an angry citizen, the ‘common man', confronting Shonekan about the 
removal of fuel subsidies summed up in the phrase ‘Fuel Hijack', accompanied by a caption in 
pidgin English: ‘Oga! This cloud, hun…katakata go burst o'. The cartoon implies that the 
people on the street i.e. the ‘common man’ reject the ING. It also invokes violence: the 
‘common man' can be seen to yell and threaten Shonekan ‘katakata go burst o'. Katakata is 
Nigerian slang that stands for ‘wreaking havoc'29. University students who formed the bulk of 
the protestors were also caught up in ‘katakata’. They often displayed unruly behaviour toward 
senior academics who cautioned against protests outside the university environment and 
clashing with the security (see Chapter One above). Vice chancellors, Deans of students and 
other officials in charge of student affairs were often abused and pelted with stones and urine 
                                                                 
29. Indeed, violent protests that characterised the latter days of Babangida regime spilled Into the Interim 
Government with ferocity. The katakata slang used by the paper in the cartoon is one of the ways in which 
newspapers plainly incited violence. The period was marked with attacks on public buildings, state officials and 
security operatives, leading to the deaths of protesting youth, as security operatives quelled the violence, at 
times with l ive bullets. 
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in plastic bags, while in some cases official cars were damaged. The cartoon indicates perhaps 
how newspapers legitimated a culture of disobedience towards authorities during this period. 
However, unlike the passivity that characterised the better part of the Babangida years, The 
cartoon represents the ideological position of Vanguard – a rejection of ‘lame-duck’ Shonekan, 
and beneath this rejection, a desire for the military, as it turns out later. 
The above examples, especially from the Vanguard, typified the way in which most 
newspapers were opposed to Shonekan’s regime. With the latter represented as a threat to the 
unsuspecting public, the case for the return of the military was reinforced and amplified; and 
on 17th November 1993  a ‘forced resignation’ was imposed on Shonekan (Akinrinade 2006), 
paving the way for Abacha. It was arguably Vanguard and other papers (as Uko’s quote in the 
opening of next section indicates) that set and framed the agenda for the return of the military, 
whilst the restraint on the part of Champion was an exception. As Dennis McQuail notes, by 
‘using certain words or phrases, making certain contextual references, choosing certain pictures 
or film, giving examples as typical, referring to certain sources and so on’ (McQuail 2005, 
379), the media moves from ‘agenda setting – what the audience should think about’, i.e. (the 
focus on Shonekan), into ‘agenda framing – how they should think about it’ (how Shonekan 
should be portrayed) (Nwabueze et al 2011, p. 29). 
 
Press Invitation to Abacha: A Turning Point 
The press invitation to Abacha came from the most interesting of avenues. Guardian, 
the most highly respected national newspaper, in an editorial in October 1993 called on 
the military to intervene ‘as the only nationa l institution that can act as the honest broker 
in the process of reconciliation’. Abiola's Concord group of newspapers also called on 
Abacha as the most senior officer to stop sitting on the fence and intervene.  
            Ndaeyo Uko (2004) Romancing the Gun: The Press as a Promoter of Military Rule 
Abacha's eventual ascension to the seat of power, on the invitation of the press (as The 
Guardian, Concord and the Vanguard’s rejection of Shonekan reveal), casts a shadow on the 
Nigerian Press's liberal claim and raises critical questions about the press. Abacha had been an 
active participant in the nation's military politics for a decade (1984-1993) and a key player in 
the past two successful coups. This background would ordinarily have marked him out as an 
ambitious soldier and an interesting figure to the press. But it is strange that a ‘liberal’ press 
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should count on a man who in 1983 had announced and led the subversion against Shagari’s 
democratic regime. 
Beyond Abacha’s background, there were speculations between June and August, 1993, 
following the crisis that attended the annulment of June 12 election results, that some top brass 
of the army did not want Abiola as commander-in-chief. Retrospectively Ndaeyo Uko also 
confirmed that Abacha was generally regarded in the military as the ‘Khalifa’ (the prince in 
waiting) (Uko 2004, p. 112). Newspaper reports at the time also quoted Babangida as claiming 
that his ‘hands were tied', a view validated by Professor Omo Omoruyi, Director General of 
the Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) – a think-tank for the Babangida regime – in his book, 
The tale of June 12: The betrayal of the democratic rights of Nigerians (1993). He cites 
Babangida explaining why he annulled the election: 
Sani [meaning General Sani Abacha] is opposed to a return to civilian rule. Sani cannot 
stand the idea of Chief Abiola, a Yoruba, becoming his Commander-in-Chief at all; 
Sani seems to have the ears of the Northern Leaders that no southerner, especially from 
the Southwest, should become the President of this country. Sani seems to rally the 
Northern Elders to confront me on the matter. Where do I go from here? They do not 
trust me. Without Sani, I will not be alive today; without the North, I would not have 
become an officer in the Nigerian Army and now the President of Nigeria…… 
I don't want to appear ungrateful to Sani; he may not be bright upstairs but he knows 
how to overthrow governments and overpower coup plotters. He saw to my coming to 
office in 1985 and to my protection in the many coups I faced in the past, especially the 
Orkar coup of 1990 where he saved me and my family including my infant daughter.  
Sani, you know, risked his life to get me into office in 1983 and 1985; if he says that 
he does not want Chief Abiola, I will not force Chief Abiola on him….’  (Omoruyi 
1999, p. 165). 
Given many senior members of the press served in the Babangida regime, elements of the press 
may well have been aware of scheming within the military, of Abacha's importance to 
Babangida and thus that it was unlikely Abiola would become leader. 
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Decree No 61, 199330 (Interim Government (Basic Constitutional Provisions) Decree) which 
Babangida enacted to legitimise the ING also had some suspicious provisions that ordinarily 
would have interested a ‘liberal press'. While the Decree recognised Shonekan as the head of 
state, it did not make him the commander- in-chief of the armed forces, whilst Abacha was 
recognised as the ‘Defence Secretary’ and the ‘Senior Minister’. Strangely too, the Decree 
provided that in the event of ‘resignation or other untoward event’, the ‘senior minister’ shall 
succeed the head of the ING (Fawehinmi 1993, Ogbeidi 2010). It seems clear that in making 
these legal provisions, Babangida had marked Abacha down for the top job, presumably to 
reward him for his decade of loyalty. 
Given these anti-democratic tendencies, one might have expected the press to be vigilant and 
a pillar of support for the ING rather than its adversary, and at least concerned about warding 
off further military intervention. But it seems as if the press knew about Babangida's game plan 
to allow Abacha to take up the helm. During my interview with Ehichioya Ezomon, deputy 
editor of the Sunday Guardian, he defended the press, denying that it invited Abacha rather 
indicating that it was a ‘design by the military clique to pass power round — that was why 
Babangida left Abacha behind’ (Interview on January 16, 2013). The fact that Abacha later 
appointed Alex Ibru, publisher of The Guardian as the minister in charge of Internal Affairs, 
coupled with Uko’s quote at the top of this section, all raise suspicion that Abacha's ascendancy 
was not only known to the press ab initio but, possibly, was also facilitated by the press when 
it seemed he was dragging his feet, before eventually sacking Shonekan in late 1993. 
From November 17th, when Abacha took over the reins of Government, to the end of December 
1993, there appeared a relative calm in the press (not surprisingly if the above is true, i.e. 
Abacha was long awaited by the press). Immediately Abacha assumed power the stormy anti-
ING headlines characterising newspapers gave way to a celebration of the ‘new order'. 
Notwithstanding the ending of democratic structures by Abacha, the newspaper pages were 
adorned with photographs of Abacha and other military officers, as well as photographs of new 
civilian appointees, pumping hands and beaming. This new affirmative order, in part created 
by the press, reduced tension, particularly as regards the general strikes ordered by the labour 
movement. On November 21, 1993 the Labour movement ended its strike after meeting with 
military chiefs. Vanguard reported Labour's agreement in its edition of November 22, 1993 
under a large banner ‘Fuel price now N3.25 as NLC ends strike’.  Labour, which had he ld 
                                                                 
30 See Gani Fawehinmi: ‘June 12 crisis: The il legality of Shonekan's government’ (1993). 
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Shonekan to ransom, suddenly soft-pedalled realising they were handicapped in pushing their 
demands any further with the military. They accepted precisely the same concession that days 
earlier they had rejected from the ING. 
As part of his strategy to win hearts and minds, Abacha embarked on regular consultations with 
various segments of the society and the diplomatic community. Both Vanguard and Daily 
Champion reported events with the generous use of front page and other photographs, a 
journalistic mode giving further legitimation to Abacha. 
News photos, as scholars suggest, do more than attract readers. Sidey & Fox (1956) opined that 
editors will do all they can to hold their readers time and attention and their best weapons are 
their cameras. Gibson (1991) in another study advised that: ‘(1) Photographs can tell some 
kinds of stories far better than words; and (2) photographs can be used as strong lures to attract 
readers to text matter’. Given these powers, Fox (1993), Garrison (1992) and Zillmann et al 
(2001) were surprised to discover that little consideration is being accorded the use of news 
photos in text books on print journalism.  
Vanguard's photographs were in colour and appear to celebrate and present Abacha as a 
popular leader. Most photographs were cropped to show a full length Abacha either beaming 
or shaking hands with his guests, often wearing white traditional robes — a symbol of peace 
and purity in the Nigerian context. However, in the Daily Champion, most photographs were 
either in black and white and not obviously cropped, devoid of pomp, presenting Abacha 
mostly as a military man. While Vanguard homes in and celebrates Abacha, making him 
attractive to the public, the Daily Champion maintains some distance, reminding the populace 
that Abacha is a military man and perhaps, a notable figure in the crises plaguing the country 
— a representation that might caution some citizens from seeing Abacha as the ‘new order' 
portrayed by Vanguard. By presenting Abacha mostly in military uniform, Daily Champion 
also raises the possibility of yet another military odyssey in politics.  
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Figure 18: Vanguard Monday November 22, 1993, p.1 
164 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Daily Champion, Wednesday December 8, 1993, p. 1 
Captions on the two photographs also reveal how the two papers differently present Abacha in 
his official capacity. Vanguard refers to his two full titles, ‘Head of State and Commander- in-
chief of the Armed Forces’ accompanying the photograph of the official residence, the 
‘Defence House’ in Lagos, where he received the Japanese Ambassador. Daily Champion opts 
for the simple title ‘Head of State’ with Lagos represented as the place where Abacha received 
the President of the Benin Republic. While these representations might be seen as 
inconsequential, they help contribute to particular ideological positions. The title ‘Commander-
in-chief' is rarely used in the Nigerian press unless during a military event or in a real war 
situation when the President or the Head of State must be seen to be in control of the troops. 
The use of the title by Vanguard can be seen to align with the paper's wider labelling process 
which constructs Abacha as a ‘new order'. Together with the detail of his official residence, 
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this appears to convey two things: power and honour for the new strong man. In contrast, the 
photograph in the Daily Champion presents Abacha as the familiar general in the corridors of 
power for the past decade, rather than a ‘new order’. This is also consonant with the paper’s 
opposition to a re-emergence of the military in politics and manifest in its non-antagonist ic 
reporting of events under Shonekan. 
The Daily Champion placed itself on the side of the people. To engage in over-promotion of 
Abacha at the time, would have suggested the political situation was ‘normal', a concern 
expressed by the paper a few days after Abacha’s claim to power. In its edition of November 
20, 1993, Daily Champion carried a series of reports on its front page pointing to the paper's 
position. One of three headlines is: ‘Abacha’s tenure uncertain’, beneath which is a large 
photograph of Abacha and other military officers. Tallying with this headline, the photograph 
shows Abacha and other military chiefs looking sideward with some degree of discomposure, 
as some of them shield their faces with dark sun glasses. With Abiola in detention, June 12 
issue stalemated, and democratic structures dissolved with Abacha’s seizure of power, this 
photograph reinforces the uncertainty that the military faced. Other headline s are: ‘Democracy 
at crossroads - a news analysis’ and ‘New order creates worry’. All the reports various ly 
describe the situation as ‘a turning point'; ‘a crossroads'; ‘worrying' and uncertain’. And these 
evaluations are anchored by the tone of the headline — ‘Abacha's tenure uncertain'. 
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Figure 20: Daily Champion, Saturday 20 November, 1993 p. 1 
Daily Champion had already exhibited its considered approach, as Abacha took over the reign 
of power. Politicians and favour-seekers regrouping to align with the new military regime, 
bought media space in order to place congratulatory messages. The scale of the sycophantic 
celebration of Abacha in the press became so embarrassing that the regime had to issue a 
statement, ordering an end to it. In this context, Daily Champion published a critical editorial, 
‘Abacha and Sycophants’ (Monday 6, December, 1993 p. 4).  It decried the ‘obscene avalanche 
of goodwill messages in the media — newspapers especially’, commending Abacha who had 
‘been close to the seat of power for a decade, maybe even longer’ for stopping the ‘praise -
singers’ from their ‘unwarranted flattery and dubious’ messages.  The paper lamented that it 
was difficult to stop those with vast resources who choose to promote their personal agendas 
in an ‘ever thriving advertising business’. In deploying a particular vocabulary to describe the 
messages of support for Abacha,  ‘obscene', ‘praise-singers', ‘unwarranted flattery', ‘dubious', 
the editorial spares no effort in condemning the whole Abacha phenomenon as a charade, and 
in the process perhaps also casts aspersions on Abacha himself. 
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More widely, it is perhaps curious that the newspapers continued to accept the ‘flattery and 
dubious’ messages which ultimately promoted a military culture. But such messages not only 
dovetailed with the press agenda at the time: a preference for what they saw as an ‘effectua l' 
Abacha rather than a ‘lame duck' Shonekan. But also, as Shina Oladeinde, Associate Editor of 
Nigerian Tribune outlined, ‘economic considerations’ significantly contributed to the press 
having to ‘gravitate’ to the military state (Interview on October 18, 2011). Reinforcing the 
economic dynamic, Moshood Fayemiwo, publisher of the defunct Razor magazine and 
detained under Abacha, points out that the ‘press is a business venture which needs to post 
profits and or losses’; and ‘no newspaper can and has made it without advertisements’. 
However, Fayemiwo, having obtained a doctorate and now a Chicago-based author, was quick 
to point out the corruption of the press at the time. Concurring with the Daily Champion, he 
suggested that there were ‘also journalists who harboured bourgeois tendencies too and were 
unprincipled because they profited from the status quo’ (Interview on March 14, 2013). Indeed 
Oladipo Diya, a Lieutenant General and Abacha's second-in-command commenting more 
generally using the dictum, ‘he who pays the piper dictates the tune’. He reasons that the press 
cannot ‘be free’ in a situation where the Nigerian state owns press titles (during Buhari era) 
and reaches out to the press (in subsequent regimes). He further alluded to this culture as a 
global phenomenon even in established democracies, citing the example of the Nigerian 
expericne since 1999 when politicians establish media outlets to further their interests. In this 
instance, Diya opines, the freedom is compromised (Interview on October 10, 2011).  
On the whole then, notwithstanding Daily Champion’s greater ambivalence, the press heralded 
Abacha's ascendancy to the seat of power and helped consolidate it such that by the end of 
November, 1993 when Abacha released the names of cabinet ministers, military rule was again 
entrenched. A high number of notable politicians, including, surprisingly, Abiola's running 
mate in the annulled June 12 election, Alhaji Baba Gana Kingibe, and from the Yoruba tribe 
(Abiola’s kinsmen), accepted to serve under Abacha. The publisher of The Guardian, Alex 
Ibru also accepted ministerial appointment in charge of internal affairs, one sign that the press 
offered Abacha a licence to expand his political base. Nevertheless, by the turn of New Year 
1994, Abacha was beginning to articulate his personal political agenda and from that time on, 
the ‘honeymoon’ between the regime and the Press ‘was over’ (Interview with Oladipo Diya, 
October 10, 2011). 
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In discussing this stage, the press's war against Abacha and his ferocious response, Golding 
and Elliot’s views that the press’s ‘double allegiances to political and professional goals’ 
(1979) are pertinent, continuing  to impact negatively on the press’s quest to act as a ‘fourth 
estate’. 
 
A Familiar Story: The Press Withdrawals Support for Abacha 
Following the inauguration of cabinet ministers, including many of Abiola's supporters, such 
as Baba Gana Kingibe, his vice presidential candidate, there were speculations in the press that 
Abiola, whom Abacha had met earlier, had agreed on the formation of the new Government 
and advised on names and further, that Abacha would hand-over to Abiola. This rumour was 
validated by Fayemiwo: ‘Abacha told Abiola he was going to hand over to him, but Abacha 
was not a man of honour’ (Interview, March 14, 2013). This speculation, which led to 
accusations by activists that Abiola had sold the people's mandate to the military, prompted 
him to issue a public statement detailing his meeting with Abacha. The ‘advertorial’, with the 
title ‘The State of the Nation: My stand on June 12’ was published in all newspapers. Denying 
the accusations, Abiola stated that he was invited by Abacha for his views on the way forward. 
After meeting with Abacha at 11 pm on November 18, 1993, Abiola met his supporters to 
discuss Abacha's proposed cabinet of ‘big names’. This meeting urged Abiola to hold firmly 
to the June 12 mandate, but could not agree on whether his supporters should join the 
Government, only that each individual should decide his or her own relationship with the 
Government (Vanguard, Sunday December 19, 1993, p. 12). 
Further, the public notice, personally signed by Abiola, stated that he conveyed the decision of 
his supporters to Abacha on November 22, 1993, particularly holding firm to the mandate of 
June 12. As reported by Vanguard, Abiola concluded with a strong statement: 
It is clear that the present dispensation imposed one month ago will not lead us out of 
the economic morass. It lacks legitimacy and credibility and being undemocratic, it 
does not have the necessary ingredients for good governance. The only way forward 
for Nigeria is the return to where and when June 12 was derailed. Any other solution is 
begging the question (Vanguard, Sunday December 19, 1993, p. 12). 
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In response to Abiola's ‘clarifications’ it is probably safe to assume that his supporters in civil 
society (if not those in government), and a section of the press, were shocked that Abacha had 
not only dismantled the entire democratic structure but was also consolidating his power. With 
this realisation (albeit a late one) of another full blown military regime, the press now gained a 
fresh impetus to move against Abacha. Abiola's firm rejection of the military and the 
description of the Abacha regime as lacking ‘legitimacy, credibility and undemocratic' was a 
less than subtle declaration of war against Abacha. It was thus only a matter of when the war 
would break out, not if it would break out, and of when Abacha would act against Abiola. 
It is intriguing that Abacha who was openly invited by the press  to take over from Shonekan, 
few weeks earlier, was now loathed as ‘dangerous and undemocratic'. This change of course 
by the press can be linked to Abacha reneging on what had been ‘agreed’, ie seizing power 
from Shonekan in order to hand over to Abiola. Why the press initially trusted Abacha, a coup 
veteran rather than Shonekan, has remained puzzling. Twenty years on, Felix Abugu, editor of 
Guardian on Saturday, justified the press’s stance: the military is a ‘patriotic institution which 
by orientation and training, is better organised and less corrupt, to flush out the corrupt 
politicians and then do a transition that will bring a new set of politicians that are devoid of the 
practice of the old’. Buttressing his points, he cited South Korea and Brazil – whose 
foundations for prosperity, he insisted, were laid by their militaries – as good examples of a 
military capable of building a nation. ‘The press didn't do anything wrong trusting the milita ry’ 
but he lamented that the Nigerian military ‘betrayed that trust we have in them as a patriotic 
institution’ (Interview on January 16, 2013). But his account does not really explain why the 
press would trust the military yet again, given Abacha had been part of the ‘betrayals’ of the 
past. He continued: 
Again, it was the trust the press had in the military as an institution of integrity that 
could rise to the challenge of saving Nigeria from the June 12 crises, which necessitated 
the call on Abacha. There were interactions people had with the leadership of the 
military. Contacts were made and there were permutations. People didn't just wake up 
and invite the military. We weighed the options to see which one was better for us — 
was it to allow Shonekan, who was like a lackey, just there like a filing general left 
behind, or based on the contacts/interactions the leadership of the Nigerian people had 
with the military leadership, and our readings/permutations of the political climate? 
Then we say OK! If this is what you think you could do, to remove Shonekan and install 
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Abiola, why don't you come in? So, the press didn't just invite Abacha. It was an 
agreement, even though it was not written. The people involved [mentions notable 
names] were not fools because a lot of them staked their lives, were detained and killed. 
So the press was just echoing those interactions/contacts and telling the people: Yes! 
This is the best way for us to go that this man we believe will come in and do the right 
thing (Interview on January 16, 2013, my emphasis). 
Whatever their principled intentions, however, these revelations together with Abiola's press 
release point to the press handing Abacha power on a plate.  
In the aftermath of Abiola’s December, 1993 statement, Abacha appeared to take notice of the 
impending political attacks on him. According to press accounts, the game changed 
dramatically when Abiola declared himself president-elect at a crowded rally at Epetedo 
Playing Ground, Lagos, on June 11, 1994 (Folarin 2013, p. 15). He was subsequently arrested 
and charged for treason. With this turn of events, Vanguard's news practice changed direction 
from its initial pro-Abacha to a view also adopted by other papers which was sympathetic to 
Abiola and June 12. As bitter criticisms surfaced in the press, Abacha began fighting back, 
beginning with the seizure of offending titles, arrest and detention of editors and journalists. 
The intensity of the clampdown on the press forced some publications, notably magazines – 
Tell and TheNews in particular, and a new publication, Razor – to go underground and publish 
in defiance of the official ban placed on them. According to Oyediran and Agbaje, and, 
Olukotun, this marked the beginning of ‘guerrilla journalism', whereby editors and journalis ts 
without identifiable offices were able to meet undercover  in different locations and at different 
times to decide on stories for publications, thus confounding the security operatives who were 
hounding them (see Chapter Two above) (Oyediran and Agbaje 1999, Olukotun 2002). By 
February 1996, the situation took a frightening turn when Alex Ibru, The Guardian publisher 
and Abacha’s former minister was shot by gunmen believed to be agents of the regime. The 
assassination attempt was linked to Ibru’s inability to curtail the criticisms of the Government 
by his newspaper (Abugu January 16, 2013). In 1997, there was another ‘staged' coup largely 
involving senior military officers – including Abacha's second-in-command and then Chief of 
General Staff, Oladipo Diya. After this event, Abacha was regarded as a threat to nationa l 
security (Olukotun 2002, Uko 2004, Fayemiwo 2012). 
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However, one particular set of events in 1997 before the second coup attempt became an avenue 
for Abacha to openly acknowledge the war between his regime and the press. At the Guild of 
Editors' Conference held in Sokoto in January 1997, Abacha castigated the press, describing it 
as ‘purveyors of rumours, agents of disintegration, invaders of private closet and unrepentant 
alarmists’ (Olukotun 2002, p. 108). During the fourth anniversary of his regime and after the 
second coup attempt in 1997, Abacha further condemned the press's war against his 
government: 
The Nigerian media has become an unpatriotic institution which tended to misinterpret 
the notion of free speech and freedom of the press to mean a license of defiance to 
defame individuals and governments, indeed to destabilise society (Olukotun 2002, 
p.108). 
It was clearer that Abacha meant business in his revenge against the ‘idiocy and hypocrisy’ of 
the press (Uko 2004, p. 121). These words testify to the tense situation between 1994 when 
Abacha’s succession bid to become a civilian president began to 1998when he suddenly died.  
 
Abacha: The President in Waiting 
 ‘He will contest as a General if he accepts to vie for the presidency’ 
Wada Nas, Special Adviser to Abacha (Quoted in Daily Champion, Tuesday April 
14, 1998, p. 1). 
By April 1998, Abacha was closer to becoming a civilian president. With his transition 
programme already in place, speculations started surfacing in the newspapers that Abacha was 
scheming to take up the succession himself. Daily Champion quoted Abacha's Special Adviser; 
Alhaji Wada Nas as telling CNN's ‘Question and Answer’ that Abacha would not resign from 
the army before contesting the presidency. From that moment, the political situation assumed 
another dimension — that of dramatic political manoeuvrings, later culminating in Abacha's  
sole presidential candidacy. 
With rallies held across the nation by Abacha's political allies to drum up support for his 
succession bid, pro-democracy activists also stepped-up their opposition rallies, sometimes 
leading to bloody clashes. I personally witnessed the biggest and the bloodiest of such rallies 
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organised by a political warlord, the late Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu, in my city of Ibadan, the 
capital of Oyo State.  The rally, held with the blessing of Abacha and supported by the police, 
took place on Wednesday April 15, 1998, at Lekan Salami Stadium and, leading to the deaths 
of some pro-democracy activists who were attacking the rally, while during the bloody 
conflicts the ‘strongman' escaped through a car belonging to a Lagos based private Televis ion, 
Africa Independent Television (AIT)31.  
After these rallies, the stage was then set for the registered political parties to begin the process 
of adopting Abacha. On Thursday April 16, 1998, the United Nigeria Centre Party (UNCP) 
became the first party to adopt him, though he was not a registered member of the party. The 
party chairman, Mohammed Said told the Congress that, UNCP decided to adopt Abacha based 
‘on his good works for the country and the sustenance of peace’. He also stated that after wide 
consultations, the party was able to establish that the majority of Nigerians wanted Abacha to 
‘continue in office as a civilian president’ (Daily Champion Friday April 17, 1998 pp. 1 & 2; 
Vanguard, Friday April 17, 1993, pp. 1 & 2). Abacha's good works, alluded to by the party's 
chairman, could well have referred to his ‘generous' handing out of cash to have his way on 
any issue. It was generally believed that the pro-government registered parties were being 
funded by the regime, a situation that spurred activists. But with the UNCP taking the lead, 
other parties followed suit. Thus from April 16, 1998 when the UNCP endorsed Abacha and 
through to April 20, 1998, the other four parties – Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), 
Congress of National Consensus (CNC), National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN) and 
Grassroots Democratic Party (GDM) – all adopted Abacha as their sole candidate for the 
August 1, 1998 presidential elections, at their separate conventions.  
During this week of interesting political scenes, what was the position of the press? How did 
the press report the endorsements? What/whose agenda dominated the media? In the preceding 
discussion, I established that Vanguard, having battled with the ING and heralded Abacha, 
later switched to Abiola and June 12 side. Through May and June 1998, Abacha and his 
ambitions, as well as the activities of his political foot soldiers, received generous mention in 
both Vanguard and Daily Champion. Vanguard's reporting of the Abacha phenomenon, both 
in news stories and cartoons, tended to enhance his image and ambition, even while seeming 
                                                                 
31 . The television station subsequently explained it was not on the side of any of the opposing groups, but that its 
staff rescued the man on humanitarian grounds when he took shelter with journalists covering the rally after he 
was chased by the mob. 
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to be on the side of Abiola and June 12. Editorials which appeared to be critical of Abacha's 
ambition were indirect. As for Daily Champion, the pattern of reporting did not change from 
the period of ING to Abacha's early days. In most cases, news reports on Abacha's ambition, 
while not necessarily negative, suggested problems. This is in spite of the fact that its publisher 
was fully participating in Abacha’s transition process as a member of one of the five parties. 
Olaoye Bisiriyu, deputy editor of Daily Champion attested to the fact that his publisher ‘did 
not dabble into what we do… he didn't get involved to the best of my knowledge’ (Interview 
on January 15, 2013). For instance, after the endorsement of Abacha by the four parties, the 
remaining party GDM became the subject of discussion, as to whether the party would join the 
endorsement train. Thus when the party held its convention on Sunday April 19, 1993, it caught 
the attention of the nation. However, because of disturbances at the convention and the 
inconclusiveness of the proceedings by the publication deadlines, Vanguard and Daily 
Champion both reported the convention as if it had concluded. On Tuesday April 21, 1993, the 
papers carried the story on their respective front pages. The Daily Champion headline read: 
‘Presidency: How GDM endorsed Abacha’ with a rider, ‘Gani goes to court’. Vanguard 
reported it wholly from this latter angle: ‘Gani in court to stop Abacha’. 
From the Daily Champion's headline, the awaited result was clearly made known to readers — 
Abacha was the party's choice in the coming election. The rider, counterpointing the headline 
‘Gani goes to court' referred to a legal challenge mounted against Abacha by Gani Fawehinmi, 
Nigeria's most credible and unrepentant rights crusader at the time. He was a newsmaker in the 
mould of Wole Soyinka and indeed, a thorn in the skin of Abacha's regime. Going to court after 
the fifth party endorsed Abacha would be newsworthy for the public.  
The stance taken by Daily Champion tallied with its anti-military ideology since Shonekan’s 
interim government. The headline offers a critical thread through its mobilisation of  ‘How’ 
and the power verb ‘endorsed' which are picked up in the news story. The latter gives an 
account of the manipulations, leading to Abacha’s adoption. The first paragraph makes 
interesting reading:  
Intense lobbying and horse-trading among more than 3, 000 delegates characterised the 
national convention of the Grassroots Democratic Movement, (GDM) held at 
Maiduguri Sunday where the Head of State General Sani Abacha was adopted as its 
presidential candidate (Daily Champion, April 21, 1998, p. 1). 
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Qualifying the process of  ‘how’ Abacha was ‘endorsed’ (as signalled in the headline), ‘intense 
lobbying and horse-trading’ connotatively suggest a sense of a manipulative process i.e. an 
adoption fraught with bribery, corruption and intimidation of unyielding delegates. The 
newspaper put into play the possibility of an illegitimate process to Abacha’s endorsement, 
discrediting the convention and not in any simple way accepting it. In this way, we might argue 
that Daily Champion played the role expected of a liberal press.  
In contrast Vanguard's headline totally obscured the process of ‘endorsement' of Abacha by 
the GDM and a crucial news item of interest to the public was missing. But perhaps the Gani 
court angle allowed the paper to make a critique by proxy – maybe a safer line to adopt. The 
news story also distances the paper from the processes of the convention and Abacha’s 
endorsement.  Running from the front page through page two and four, its opening (three of 
sixteen) paragraphs, repeats the headline that ‘Gani Fawehinmi headed for the court to stop 
Abacha from contesting the forthcoming election’, and that this was ‘one of the reactions that 
trailed Abacha’s adoption by the five parties’. Besides quoting a civil society group, 
‘NADECO’ which was not ‘surprised by the adoption of Abacha by the parties’, the rest of the 
story deals with the affidavit (legal claims) of Fawehinmi. However an interesting angle to the 
Vanguard's position on his candidacy surfaced in the previous day’s edition of the paper, in a 
pungent cartoon. 
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Figure 21: Vanguard, April 20, 1998, p. 6 
In the upper left corner is an announcement of the three candidates for the party's primary. With 
the rain falling at the party convention, Abacha is seen to arrive, stepping onto the carpet 
(marked Nigeria) and represented as the winner. He is beneath an umbrella marked 
‘presidency', which shields him from the torrential rain. The other two candidates are seen 
trailing behind and, without umbrellas, drenched in the rain. The caption ‘First come first 
served’ appears to suggest that Abacha as the winner has been served the presidential ticket, 
because he happens to be there first with the aid of State protection (the umbrella as a 
metaphor). 
At the time this cartoon was published, the party's convention was inconclusive and both papers 
had reported that a fracas had broken out between pro and anti-Abacha party delegates leading 
to the deployment of riot police, highlighting that it was not an easy ride for those routing for 
Abacha. It is thus curious that before the convention was even concluded, Vanguard boosted 
the Abacha camp by presenting him as the GDM’s preferred candidate. Whether delegates who 
saw the cartoon at the convention ground were swayed into voting for Abacha or whether it 
helped break the ranks of anti-Abacha delegates is a matter of conjecture. Several similar 
cartoons promoting the five parties and Abacha's candidacy appeared regularly in the paper.  
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A further cartoon also appeared on Wednesday April 22, 1993 edition of Daily Champion 
which appears to ridicule the bloody Ibadan rally organised the week before (April 15, 1998,) 
In the background pro and anti-Abacha demonstrators clash while victims lie on the floor and 
the Ibadan politician who spearheaded the rally is saying: ‘Ah! It was a very successful rally. 
You can see for yourself'. Obviously, the violent scene presented contradicts the ‘very 
successful rally’ claim by this Abacha politician — pro- Abacha campaigners in Figure 22 
below can be seen on the floor beaten /injured by the surging anti-Abacha protestors. The 
cartoon mocks the stage-managed attempts to foist Abacha on the Nigerian people, taking issue 
with the idea that the Abacha camp was ‘winning'. This is in contrast to Vanguard's cartoon 
that portrays Abacha as sailing smoothly towards the presidency.  
 
Figure 22: Daily Champion, Wednesday April 22, 1998  
Scholarly works have established the pre-eminence of political cartoons as powerful tools in 
political struggles. Lamb (2004), Conners (2007), Eko (2007), Hammett (2010) all agree that 
political cartoons are used variously to criticise certain public figures as well as to reinforce 
the political interests of others.  Cartoons are also thought to be used during electioneering to 
manipulate the voters’ opinion. In Nigeria in particular, Sani et al affirms the use of politica l 
cartoons to ‘set [the] agenda by mainly encapsulating current and sensitive issues that people 
are much concerned about’ (Sani et al 2012, p. 156). As the foregoing discussion reveals, the 
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short-lived regime of Shonekan and later, the vilified regime of Abacha, were of immed ia te 
concerns to the Nigerian people. Both Vanguard and Daily Champion thus, deployed their 
cartoons to set their different agendas. 
Typical of the shifting of political position and the sectarianism that characterises most 
Nigerian newspapers, Vanguard in particular deployed its cartoons to serve different politica l 
figures. Under Shonekan it used the cartoon in figure 17 to discredit the leader when he 
removed the fuel subsidy. During the thick of Abacha's succession project, as we have just 
seen, Vanguard’s cartoon Figure 21 manipulates members of the GDM to endorse Abacha.  
Whilst there are optimistic account that political cartoons echo popular will and provide spaces 
for resistance (Mbembe 2001; Eko 2007; Obadare 2009), other scholars differ with this 
optimism, contesting that indeed, rather than resisting the powerful, they actually reinforce and 
promote their preferences (Fontein 2009, Hammett 2010). 
If the newspapers reveal political allegiances through cartoons, though not always directly, in 
editorials such allegiances are more direct. Throughout the periods of Abacha's succession bid 
between April and June 1998, Vanguard ran a series of editorials marking out its politica l 
position. John Windhauser describes a newspaper editorial as the ‘opinion column that reflects 
a paper’s views on an issue or event and appears daily in approximately the same place on the 
editorial page or section’ (Windhauser, 1973 p. 563); while John Oakes opines that a newspaper 
editorial page is ‘the heart and soul — the one area where the personality and, more important, 
the philosophy of the newspaper can most properly be expressed’ (Oakes, 1968, p. 2). In his 
perspective on the role of the editorial in the Third World, Cornelius Pratt suggests that 
newspaper contents focus on the ‘needs and interests of the urban elite and more particula r ly 
those of the government’, and thus, he avers further that, the editorial page is the ‘logical place 
for the press’s criticisms of government and for its opinions on national issues’, while at the 
same time, it ‘provides a forum for the discussion of development issues’ (Pratt 1990, p. 18). 
An editorial on Monday April 27, 1998: ‘Essence of democracy’, which ran on the front page 
and continued on page sixteen, read more like a written paper for a workshop chronic ling 
military incursion into government since 1966, but not criticising the political manipulat ions 
going on at the time. In all its sermonising about the ‘essence of democracy', the paper made 
no mention that Abacha and the five political parties endorsing him, might have violated that 
essence. Yet in its final paragraph the editorial lamented that Nigeria ‘deserved a better deal — 
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genuine and not half-baked or manipulated democracy’ but leaves the readers to figure out the 
manipulator, thus shielding Abacha – the beneficiary – whom the paper supports.  
A second editorial appearing after Abacha’s candidacy had been endorsed by all the five parties 
is similarly reticent but again indirectly reveals approval of Abacha’s candidacy (Monday May 
25, 1998, p. 6). ‘This Transition’, a twelve-paragraph editorial, discussing and complaining 
about the transition, is devoid of critical phrases and makes  no mention of Abacha on whose 
behalf the transition was being manipulated. As in this paragraph: 
There has been quite a debate on the nature of the presidency and the modality of its 
emergency. Two months or so to the decision, the picture is not clear as to the 
contestants. Rather, what we have had has been acrimonies as to the nature of the 
selection of the presidential candidate.  
The word ‘debate’ suggests a public discussion in which different voices and groups can be 
heard. By implication Abacha’s candidacy is neither illegal nor undemocratic: the candidacy 
is debatable, and if the debate eventually favours Abacha, so be it. Notwithstanding the 
financial inducement of the parties and the coercion of others’; the deadly Ibadan riots; the 
violence that trailed the GDM convention; the two ‘phantom coups’ and the closure of many 
media houses — all to smooth Abacha’s path – the paper (deviously?) seeks to legitimise a 
contentious and undemocratic transition by framing it as a consensus arrived at through proper 
debate. 
The editorial not only leaves Abacha out of the picture, so too the political parties and other 
figures promoting the succession process. No person (and thus no agency) is mentioned. In this 
way, the public is left wondering whether there are any culprit/s, or if no one is to blame for 
events and to consider the process a ‘natural’ or inevitable one. By using the phrase ‘the nature 
of the presidency’ (above) rather than ‘the nature of Abacha candidacy’, the paper shields 
Abacha from public anger. As Haliday explains:  
Language is closely related to the demands that we make of it, the functions it has to 
serve. The particular form taken by the grammatical system of language is closely 
related to the social and personal needs that language is required to serve (cited in 
Fowler 1991, p. 32). 
Thus, the system of language employed achieves a particular ideological end, leaving the reader 
unclear as to who is directly responsible for the political crisis. To have referred to Abacha 
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would mean readers could instantly blame him, whereas, ‘presidency’, leaves the issue of 
‘who’ in the realm of conjecture.  Vanguard also writes that ‘two months or so to the decision, 
the picture is not clear as to the contestants’ (my emphasis), yet even according to Vanguard’s 
own news reports, the process of selection of presidential candidates was completed at the time 
of this editorial: all parties had ’endorsed’ Abacha as the sole candidate. So what ‘picture’ is 
Vanguard suggesting not ‘clear’? To whom? Who is Vanguard referring to as ‘contestants’ 
when the only contestant was Abacha? This would seem to be an attempt to douse the growing 
flames of tension surrounding Abacha’s candidacy. Viewed from this angle, one can conclude 
as (Oakes 1968; Windhauser 1973 and Pratt 1990, see p. 177) note, that Vanguard’s editoria ls 
signify its preference for Abacha and for him to become a civilian president without first 
resigning from the military. 
Tom Koch refers to such accounts above by Vanguard as the ‘institutionalised narrative form’ 
of journalism. These arise from contact with officials, reducing the ‘power of a journalist from 
a critical and independent stance’ to ‘moderators for, publicists to and legitimaters of the 
official world’ (Koch 1990, pp. 175 & 181). Koch goes on to explain that a majority of stories 
that appear in the principal newspapers are based on the statements and quotes of government 
officials passed to journalists during photo sessions, media opportunities, press conferences or 
press releases. In the Nigerian context, such narrative forms also emerge from bribe taking and 
favour seeking from officials. Mvendaga Jibo gives more insight on this institutionalised 
narrative form, pungently noting that the Nigerian press often puts itself in a compromised 
position: 
In Nigeria, the editors rather than ask the right questions, often join the list of applicants 
for plum jobs from a military regime. In this move, the last thing on their mind was the 
fate of democracy. The media only complain when its own corporate interests are at 
stake or when an individual journalist is jailed or manhandled by the government (Jibo 
2003, p. 224). 
There were several other formats aimed at boosting Abacha ratings. Of particular interest were 
the numerous interviews granted to Abacha campaigners for promotional purposes and which 
portrayed him as the ‘messiah’: ‘Only Abacha Can Achieve Stability’ (Vanguard May 16, 1998 
p. 12). The interviewee in this case, a former minister of aviation under the Babangida regime 
and senator-elect under Abacha, argues in support of ‘a locally nurtured democracy’ that only 
Abacha ‘at this point in time can achieve. ‘Arthur Eze makes case for Abacha’ (Vanguard 
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Wednesday May 20, 1998, p. 1 & 2). Here the Abacha campaigner, addressing a pro-Abacha 
rally in Enugu, south-east Nigeria, threatened that the ‘life of every Nigerian will be on the line 
should General Sani Abacha fail to become Nigeria’s next civilian president’. In ‘It’s too late 
for Abacha to say no’ (Vanguard Sunday May 24, 1998 page 3), another senator-elect claims 
that since no other contestants ‘have the guts to come out and say they want it, why do we want 
to punish the person who says he wants to continue?’.  
Further, there were news reports which in fact ‘promoted’ Abacha. In ‘Useni sells Abacha’s 
adoption to royal fathers’ (Vanguard Thursday 28 May, 1998 pp. 1 & 2), the paper quoted an 
army general and minister for the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, addressing the royal fathers’ 
meeting,: ‘the Head of State acknowledges the profound sense of appreciation which informed 
the persistent clarion call from all and sundry to once again place his services at the nation’s 
disposal’. Another report: ‘Time not ripe for Abacha to quit’ (Vanguard Monday June 1, 1998, 
page 3), quoted a professor and member of the Transition Implementation Committee, at a 
book launch, also backing Abacha as a good leader: ‘General Sani Abacha knows that military 
rule is not the best for the country, but given the situation in which we find ourselves, a good 
leader does not abandon the ship midstream. He must find a solution to the plaguing problem 
before he can make his exit’. In an opinion article, ‘A vote for Abacha Presidency’ (Vanguard 
Wednesday May 13, 1998, p. 7), the author justified Abacha’s candidacy – ‘morally and 
legally’, there was nothing wrong in Abacha contesting as a military head of state – whilst at 
the same time lampooning the opposition who ‘selfishly’ think they are ‘gods of democracy’.  
With this litany of PR-styled news stories, cartoons, photographs and editorials, Vanguard 
journalistic practice was reduced to what Koch, referring to the American press, describes as 
‘news as myth’ (Koch 1990). As Koch notes, to adopt another tack and criticise the candidacy, 
Vanguard, like the American press, would have had its ‘access to the powerful decreased’ 
(Koch 1990, p. 181). Though Taiwo observes that ‘no news report is ideologically neutral, 
transparent or innocent’ (Taiwo 2007, p. 221), the scale and weight of Vanguard’s partisan 
support for Abacha at a time of heightened military violence against the civil populace, was 
striking. But as Pratt notes, discussing sub-Sahara African media culture more generally, one 
of the ‘salient variables in Nigeria’s media behaviour is the co-opting of influential journalis ts 
into the Government as a system of softening the press criticism’ (Pratt 1990, p. 37). The upshot 
of this practice, as General Oladipo Diya well describes, is that the press cannot be free in a 
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situation where ‘he who pays the piper also dictates the tune’ (Interview on October 10, 2011 
my emphasis).  
In the Daily Champion, its position was conveyed in news reports, articles and cartoons. Most 
of these implicitly if not explicitly discredit the Abacha campaign. I first explore a story picking 
up on the fuel scarcity and the strike by bus owners in Lagos which suggests that the situation 
under Abacha is precarious (Thursday May 14, 1998, p 2). I focus on the headline, ‘Fuel crisis 
cripples commercial activities, Council of State meet’, and the significance of the first 
paragraph32: 
Protracted fuel scarcity has reduced to the lowest ebb, commercial activities across the 
country, with the situation compounded in Lagos Tuesday by the continued strike by 
owners of mass commuter buses as the state police command threatened to sack any 
senior officer found colluding with unions. 
In this headline and paragraph, six terms invoke crisis and problems which are likely to increase 
public anger against the Government: ‘crisis’, ‘cripples’, ‘protracted’ ‘reduced’ ‘lowest ebb’ 
and ‘compounded’. Since readers  – buyers and ‘free readers’ alike – first notice and read the 
headline and opening paragraph of a news report, Daily Champion effectively amplified the 
emotional impact on the reading public at a time when the Abacha candidacy was being foisted 
on the electorate. The phrasing ‘protracted fuel scarcity has reduced to the lowest ebb, 
commercial activities across the country, with the situation compounded in Lagos’, raised the 
stakes: the problem has not only spread nationwide, but to Lagos in particular, i.e. the 
commercial nerve centre of Nigeria is worst hit. The reading public is left with the fear of the 
unknown as their increased anger is guided towards the government and, perhaps Abacha — 
the man who could not fix the nation’s woes, but yet is bent on imposing himself on the people.  
The issue here is about the disposition of Daily Champion towards military rule, a situation 
where one might expect the use of less ‘extreme’ language. For instance, during a comparable 
situation under Shonekan, the paper protected the civilian regime with the use of phrases less 
likely to incite and more geared to reassurance, as when it reported that the labour strike ‘stalls’ 
business. Here, under the military regime, the phrase is ‘Fuel strike cripples’. The choice of 
                                                                 
32 Other paragraphs report on how Police tackle touts taking the law into their own hands and it finishes by 
reporting that the Council of State met to discuss the fuel crisis  
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language used to refer to the Abacha regime is, in Fowler’s words, ‘hostile reporting’ (Fowler 
1991, p. 144). It underscores the paper’s ideological position: its opposition to military rule.  
Other news items that deflate and implicitly critique the Abacha project in Daily Champion 
include an article: ‘Dangling Politicians’ (Friday April 17 1998, p. 5) lampooning Nigerian 
politicians for reducing politics from a ‘serious business’ to a ‘game or dance’. The author 
describes the politicians' conduct under Abacha as ‘selfish, inconsistent, unprincipled and 
devoid of national interest'. ‘GDM in rowdy convention; Braithwaite quits’ (Monday April 20, 
1998 p. 1) gives an account of the manipulation and violence trailing the endorsement of 
Abacha by GDM. ‘Activists abort pro-govt rally’ (Thursday May 7, 1998 p. 1); ‘Don’t run — 
Ekwueme, Ciroma, Others tell Abacha’ (Sunday May 10, 1998), report pressures being 
mounted on Abacha by notable elder statesmen, and ‘Presidency: NECON unawares of 
Abacha's adoption’ (Wednesday May 20, 1998 p. 1), reports that the electoral commiss ion 
feigns ignorance of the adoption of Abacha by the five parties.  
 
Abacha: The Cul de sac 
As Abacha's succession campaign intensified and gained an upper hand, so also did civil 
society exercise pressure on him, through various means — legal suits, violent protests and 
international pressures. In particular, the latter was so significant that, US, UK and France 
became centres of co-ordinated opposition against Abacha's ambition. Newspapers reported 
that Soyinka in particular, addressed the French Parliament on the Nigerian situation in May, 
1998, the second time in six months (See Daily Champion, Wednesday April 8, 1998 p. 1, 
Vanguard, Wednesday May 13, 1998 p. 1). This international opposition only led to Abacha 
becoming more violent and desperate. 
However, as dire as the situation was, the independent voice of the press appeared to have been 
drowned by Abacha's vengeful crackdown. Both in Vanguard and in Daily Champion, there 
was no sign of a real press war against Abacha. Although Daily Champion remained consistent 
in its opposition to military rule, mildly highlighting democratic deficiencies in the transition 
processes, Vanguard could be said to be still aiding Abacha's self-succession bid. From the 
news media point of view, the situation was perhaps understandable. At the time, several 
editors, journalists and prominent citizens were either on death row or serving long jail terms. 
A journalist from the TheNews, Bagauda Kaltho disappeared without trace, with accusation 
pointed at the regime (Olukotun 2010, p. 156). Fear of Abacha and for reasons of ‘safety and 
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economics’, the press adopted a strategy of ‘self-censorship and caution' in dealing with the 
leader (Sina Oladeinde, Features editor, Nigerian Tribune, October 18, 2011). The implica t ion 
of this (self) imposed decorum on the press indicated for the first time in Nigeria's history that 
Abacha had inflicted a psychological fear on the press, such that Abacha’s election to civilian 
head of state in the August 1, 1998 presidential elections was a straightforward matter. 
Nevertheless, as the nation resigned itself to its fate, on June 8, 1998 news filtered onto the 
street that Abacha had died. I recalled attending a lecture on the day when a lecturer in my 
department peeped into the class and said ‘Abacha yamutu’ (Hausa meaning ‘Abacha is dead'). 
The class ended in chaos as students pushed and shoved to join the confusion that already 
enveloped the university community. The lecturer, with whom I was friendly, was at the time 
the editorial board chairman of Diet newspaper whose editor, Niran Malaolu, was in jail for 
coup plotting. I later joined the lecturer in his car to observe the celebration on the streets before 
proceeding to the Diet’s office. The situation in the newsroom was not much different from the 
wild jubilation encountered on the streets. The self-imposed calamity which had brought 
journalists and people alike to their knees had unexpectedly disappeared. The nation was still 
in a celebratory mood when Soyinka, upon his return to Nigeria from exile, made his emotiona l 
declaration: 
The press and let me seize this very opportunity to stress this, the press has been 
magnificent, really magnificent, heroic and one of these days, when there’s more 
pleasure, we are going to erect a statue. I am going to see personally to this, that a statue 
for heroism of the press is erected at a prominent place in this country; we must never 
ever forget (The Guardian, Saturday October 17, 1998, p. 5). 
At the time there was no doubt, that Abacha's ‘curious, strange and unexpected death’ 
(Akinrinade 2006, pp. 290 & 293) in the midst of the conflicts around his succession bid 
seemed to be a victory, not just for the traumatised press, but for the entire nation gripped by 
fear. But notwithstanding Soyinka’s accolades, the death of Abacha was hardly a result of a 
‘press war’. Though officially the result of a ‘heart attack’ (Akinrinade 2006, p. 290), most 
Nigerians believed his death was due to a conspiracy.33  
                                                                 
33 The most credible of the many reasons was, and still is, a conspiracy within the military (Fayemiwo 2013). The 
military at the time was polarised along an ethnic divide. Many army generals, mainly of the Yoruba origin  
including Abacha's second-in-command, Oladipo Diya, were on death row for coup plotting. It was thought that 
if the convicted officers were killed, the military might implode and the nation would be engulfed in a civil war;  
hence the mysterious death of Abacha and his hurried burial without an autopsy.  
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The analysis of Vanguard and Daily Champion also throws up a finding which contradicts the 
popular position at the time, i.e. that particular newspapers such as Daily Champion were pro-
state (Olukotun 2002, Daramola 2006). The latter paper had an image of a ‘promoter' of 
military rule, apparently because of its non-antagonistic culture and because it was not one of 
the papers proscribed by the military. However, as the analysis above suggests, particula r ly 
during Shonekan’s regime, and after Abacha became the head of state, Daily Champion's news 
stories in fact supported the course of democracy whilst not seemingly antagonising the Abacha 
regime — news headlines, photographs, cartoons and editorials were devoid of flattery or 
flowery phrases, while at the same time, readers were made aware that Abacha regime was not 
just a ‘new order', but one marked by ‘uncertainties, ‘worries' and a ‘turning point' in the 
nation's march towards democracy. As Ifedayo Daramola points out, this not ‘too radical’ and 
not ‘too moderate’ policy of Daily Champion, was responsible for the accusation of being a 
pro-state medium, but in actual fact, the paper's ‘editorial and presentation of stories are 
moderate and superb’ (Daramola 2006, p. 103). One might say that the paper offered a 
‘balanced journalism' when many other titles did not. 
On the other hand, Vanguard, one of the newspapers that was generally accorded respect, and 
which I personally read at any given opportunity, was not the ‘pro-democracy' paper that it was 
thought to be and which view I also held. Perhaps our position could be because we belonged 
to the mass of ‘uncritical readers’ unable to ‘discount the bias’ of the newspapers’ (Fowler 
1991). The paper not only antagonised and rejected the ING – a civilian regime – but also 
promoted Abacha (who for the previous decade had also suppressed democracy) as an 
alternative and better option to the ING. As the analysis above demonstrates, photographs and 
headlines between November 17 and December 31, 1993 were not in favour of democracy but 
showcased a military culture. Retrospectively it is strange that papers like Vanguard were seen 
to have been ‘counter-hegemonic and agitating’ voices (Olukotun 2002, pp. 120, 127).  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to critically engage with a liberal proposition which suggests 
that the press is seen as serving a parliament of the people (Olukotun 2002, 2010; Oloyede 
2004) under authoritarian regimes. In the instance of the Abacha regime, I have tried to provide 
evidence linking the press, on the one hand to the collapse of the realisation of a people-
oriented, democratic government and on the other, to an entrenchment of military hegemony. 
This latter at its peak created an atmosphere of fear and trepidation such that the people became 
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helpless in realising their democratic aspirations.  I then foregrounded that, news practice in 
the Abacha era was mythical: their ‘adversarial and lively outspokenness’ (Olukotun, 2002, 
2010) notwithstanding, Abacha had his way and but for his death would have become a civilian 
president. 
All the editors I interviewed, with the vision of hindsight perhaps, agreed that the ‘military is 
an aberration’ in terms of the possibility of a democratic trajectory. However, even during 
Abacha's regime, Daily Champion did exhibit a form of journalism one might expect of a 
‘liberal' press, given the circumstances of the period. It appeared to lead the popular will. If 
Daily Champion could produce such journalism, why not other titles? I have highlighted how 
between November 1st and 17th, 1993, the news pages from Vanguard, in particular, showed 
a consistent attack on the Government, while the Daily Champion was less antagonistic in its 
reporting of the political crisis. Daily Champion's use of cartoons in particular fulfils the duty 
of a ‘liberal press'. In this way and others, the paper resisted the military hegemony being 
foisted on the Nigerian people by the likes of Vanguard. But on the whole, news items in the 
Vanguard called for an end to the interim arrangement. Most headlines during the period were  
excessive and arguably misleading, while threats of violence against the government by pro-
democracy activists were given generous mention.  
Given the provisions of the decree that established Shonekan regime, it was obvious that 
Abacha was actually waiting in the wings to take over power. It was thus a blessing for him 
that his ascension to power was facilitated by the press, saving him the use of troops and 
weapons. Still, the pulls from Abugu’s revelation make an interesting reading of the situation. 
If the press ‘did nothing wrong' by ‘trusting' and inviting the military, and was right to 
‘hammer’ Abacha when he betrayed them, was Abacha then right to crackdown in return? 
Contrary to Ayo Olukotun’s position that ‘a tradition of lively outspokenness is in evidence’ 
during the Abacha era (Olukotun 2010, p. 162), I argue that that the press was at the heart of 
very murky politics which turned out to be self-defeating.  
The fact cannot be overemphasised that Abacha largely succeeded in emasculating the press, 
and was close to ‘defeating’ it when he suddenly died. That he died and the press was still 
‘standing’, though wobbly, represents some kind of victory (Uko 2004, p. 123). Chronicling 
the military era from 1984, Lanre Arogundade, Chairman of the Lagos State chapter of the 
Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) agreed that Abacha had indeed succeeded in cowing the 
press: 
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When we had the regime of Buhari and Decree 4, we said we could not have it worse. 
Then we had the regime of Babangida and newspapers were shut down and we said it 
would not be worse than this. But certainly, things were worse off under Abacha. If we 
have to look at the Military regimes from 1983 up to date, that period was the darkest 
as far as the relationship between the press and the government goes (Olukotun 2002, 
p. 109).  
Whatever way the regime is perceived, it is perhaps too simplistic to describe Abacha as a 
‘monster' as various studies have opined (Alimi 2011, Uko 2004, Olukotun 2002) without 
looking at the underlying factors. Abacha's antecedents in the preceding decade as a member 
of Buhari and Babangida regimes ought to have marked him out as a threat to democracy rather 
than its candidate. That the press ‘trusted’ (Abugu 2013) Abacha to restore democracy is indeed 
perplexing. While the argument that the harsh economic realities of the time partly forced the 
press to ‘gravitate’ (Oladeinde 2011) to the military sounds convincing, but even if this 
economic angle is countenanced, such a stance is still an anathema to the principles of a ‘liberal 
press' as Fourth Estate.  
The press's fraternity with the military, or its ‘double allegiance’ to its own role and 
‘inclination’ to military ethos (Golding and Elliot 1979), or better still, the extent of degree of 
‘political parallelism’ (Hallin and Mancini 2004) was its major undoing: once that was in place 
their opposition to the military was ineffective and the fate that befell them inevitable. The 
'hammering' (Abugu 2013) of Abacha after the 'dinner was over' (Diya 2011) was a face-saving 
exercise that failed to repair the damage done to the democratic aspirations of the Nigerian 
people. As in James Curran’s description of the American press as a ‘shining city on the hill’ 
but which when inside, ‘become[s] less luminous’ (Curran 2011), the Nigerian press during 
this period also lost any ‘shine’ it might earlier have had.  
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Introduction 
 When Abacha died, Abubakar came-in, appealing to everybody, releasing prisoners, 
 flying the olive branch – saying, we will go very soon and we say (the press) let’s 
 give him the benefit of the doubt.  Let’s do away with the crises. Maybe, a Daniel has 
 come to judgement. That was the attitude of the press. No! We didn’t know that he 
 had his own plan. Perhaps, Abiola could not have died naturally. He was killed. He 
 could have been poisoned. 
 (Interview with Felix Abugu, Editor of Guardian on Saturday, Tuesday January 15, 
 2013). 
As we saw in the previous chapter, notwithstanding the pockets of resistance by a few 
magazines adopting guerrilla journalism, Abacha appeared to have subdued the fighting spirit 
of the Nigerian press. Whilst Felix Abugu, editor of The Guardian on Saturday insisted that 
the press kept ‘hammering’ the military, he nonetheless agreed that the death of Abacha on 
June 8, 1998 brought ‘happiness and jubilation’ to everybody (Interview on January 16, 2013). 
But so ‘happy’ (or perhaps war weary) was the press after the death of Abacha that they had 
no objection to Abubakar’s ‘hands of fellowship’.  
Playing the old military card of courting the press while fresh in power, Abubarka’s ‘olive 
branch’ (Abugu, January 16, 2013) included the release of jailed editors, reopening the 
proscribed titles and an appeal to those underground and in exile to embrace the new 
government. As the ‘celebration’ of Abacha’s death and Abubakar’s ‘new order’ enveloped the 
newsrooms, the press appeared to have forgotten Abiola, (still in jail34) and the June 12 struggle 
(the thorny issues that brought it to war with the Abacha regime). As Ndaeyo Uko rightly noted, 
at the peak of battle between Abacha and the press, the latter was, more or less, fighting a 
survival battle. A survival battle in the sense that the media space was dominated with 
lamentations about freedom for jailed journalists and proscribed media houses, overriding the 
core issue of June 12 and leading to a distorted public sphere (Uko 2004 pp 122, 123). However, 
the moment Abacha died and Abubakar ‘freed’ the press, the latter went into a period of 
recuperation. Yet paradoxically this moment of recovery also offered the military the chance 
to finally defeat the press’s touted ‘protest tradition’. 
                                                                 
34 Although Abubakar released other prisoners from jail , for whatever reason, Abiola was kept behind bars. 
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In what was, and is generally still, seen by Nigerians as a conspiracy between the military and 
the Western powers to nail the coffin of Abiola and June 12 on the head (Olorode 2006; 
Olumide and Akachi 2012, pp. 83, 84); between the time Abacha died on June 8 and July 7, 
1998, Abubakar received an unusual stream of diplomats. The first was the special envoy of 
the European Union and British Foreign Office Minister, Tony Lloyd who after meeting with 
the Head of State addressed a press conference, telling them ‘June 12 was dead’ and that it was 
time for Nigeria to conduct another election (Sunday Champion, June 28, 1998, p. 1). The 
diplomatic shuttle culminated on Tuesday July 7, 1998 with the visit of Thomas Pickering (US 
Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs) and Susan Rice (Assistant Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs). After meeting with Abubakar, they then met with Abiola. In the course of 
this latter meeting, Abiola collapsed after drinking tea served by one of the diplomats. Efforts 
were made to revive him on the spot before he was transferred to the State House Clinic, where 
he was pronounced dead. Though the official report claimed that he died of heart failure, the 
very cloudy circumstances surrounding his death led to civil society organisations claiming 
that he was murdered in a high-wire conspiracy, the latter fuelled by the strangeness of visit ing 
US diplomats serving tea to a political prisoner (Kabila 1998, p. 2; Olorode 2006; Olumide and 
Akachi 2012, pp. 83, 84; Abugu 2013). By extension, and significantly, this event also marked 
the death of the June 12 struggle and a permanent sealing of the annulment of June 12, 1993 
elections: the military had ‘won’. Not surprisingly, riots broke out and the nation was plunged 
into another period of violence. 
Abugu’s sombre explanation in my opening quotation summarised (in hindsight) the 
psychological state of the press at the death of Abacha: the relief from Abacha’s vengeful attack 
but which seemed to throw the press into a state of inertia. As if a ‘Daniel’ ha[d] come to 
judgement’35, Abubakar eliminated the stalemate but Abiola, June 12 and the ‘liberal’ press 
were all ‘punished’, the military gained another edge in winning the next ‘war’. In this chapter, 
I analyse Abubakar’s one year regime which culminated in the handing over of power to a 
civilian government on May 29, 1999. Specifically, I discuss the state of the press after the 
death of Abacha; the emergence of Abubakar and his ‘olive branch’ to the press; the state visits 
by foreign dignitaries and the death of Abiola; and, finally, the transition to democratic rule. 
                                                                 
35 Someone who makes a wise judgment about something that has previously proven difficult to resolve. It 
alludes to the biblical character Daniel, who was attributed with having fine powers of judgment. See Daniel 5:14 
(King James Version) 
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Engaging with this period, as discussed earlier (see Chapter Three), I analyse three nationa l 
dailies, Thisday, Vanguard, Tribune and two weekly magazines Tell and TheNews. The chapter 
draws on a wider range of publications than in previous chapters. Firstly, this regime was at 
the centre of an ‘extraordinary confluence’ (Robinson 1998, p. 136) – the deaths in June/July 
1998 of both Abacha and Abiola in cloudy circumstances. Secondly, the regime ended the 
sixteen years of protracted struggle between the press and the military, handing over to a 
democratically-elected government on May 29, 1999. It seemed appropriate, therefore, to offer 
a broader analysis of press behaviour and news practice, but continuing the emphasis on 
headlines, news reports and photographs, supported again by interviews with editors and state 
officials. How the press reacted to this 'extraordinary confluence’ of events (Robinson 1998) 
and the transition that ushered in a civilian regime, are the focus.  
The chapter is arranged in two parts. In the first, I discuss and critically appraise the emergence 
of Abubakar as head of state and the ‘psychological’ state of the press. Then I focus on 
Abubakar’s re-igniting the democratic process which had been struggled over for 15 years , 
since 1984. In the second part, attention shifted to Abubakar’s transition process after the dust 
over Abiola’s death had settled. Though the two weeklies were cautious about changing their 
stance – continuing their more questioning journalism – the regime’s ‘olive branch', as well as 
the end to Abiola and the June 12 crises, made it impossible for them and the wider press to 
engage with the regime’s transition as critically as might have been expected, leading to ‘a low 
quality democracy’ (Diamond et al 1999, p. 2). For reasons to be discussed below the 
quiescence of the press eventually gave rise to the election of the military’s preferred candidate, 
Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired general and former military head of state. He was released from 
jail, shortly after the death of Abacha, pardoned, and in December, 1998 became presidentia l 
candidate of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The press was, again, emasculated, playing 
no part in this decision. 
 
‘Hands of Fellowship’ 
For many Nigerians, the sudden death of Abacha on June 8, 1998, was suspicious and 
mysterious (Olorode 2006; Alimi 2011 p. 64; Olumide and Akachi 2012, pp. 83, 84; Abugu 
2013). The suspicion was not misplaced: Abacha had made many enemies. In addition to his 
crackdown on the opposition and the press, he also turned against his own constituency – the 
military – with the aim of getting rid of any powerful figures he considered might stand in his 
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way. At the time of Abacha’s death, Olusegun Obasanjo commanded a considerable respect 
among serving and retired generals, but was in custody, whilst his deputy (when in power 1976-
1979) General Sheu Musa Yar ‘Adua died in detention in December, 1997 in  suspicious 
circumstances over his criticism of Abacha regime. Further, Abacha’s deputy, General Oladipo 
Diya, as well as a host of notable serving military generals was also awaiting executions, having 
been found guilty of a coup plot (Olorode 2006, Lewis 1999). Abacha also deposed the 
foremost Sultan of Sokoto and Spiritual Head of Muslims in Nigeria, Alhaji Mohammadu 
Dasuki. In effect, Abacha could be said to have held public office but held the public in 
contempt. Peter M. Lewis emphatically notes that ‘years of predatory rule…created a 
formidable set of difficulties [but] abuse of executive power reached a nadir under General 
Abacha’ (Lewis 1999, p. 151).  
Whatever caused the death of Abacha seemed immaterial to most Nigerians who thronged the 
streets and expressed jubilation, including in the newsrooms to celebrate the end of an ‘abysmal 
era’ in Nigeria’s political history (Ogbondah 2000, p. 231). General Abubakar, the Chief of 
Defence Staff, was sworn in as the head of state on June, 9, 1998 (Nwankwo 1999). In relation 
to this moment, Abugu argues that as a first step Abubakar consolidated the peaceful 
atmosphere that pervaded the nation after Abacha’s demise by releasing various individua ls 
either jailed for certain phantom offences or in detention without trial (Interview on January 
16, 2013). Characteristic of previous military tactics, Abubakar also earnestly began 
discussions with the opposition, including the press. Defending the press’s alliance with the 
Abubakar regime, Abugu insisted that it was natural for the press to embrace Abubakar’s ‘olive 
branch’ because it was an authority the press could ‘interface with’ (Interview on January 16 
2013). 
Given the pro-military background of Thisday’s publisher, the public relations- led journalism 
of Vanguard and Nigerian Tribune’s gravitation to the military, it was not surprising that these 
three papers gave generous coverage to the Abubakar regime with his name featuring 
prominently in news headlines, though less often in Nigerian Tribune. In addition, from the 
time Abubakar was sworn in, to July 7, 1998 when MKO Abiola died, the coverage was 
positive, giving him a voice through direct quotes and a plentiful supply of photographs.  
Headlines too were significant in how Abubakar was framed. According to Van Dijk, headlines 
have ideological implications; they are ‘a subjective definition of the situation, which 
influences the interpretation of the news report’ (Van Dijk 1991, p. 51). Scholars such as 
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Althaus et al. (2001), Andrew (2007), Leo´n (1997) have also questioned the credibility of 
headlines in relation to articles they represent, suggesting they ‘manipulate’ readers. These 
ideas seem to be in play in the news headlines I am considering here. Most of those referring 
to the new regime were robustly edited in order to popularise the head of state and boost his 
reputation. They were boldly displayed, mostly on the front page, and in some cases with more 
than one headline. In Thisday particularly Abubakar is the active subject and where he is not, 
his name still features in the headline: 
Thisday. 
 Abubakar Sacks Nas, Oyelese, Unaogu (Thisday, Wednesday July 1, 1998 p 1)36 
 Abubakar to visit Mandela (Thisday, Tuesday August 18, 1998, p 1) 
 ‘Stay clear of Sycophants’, Abubakar Warns the military (Thisday, Tuesday August 
 18, 1998, p. 1) 
 Abubakar Rules out Ethnic-based Parties (Thisday, Thursday August 28, 1998, p. 1) 
 Gwarzo is Being Probed, Says Abubakar (Thisday, Tuesday September 8, 1998, p. 1) 
 Abubakar Orders Withdrawal of Charges Against Exiles (Thisday, Tuesday 
 September 8, 1998, p. 1) 
 Abubakar Unfolds Foreign Policy Trust (Thisday, Thursday (Tuesday October 13, 
 1998, p. 1) 
 Abubakar to meet Heads of Foreign Missions (Thisday Thursday October 8, 1998) 
 
Vanguard.  
‘My pact with Nigerians’, General Abdusalami Abubakar (Vanguard, Wednesday 
 June 10, 1998, p. 1) 
Gowon seeks support for Abubakar37 (Vanguard, Wednesday June 10, 1998, p. 1).  
Abubakar, others offer prayers for Abacha (Vanguard Friday June 12, 1998, p. 1) 
                                                                 
36 All  emphases in the headlines are mine. 
37 Gowon was the Military head of state between 1966 and 1975  
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Make Nigeria proud, Abubakar tells Eagles38 (Vanguard, Friday June 12, 1998, p. 1)  
Transition: Abubakar seeks parties’ input (Vanguard Monday, 15 July, 1998, p. 1)   
 Agbakoba pledges support for Abubakar39 (Vanguard Wednesday June 12, 1998, p. 
 3). 
 ‘I will rid Nigeria of human rights abuses’, says Abubakar (Vanguard Tuesday, June 
 23, 1998, p. 1.) 
 Abubakar warns over coups (Vanguard Thursday August 27, 1998, p. 1) 
 
Nigerian Tribune 
Handover date sacrosanct – Abubakar’ (Nigerian Tribune Wednesday August 19, 
 1998, p. 2)  
 ‘Abacha regime under probe’, says Abubakar (Nigerian Tribune Tuesday September 
 8, 1998, p. 1) 
Abubakar tells world to lift sanctions (Nigerian Tribune Friday September 25, 1998, 
 p. 1) 
Abacha planned to sack me – Abubakar (Nigerian Tribune, Tuesday December 1, 
 1998, p. 10) 
At a time of political despair, the ideological implication of these headlines is simply to portray 
the head of state as being up and running – a man of the people, working hard to clear the 
system of Abacha’s messes, communicating to the Nigerian people and to the world. 
The cognitive impact on readers of consistently featuring Abubakar in the headlines can be 
profound. As Van Dijk notes, since most readers have no more contact with the newspapers 
than the headlines, it is likely to be seen as the ‘model of the situation by the readers…. headline 
information is used to stimulate the relevant knowledge the reader needs to comprehend the 
news report’ (Van Dijk 1991, p. 50). Given the ‘free readers association of Nigeria’ converging 
at the newsstands to gaze at headlines and form their opinions (see Chapter One), Van Dijk’s 
                                                                 
38 Eagles is the National football team. 
39 Agbakoba was a leading anti-military opposition figure under Babangida and Abacha, and formerly the 
president of the Civil  Liberties Organisation (CLO). 
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assessment is pertinent. With the persistent use of Abubakar’s name, the reader is likely to form 
a particular knowledge and understanding of the political situation with Abubakar perhaps 
representing their yearnings for the formation of a people’s government. The active verbs such 
as ‘orders’, ‘probes’ ‘restates’, ‘sacks’, ‘rules out’, ‘warns’ suggest an active head of state 
reshaping the system, eliminating what a scholar referred to as Abacha’s ‘anything goes’ 
(Olorode 2006) style. 
These headlines also shift attention away from the evils associated with military regimes (in a 
situation where Nigerians would in fact have preferred Abiola and were critical of Abacha’s 
replacement being yet another military man). Through frequent use of Abubakar’s name, the 
papers created him as a ‘normal guy’ not associated with a problematic past but trying to help 
the country finds its feet. Further, this repetition helped plant Abubakar’s name in the 
consciousness of the readers, perhaps endearing him to them, but importantly, given the 
prominence of headlines as an ‘emotion-inducing strategy’ geared to shaping the views of 
readers on national issues (Taiwo 2007, p. 218), this also helped to erase any suspicions about 
him.  
However, unlike the three dailies, Tell and TheNews remained sceptical of the military, 
notwithstanding the fact that the magazines benefited from Abubakar’s ‘hands of fellowship’ 
— their jailed editors were granted freedom, while those working underground came into the 
open. As radical magazines, the advent of Abubakar therefore did not represent any significant 
change. A Tell editor detained during Abacha regime, Onome Osifo-Whisky, confirmed that 
while the magazine did not specifically confront the Abubakar regime, they did not fully 
embrace it either. Had Abubakar prolonged his stay in power, Osifo-Whisky said they ‘would 
have gone back to the trenches to pick up guerrilla journalism. We left our underground 
paraphernalia intact for most of 1999’ (Olukotun and Seteolu 2001, p. 31).  
The magazine front cover and inside headlines are inflected differently, suggesting the 
magazines’ ambivalent and sometime critical position and Abubakar’s more fragile hold on 
power:  
Tell 
‘Death of a Tyrant’. Challenges ahead40 (Tell June 22, 1998, cover page).  
                                                                 
40 The story chronicled Abacha’s five year ‘brutal dictatorship’ and his sudden death. It tells of the challenges 
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‘Abubakar’s Dilemma’. How to resolve June 12. His problems with the military41 (Tell 
June 29, 1998, cover page).  
‘Nigeria After Abiola’. Fire, Fury, Farewell42 (Tell July 27, 1998, cover page).  
‘Under the Carpet’43 (Tell August 3, 1998, cover page).  
‘A Spanner in the works’44 (Tell August 17, 1998, cover page).  
 “Abubakar is Deceiving Himself” - Gani Fawehinmi45 (Tell, August 3, 1998, p. 22).  
‘We are fed up’: Nigerians Angry with Abubakar46 (Tell January 4, 1999, cover page). 
‘Crisis in Aso Rock… Over Service Chiefs’47 (Tell, April 26, 1999, cover page).  
‘Looting Incorporated: How Abubakar And His Generals Plunder Nigeria’48 (Tell May 
 17, 1999, cover page). 
‘Abiola’s Death: The Great Conspiracy’49 (Tell, June 21, 1999, cover page).  
In the foregoing headlines, the language highlights ‘challenges’, ‘Abubakar’s dilemma’, ‘A 
spanner in the works’ and ‘crisis’. Abubakar is the object of others’ emotions – ‘Nigerians 
angry with Abubakar’, and is criticised – ‘How Abubakar and his generals plunder Nigeria’, 
‘Abubakar is deceiving himself’. Headlines without an obvious agent inevitably imply 
something amiss and a probable association with Abubakar: ‘Under the carpet’ [who is pushing 
                                                                 
ahead of the new military leadership, such as Abiola and June 12 issue. 
41 The story’s opening remarks read: ‘General Abdusalami Abubakar, the new head of the military junta, is faced 
with the option of moving Nigeria forward by resolving the June 12 issue, once and for all, or sweeping it under 
the carpet l ike his predecessors, and thereby plunging the country into further political crisis ’ (p. 12). 
42 The edition captured the violence that trailed the death of Abiola in custody as well as the outpouring of 
emotion by Nigerians, and blamed the military for his death. 
43 The story appraised the new regime after the death of Abiola, concluding that Abubakar ’s ‘junta is clearly 
lacking in both the will  and the way to confront what has come to be known as the fundamental issues  affecting 
the Nigerian state’ (p. 12). 
44 This story highlights the various demands by interests groups, on the transition programme announced by the 
government, and insinuated that the transition was under threat. 
45 An interview granted by the human rights lawyer and anti -military campaigner, who lashed out at the military. 
46 The edition heaps pressures on the military, publishing the angry reactions of some Nigerians interviewed.  
47 The story reveals the uneasy calm in the seat of power over the attempt by the military to retain the service 
chiefs ahead of the inauguration of the new democratic government. 
48 This story, two weeks before the handing over to the new government, uncovers the various shady deals by 
the outgoing military government, particularly the distribution of oil  exploration blocks to military generals and 
their civil ian acolytes  
49 The edition revisits Abiola’s death and concluded that he was a victim of high wire politics. Abiola ’s personal 
physician, Dr. Ore Falomo was interviewed in the edition, where he alluded to the ‘controversial tea’ given to his 
client by the American diplomats. 
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what under the carpet?] ‘Nigeria After Abiola’. Fire, Fury, Farewell’ [who has created the ‘Fire, 
fury…’?]. As Osifo Whisky admits, they neither confronted nor embraced Abubakar (p. 194). 
Here, they play safe by seeming to offer support for Abubakar if only to ‘do away with the 
crisis’ (Abugu 2013) whilst also covertly querying the regime. 
 
TheNews 
‘Bamaiyi & Co must go’. The Umar interview50 (TheNews, April 26, 1999).  
‘The Soyinka Interview: Abubakar’s junta dubious’51 (TheNews, May 3, 1999, cover 
page).  
‘Akhigbe’s last minute deals’. Generals grab oil wells’52 (TheNews, May 10, 1999, cover 
page). 
‘Abubakar corrupt’ – Dr Junaid53 (TheNews, May 17, 1999).  
As in Tell, TheNews headlines also question the regime’s corrupt practices and highlight 
challenges: ‘Generals grab oil wells’, ‘Bamaiyi & Co must go’ and Abubakar junta dubious’. 
However, unlike Tell which offers support by hiding the ‘agent’, TheNews offers open criticism 
with an obvious ‘agent’ in the headlines: ‘Abubakar junta dubious’ – attributed to Soyinka, and 
‘Abubakar corrupt’ – attributed to Junaid. In this instance, TheNews appears to insist on 
showing its opposition to the military by not offering covert support for the regime. 
Van Dijk (1991), Chiluwa (2007), Taiwo (2007) all point out that the choice of words in 
newspaper headlines plays an important role, in that they not only define the situation but serve 
the interests of some and undermine those of others.  Unlike Thisday, Vanguard and Nigerian 
Tribune’s portrayals of Abubakar through headlines, Tell and TheNews signal their politica l 
                                                                 
50 An interview granted by a retired radical army colonel, who fell  out with Abacha over Abiola and June 12, and 
was retired by the former. He demands the retirement of the army chief, General Bamaiyi and other service 
chiefs before the new government is sworn in, warning: ‘The last time a service chief was left behind, he 
brutalised us all. Now they want to have three behind to finish us up’. The colonel was referring to Abacha left 
behind by Babangida, but who later removed the interim government of Shonekan.  
51 An interview granted by Wole Soyinka where he condemns the regime, particularly the scheming to leave 
the service chief in power. 
52 The edition reports on the corrupt practices of the military, highlighting in particular, shady deals involving the 
chief of general staff, Admiral Mike Akhigbe. It lamented the ‘oil and sundry deals even to the consternation of 
the president-elect and international observers of Nigeria’ (p. 16). 
53 An interview granted by a radical element and a former government appointee, who threatens: ‘I have 
evidence of his corruption. If he l ikes, he can sue me. I have all  my facts ’ (p. 17). 
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position: they do not glorify Abubakar or celebrate a new era but represent him as yet another 
military ruler who is not to be trusted and against which to take a stand. This political and 
ideological stand point is likely to frame readers’ perception of the Abubakar regime as a 
continuation of the past.  Given the mood of the people at the time on military rule, Tell and 
TheNews keyed in to the popular wish of the people. 
Clearly, each of the five publications marked out its ideological position through judicious use 
of headlines. While Thisday, Vanguard and Nigerian Tribune (more or less) supported the role 
of pro-military, Tell and TheNews embraced a more critical stance. The headlines were well 
crafted to define the political situation as they saw it and by extension, tried to lead their readers 
to follow a political line. The different viewpoints/approaches to framing news in this period 
suggest perhaps that there was an ongoing debate.  The magazines were keeping the liberal 
press alive even if mainstream titles were not. 
 
Having its way: The Military Triumphs 
The death of Moshood Kasimawo Olawale Abiola marked a turning point in the yearning of 
Nigerians for democratic governance. In particular, it was a humiliating defeat to the touted 
‘lively outspokenness’ (Olukotun 2010) or ‘robustness’ (Ibelema 2002, p. 163) of the press at 
the time. Abubakar would have had knowledge of the troubled alliance of military-press 
relations under Babangida and Abacha and wanted to avoid their mistakes. He therefore moved 
rather swiftly, putting paid to the possibility of such a problematic relationship re-occurring. 
Extending the ‘olive branch’ to the press – to give a sense of a return to ‘normal’ business – 
Abubakar thereby weakened the press’s moral basis to ensure government accountability. He 
also undermined journalists by what Britain refers to as ‘breaking the political ice’ (Britain 
1998) – removing Abiola and the June 12 debacle from the political agenda. After Abiola’s 
death, he further leveraged a blow to the press, announcing an exit strategy tallying with the 
expectation of a populace who no longer wanted to support military rule 54.  
Thus the way appeared clear for Abubakar to implement the final phase of his agenda — the 
transition to an elected government. On July 20, 1998, two weeks after Abiola’s death, 
                                                                 
54 In this process of democratisation, however, he further closed any further avenue to courting the press. Osifo 
Whisky confirms that had Abubakar elongated his tenure, they would have returned to guerril la reporting (p. 
194). 
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Abubakar announced his transition programme, with May 29, 1999 fixed as the date of his 
departure from power. Albeit, Abubakar was said to be an apolitical soldier, he was aware that 
the Nigerian people, vehemently opposed Babangida and Abacha and were no longer in the 
mood to accept military rule. He was poised to return the country to democracy (Robinson 
1998, p. 136, Obi 2000, p. 78). Yet germane to Abubakar’s plan was ensuring that the military 
retained power, an intention manifest in several ways. Having released former military head of 
state, Olusegun Obasanjo, along with others, he granted Obasanjo a presidential pardon while 
others, including journalists and military generals, were left with criminal records hanging over 
them. The presidential pardon meant that Obasanjo’s criminal past was officially erased, thus 
allowing him to hold public office again. Interestingly, Babangida also paid a visit to Obasanjo 
a week before Abiola’s death, telling the press ‘Nigeria needs Obasanjo’ (Vanguard Sunday 
June 28, 1998, p.1). Further Emeka Anyaoku, Commonwealth Secretary General, visited 
Obasanjo in his Ota Farm to ‘intimate him of the desire of the imperial powers’ (Olorode 2006) 
to have him returned to the seat of power. ‘Imperial powers’ is a reference to the UK 
government, thus also suggesting Obasanjo was being positioned to become president. 
Several papers took up this story publishing photographs, but Thisday showcased the visit. 
Nigerian Tribune also published a photograph and story of the visit (Nigerian Tribune, July 3, 
1998, p. 3).  
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Figure 23: Thisday, July 6, 1998, p. 22 
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Figure 24: Nigerian Tribune, Friday July 3, 1998, p. 3 
ThisDay included eight photographs in colour, unambiguously linking the ‘imperial powers’ 
to Obasanjo and Abubakar (Fig. 23). They offer a particular narrative of events. Given priority 
at the top of the page were two photographs of Emeka Anyaoku’s visit to Abubakar, below, 
photographs of his visit to Obasanjo55.  In the first of two top photographs, Anyaoku and 
Abubakar are seen laughing (albeit nervously) with their arms stretched out and placed on the 
desk (a feature consistent with unease), Anyaoku’s head tilted in the direction of Abubakar 
invoking a challenge or questioning mode (the features in the photograph do not tally with a 
relaxed atmosphere - no banter scenario). In the second photograph Abubakar is alone grinning 
nervously, his hands clenched and placed on the table, suggesting that the head of state is 
anxious about the implications of the message just delivered by Anyaoku: should he act, or not, 
to end the possibility of a resolution of June 12 with Abiola and allow Obasanjo to take charge? 
The photos suggest Abubakar is struggling with the situation he faced at that time.  
                                                                 
55 Two days earlier Tony Blair, June 24, 1998 phoned Abubakar, tell ing him Tony Lloyd would be visiting. Similar 
arrangements for the US diplomats were also made from Washington, but neither Whitehall nor Washington 
were forthcoming on Abiola’s political future in their rapport with Abubakar and Obasanjo, thus strongly 
suggesting the narrative of Abacha/Abiola was a ‘fix’. See Britain (1998, p.1) ‘Nigeria: Abubakar Meets Abiola’. 
Africa Confidential. 
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The remaining six photographs are a world apart from the previous meeting between Anyaoku 
and Abubakar. They indicate a rather pleasant atmosphere signified by hand-slapping and back-
slapping: Obasanjo seems happy about the message Anyaoku is delivering (that he should take 
on the presidency). Press accounts suggest that when Obasanjo was informed of the need for 
him to shoulder the responsibility of holding the nation together, he insisted that with Abiola 
and June 12 still unresolved, it would be difficult for him to play any role56. It was reported 
that he was assured that there would be a solution to the crisis. A pertinent front page story in 
Vanguard on June 28, 1998: ‘IBB visits Obasanjo, says Nigeria needs him’ confirmed this 
narrative, reporting Babangida visited Obasanjo after his release from jail. Abiola died the 
following week. The photographic representation of Anyaoku’s visit, after meeting Abubakar, 
implies this arrangement will be followed through. This explains why Thisday plays up the 
emerging political drama generously devoting its most expensive colour photo page to the 
news. The photographic narrative also implies that the press knew of the arrangement.  
Retrospectively the latter’s foreknowledge of the political game is evident at a pertinent event 
that took place earlier on May 12, 1998, a month before Abacha’s death. A seminar with the 
theme ‘Patriotism and Professionalism in Defence Reporting: Nigeria as a Case Study’ was 
organised by the Association of Defence Correspondents (ADC), held at the Air Force 
Officers’ Mess in Ikoyi Lagos, and attended by top military brass as well as top editors. 
Interestingly, the special guest of honour was the Chief of Defence Staff, General Abubakar, 
who became the head of state a month later. In his opening presentation, captured in an editorial 
published a week later by Vanguard, Abubakar proclaimed: 
The sword in the days of old was mightier than the press. As the time went by, the press 
evolved a greater status than the sword, but today in our contemporary society, the pen 
                                                                 
56 There had been an age long rivalry between Obasanjo and Abiola prior to the June 12 crisis. Both were kinsmen 
and former classmates from the Egba Tribe of Abeokuta, the capital of Ogun State, South West Nigeria. While 
Obasanjo was one of the nation’s military ‘big boys’ enjoying the limelight from the 1960s, Abiola became 
friendly with these military ‘big boys’ on account of his company’s business as a military contractor. Shortly after 
Abiola met the then minister of Communications in Gowon’s regime, General Murtala Mohammed in 1975 on 
behalf of International Telephone Telegraph (ITT) handling military communications, the latter became Head of 
State (after the coup that toppled Gowon) and Obasanjo became his deputy. With Abiola having his friend 
Murtala as Head of State and Obasanjo his kinsman as the deputy, the rivalry grew. Obasanjo  was said to be 
uncomfortable with Abiola, his former classmate, not only rubbing shoulders with the military high command, 
but sharing the lime light alongside him. Thus, it was not a coincidence that after Babangida annulled June 12, 
Obasanjo did not offer support but instead campaigned against Abiola whom at a gathering in Zimbabwe in 1993 
he dismissed for not being ‘the messiah Nigeria was looking for’. Though he became Nigeria’s president in 1999 
after Abiola’s suspicious death in State custody, Obasanjo refused to acknowledge the latter ’s election victory 
and sacrifices, and throughout his eight year tenure declined calls to immortalise Abiola. See Adebajo Adekeye’s 
‘The Nigerian Emperor’s New Clothes’. Africa Review of Books Volume 9, No 1, pp. 4 – 6. 
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and the sword are partners in progress (Vanguard, Tuesday May 19, 1998 p. 6 my 
emphasis). 
Vanguard relished the positive outcome of the seminar. Under the heading ‘Military vs. Press: 
A new spirit?’ the editorial described Abubakar’s pronouncements as ‘mighty’, asserting that 
‘both sides share a common stake in nation building’. ‘Freedom for all jailed and detained 
journalists today will be well in accordance with the emerging new spirit’ (Vanguard, Tuesday 
May 19, 1998 p. 6). 
The allusion to the ‘emerging new spirit’ is interesting, given there was no sign at the time that 
Abacha was soft-pedalling in his war on the press. Retrospectively at least, it is clear that 
Abubakar was not representing Abacha at the event and the confidence exuded in the editorial 
can be interpreted as a sign that Vanguard was sure of its assertion. Indeed, it became a reality 
a month later. The inaction of the press in the following month of June/July 1998 when Abacha 
and Abiola died, and its seeming acceptance of Abubakar’s ‘hand of fellowship’ is itself 
suspicious, at least viewed from the statements coming out of the May 12 seminar. Once in 
power and in the spirit of ‘partnering for progress’, Abubakar kept his side of the bargain with 
the unconditional release of jailed and detained journalists. It would seem that, in turn, the press 
would play the game ‘fairly’. For the press to have reneged and attempted any form of 
opposition, would have meant the ‘honeymoon’, as in previous periods, would be ‘over’ 
(General Oladipo Diya, October 10, 2012). The cost yet again was democracy - Abiola, June 
12 and the ‘liberal press’ – whilst the retention of power in the hands of the military was also 
assured. 
In August, a news item in Nigerian Tribune also reinforced the idea that Abiola may have been 
killed. In a banner headline, ‘CIA killed MKO?’ (Tuesday August 25, 1998, p. 3) the paper 
linked Abiola’s death to the American CIA. Convincing its readers further of this possibility, 
the paper reproduced its 1983 story ‘CIA plans to kill Awo, MKO’ (see Figure 25 below). It 
alleged a CIA plot to eliminate Obafemi Awolowo (opposition leader at the time) and MKO 
Abiola who had fallen out with the ruling party, NPN and aligned himself with Awolowo. As 
a socialist the latter was not the choice of the western powers and Abiola’s association with 
him rattled their calculations. The story also revealed that the CIA was involved in the politica l 
crisis leading to Buhari’s 1983 coup. Coincidentally, and adding fuel to the fire perhaps, the 
American Ambassador to Nigeria at the time of the 1983 plot, Thomas Pickering, was again 
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the Under Secretary of State in 1998, accompanying Susan Rice at the meeting when Abiola 
collapsed after the fatal cup of tea.  
 
Figure 25: Nigerian Tribune, Tuesday August 25, 1998, p. 1  
Reflecting back on this period, Abugu suggests that the press was helpless to save the situation. 
Nonetheless he implicitly confirmed that there had been a ‘political fix’; he complained 
bitterly: ‘we didn’t want Obasanjo, but then we still had to support Abubakar’s transition, 
haphazard as it was’, because of his ‘olive branch’ and the need to ‘do away with the crisis’ 
(Interview on January 16, 2013).  
 
The Press Support the Transition 
With over sixty protestors killed by security forces in the aftermath of Abiola’s death (Lewis 
1999), the transition took off with the registration of political parties and the constitution of the 
electoral commission. Even before publicly declaring his presidential ambition, Obasanjo, 
whose businesses according to press account, were said to be in ruins after his detention, gave 
a large donation of One Hundred and Thirty Million Naira (N130 M – US $1M) to the leading 
party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) (Nigerian Tribune, Tuesday December 1, 1998, 
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p.1). The donation may have come from the party backers alleged to be rich retired military 
Generals and civilians with close links to the Government (Olorode 2006). 
Throughout the period of electioneering, from local government, through governorship, 
parliamentary and presidential elections, all five publications, but particularly the three dailies 
performed the role of informing the electorate about candidates as well as providing details on 
the activities of the electoral commission. The three newspapers were more generous in their 
coverage of the transition, carrying more front page reports on the head of state. They also 
carried more stories on the activities of the leading party PDP and its presidential candidate, 
Obasanjo. According to Olukotun, this was in line with an economic logic: his party was rich 
and spent more on advertising and patronage than others (Olukotun 2000, p. 32). 
For instance, Nigerian Tribune carried a front page report on Wednesday August 25, 1998, 
informing its readers of the planned release of the transition guidelines by the electoral 
commission. The story was headlined ‘INEC releases guidelines today’. Thisday carried a bold 
headline on its front page edition of Tuesday September 22, 1998: ‘Transition: INEC May 
Extend Verification Exercise – Akpata’. The story pertained to the on-going verification of 
claims by political parties and the desire of the electoral body to give more rooms to the parties 
to comply with the rules. Given the scepticism evident during past transitions, the paper quoted 
the electoral chairman, Justice Akpata, assuring the public that he ‘did not foresee the 
possibility of extending the on-going transition programme beyond the May, 29, 1999 set for 
it to terminate’ (Thisday, September 22, 1998 p.1). This direct quote from the electoral 
commission’s chairman on the front page showed the importance attached to the Abubakar 
transition, reassuring the public that the extension of the verification exercise would have no 
implication for the hand over date. This story was followed up the next day with another bold 
headline on the front page, confirming the speculation: ‘INEC Extends Verification Exercise 
to October 12’ (Thisday September 23, 1998, p. 1). Vanguard featured the same story on its 
front page edition of September 23, 1998: ‘Verification: INEC extends deadline’. With the 
headlines robustly edited to popularise the activities of the electoral commission, all three 
papers guide the public towards supporting the transition process. 
Following Abiola’s death, part of Abubakar’s consultation process involved diplomatic visits 
to countries in order to restore Nigeria to the comity of nations. In their continuing support of 
his regime, all three papers prominently featured these foreign visits with front page stories and 
photographs. Nigerian Tribune headlined his visit to South Africa: ‘Mandela lauds transit ion’ 
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(Nigerian Tribune, Tuesday August 25, 1998, p. 1), reporting that Nelson Mandela was 
impressed by the transition being put in place by Abubakar to restore Nigeria to democracy. A 
photograph on page three showed Abubakar being welcomed to Pretoria by Deputy President 
Thabo Mbeki and the Foreign Minister. The following day, another photograph was published 
showing a joint press conference held by Abubakar and Mandela.  
 
Figure 26: Nigerian Tribune, Wednesday 26, August, 1998, p. 3 
On the second leg of his foreign trip, Vanguard similarly informed readers of Abubakar’s visit 
to the United States in a front page story: ‘Clinton, Abubakar parley next week’ (Vanguard 
Friday September 11, 1998, p.1), whilst Thisday offered another story on a foreign trip, titled 
‘Abubakar Begins UK, US France Visit’ (Thisday September 22, 1998, p. 1). The headline was 
boxed and with a black-inked background to stand out. Vanguard followed with yet another 
similar story under the headline ‘Abubakar, Tony Blair hold talks on EU sanctions’ (September 
23, 1998, p. 1). 
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Figure 27: Thisday September 22, 1998, p. 1. 
A follow-up photographic story on the same visit also appeared on the front page of Thisday 
on Thursday September 28, 1998. It shows the General shaking hands with British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair on the door step of Number 10, Downing Street. Abubakar appears relaxed 
and smiling as he and Tony Blair pose for the camera. Their demeanour suggests confidence, 
satisfaction progress being made – overall a fruitful meeting. The paper reproduced the 
photograph in another edition three months later on December 27, 1998 with a sub-head title: 
‘Perspective’ (see Fig. 28), the caption describing the visit as ‘evidence of what changed in 
‘98’. Again by re-publishing the photograph of the visit to the ‘imperial powers’, Thisday 
reassured readers that the ‘extraordinary confluence’ of June/July 1998 was over. It is perhaps 
also another indication of the press having knowledge of the ‘political fix’. 
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Figure 28: Thisday, Sunday December 27, 1998, back cover) 
The foreign visits by Abubakar were symbolic in the sense that Nigeria’s relationship with 
these countries had been severely strained for over five years since the annulment of June 12, 
1993 elections with many sanctions imposed on Nigeria57.  Such a story on the front page of 
                                                                 
57 Though these countries imposed sanctions on the Abacha regime, owing to pressures by civil  society 
organisations, they had covert dealings with the military. For instance, Soyinka told newsmen in Lagos, 1995 that 
the United Kingdom in particular was aiding the Abacha regime with continued supplies of military hardware at 
a time of gross rights violations. This was after Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth following the 
hanging of the Niger Delta environmentalis t, Ken Saro Wiwa and eight others. The British High Commissioner 
replied that the supplies were ‘outstanding’. 
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each of the three papers, complemented with photographs, sent a message of stability to 
Nigerians that the country was back on the world stage. The photographs were direct evidence 
of their head of state’s successful foreign trips to the world’s notable seats of power: Abubakar 
gaining credibility through his association with foreign leaders, suggesting that he was working 
hard to restore Nigeria’s image – and its democracy. In effect, the press’s packaging of 
Abubakar in this way could be seen to be striving to partly erase from people’s memory, the 
tragedy of the two months (June/July 1998) earlier – the deaths of Abiola and Abacha but more 
particularly of over sixty protestors killed following Abiola’s death. There was no probe into 
these deaths, and the press did not lobby for an inquiry.  As Hall points out, in the modern 
newspaper, while text is essential, photographs add colour to a text. “Pictures are more 
imperative than writing; they impose meaning at one stroke, without analysing or diluting it” 
(Cited in Cohen and Young 1973, p. 226). The three papers thus tell their readers: ‘This is the 
direct evidence, our man was there’.  
For Tell and TheNews, as expected of weekly magazines, space was limited. Although the 
magazines appeared to put Abubakar on his toes, with stories about Abiola and June 12 
persisting, as well as consistent allegations of corruption, they also adopted a moderate tone 
and did not attack the transition programme. As a matter of civic responsibility and perhaps to 
put pressure on the regime not to renege on the transition, throughout the entire transition 
period, Tell in particular, offered a weekly countdown to the hand-over date.  Olukotun and 
Seteolu describe this feature as a ‘kind of advocacy advertising for the transition programme’ 
(2001). One of the contributions from TheNews was a light-hearted cover story featuring all 
the presidential candidates, complemented by individual photographs and their campaign 
rhetoric, thereby giving readers a glimpse of those angling for their votes. Here, TheNews leads 
the electorate to consider the full range of candidates. In these ways – and there were several 
other such features and stories – these titles made manifest their support for the Government’s 
activities, particularly in relation to the transition programme. This stance contributed to 
ensuring that Abubakar’s plan sailed through without hindrance. 
But while the three dailies emphasised the promotion of Abubakar as personality, the two 
magazines were more restrained. They did not highlight Abubakar, at least in a PR sense. His 
regime was consistently referred to as a ‘junta’. The ideological differences between the dailies 
and the weeklies had to do with their backgrounds and orientation. Indeed, until the end of 
Abubakar’s transition, editors of the two magazines at the centre of guerrilla practice all 
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through the Abacha years strove to restore their reputation, seriously dented by their earlier 
collaboration with the military during Buhari and Babangida years. 
 
Obasanjo: The Press rallies round him 
After Obasanjo (unsurprisingly) won the vote at the February 27, 1999 general elections, the 
opposition candidate, Olu Falae, filed a case challenging the victory only to abandon it midway. 
‘Programmed’ to succeed by the military, Obasanjo’s, victory was a fait accompli, such that it 
would have been a herculean task for any opposition candidate to upturn the result. Whilst the 
press did give coverage to Falae’s case, largely, it seemed pleased with the Obasanjo victory. 
Shortly after the electoral commission declared Obasanjo the winner, the paraphernalia of 
office of the president was extended to him. He also began a presidential pre-inaugura t ion 
world tour, ignoring the fact that his victory was the subject of judicial scrutiny. Ordinarily, 
while the Election Tribunal determines the authentic winner, nothing should be done to 
jeopardise or influence any pending case. But in this case there was no indication of any press 
criticism of this anomaly; rather, his presidential conduct was elevated by the press, in part 
through their take up of the fulsome endorsements of his foreign trips 
Barely two weeks after Obasanjo was declared winner, and as the opposition challenge was 
still being debated, British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook arrived in Nigeria on a visit to see 
Obasanjo. Nigerian Tribune in a front page story ‘Obasanjo’s election credible – UK, 
Anyaoku’ reported that the visiting diplomat declared the election ‘generally free and fair’. The 
report also captured a statement issued by the Commonwealth Secretary General, Emeka 
Anyaoku to the effect that the election was a ‘credible exercise in spite of the reported 
irregularities’. A photograph of Robin Cook’s visit to Obasanjo on the same front page 
complemented the story (Nigerian Tribune, Thursday March 11, 1999, p. 1, see fig. 29). A 
further press account also reported that the US sent Reverend Jesse Jackson, envoy to Africa 
on democracy and Mr Andrew Young to parley with Obasanjo and Falae while other diplomats 
in Nigeria rushed to congratulate Obasanjo. In all these attempts which, in effect, undermined 
attempts to seek judicial action, the press did not query why Robin Cook and Anyaoku in 
particular, or the American officials were ignoring opposition concerns: the press went along 
with the notion that the election was generally peaceful and Nigeria should move forward under 
Obasanjo. 
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Figure 29: Nigerian Tribune, Thursday March 11, 1999 
Thisday and Vanguard also carried reports of Obasanjo’s visits abroad captured in pictures and 
elaborated on. Thisday carried two: ‘Obasanjo Meets Clinton Today, Hopeful of Nigeria’s 
Future’ (Thisday Tuesday March 30, 1999, p. 1) stating that Obasanjo was a guest at a reception 
by the African-American Institute in New York. The second report: ‘Obasanjo to Overhaul 
NNPC, CBN’ captured Obasanjo’s meeting with the World Bank in Washington DC, 
promising the Bank transparency in his yet-to-be formed Government and to reform key state 
institutions, such as the State oil company, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (Thisday, Monday April 5, 1999, p. 1). Beneath this report is a story 
on the electoral court case challenging Obasanjo’s victory: ‘Court Rules on Falae Vs Obasanjo 
Today’ about the expected judgement. However, prominence is given to Obasanjo world tour 
over the determination of the electoral dispute, with the headline about his meeting with the 
World Bank in a larger font size, across the entire six columns, with two sub-headlines 
underneath it. The effect is to highlight Obasanjo’s victory as a fait accompli.  The fourth 
additional complement to the story was on top of the main headline, highlighted by a blue 
background: ‘At parley with the World Bank…’ In this way, Thisday places a higher premium 
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on the Obasanjo phenomenon as it guides the attention of its readers away from the 
inconsequential court verdict expected on this day: court or no court, Obasanjo is the president.  
 
Figure 30: Thisday, Monday April 5, 1999 
As in the case of Anyaoku’s visit to Abubakar and Obasanjo, ThisDay also showcased 
Obasanjo’s foreign tour with a generous full colour page containing nine photographs,  
including his visit to Pope John Paul 2 at the Vatican, Tony Blair at Downing Street, Clinton 
at the White House, as well as visits to the Jamaican and Italian Presidents. The significance 
of the photos is anchored by a statement at the top of the publication: ‘President-elect, General 
Olusegun Obasanjo recently returned from a very successful and fruitful global tour that took 
him and his entourage to several countries including Europe, North and South America’ 
(Thisday Sunday April 25, 1999, p. 12, my emphasis). This PR-style packaging of Obasanjo 
continues the paper’s pro-military agenda which began with its reporting in June/July 1998 
when both Abacha and Abiola died.  
Vanguard also featured the world tour in a full page but with eight black and white photos 
similar to those in Thisday: ‘Obasanjo’s World Tour in Pictures’ (Vanguard Monday April 12, 
1999, p. 3) and some days later this was followed up with another photo page: ‘Credit Suisse 
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Fetes Obasanjo in New York’, containing five photographs of the event hosted by the global 
financial services company (Vanguard Sunday 18, March 1999, p. 8).  
In relation to the two weekly magazines, the situation did not differ much from their earlier 
ambivalent attitude to Abubakar. However, there were instances suggesting Tell was also ‘gate-
keeping’ for Obasanjo. Two cover stories suffice. The first: ‘The Army will deal with 
Obasanjo’ featured an interview with Omo Omoruyi, professor of political Science and head 
of Babangida regime’s think tank – Centre for Democratic Studies – who parted ways with the 
military after the annulment of June 12 elections. He warned: ‘the same people who jailed him 
[Obasanjo] are still in the military’ (Tell, April 6, 1999). The second: ‘Nigeria’s Last Chance… 
Challenges before the President’ (Tell, May 31, 1999), appearing two days after Obasanjo’s 
inauguration on May 29, 1999, whipped up sentiment by pointing to those in the system who 
might sabotage Obasanjo’s Government. Such reports arguably legitimated action or put 
pressure on Obasanjo to act against the unidentified threats to his Government; which indeed 
he did by retiring a number of generals after his inauguration. 
 
Conclusion 
The Press Accepts Defeat 
In this chapter, I have argued that by the time General Abdusalami Abubakar regime assumed 
power, following the death of Abacha, the press was already undermined, such that it could not 
resist Abubakar’s ‘olive branch’ (Abugu 2013). Capitalising on the ‘psychological’ state of the 
press, Abubakar then went on to further undermine the press with what the thesis proposes was 
a ‘political fix’ – death of Abiola and the permanent sealing of the June 12 crisis. Decisive ly, 
Abubakar ensured the press was bowed by handing over to an anointed candidate Olusegun 
Obasanjo.  
The chapter also throws up the possibility that, as with the past regimes, the press may have 
been compromised in order to do away with the raging crisis. I discussed the May, 1998 
seminar organised by Defence Correspondents’ Association, with Abubakar in attendance, as 
the possible avenue where the dramatic events of the following months of June/July 1998 were 
sealed – the clear out of Abacha and Abiola. 
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For instance, I argue that given the stream of diplomats who visited after Abacha died, in 
particular the weighty statement of Tony Lloyd to the effect that ‘June 12 was dead’ (Sunday 
Champion, June 28, 1998, p. 1), the press ought to have sensed the looming danger over Abiola. 
But as Abugu revealed, the mood in the press then was to give Abubakar ‘a chance’ and ‘do 
away with the crises’. All this suggest that Tony Lloyd may be addressing a briefed press.  
Having settled permanently, the June 12 and Abiola, Abubakar announced his transition. All 
the titles, particularly the newspapers, supported the transition and went further to construct 
Abubakar as a new man. Thisday, Vanguard and Nigerian Tribune deployed their headlines to 
plant Abubakar in the minds of readers. His diplomatic visits abroad were also showcased in 
photos. However, Tell and TheNews, while not antagonistic, did offer some kind of ‘protest’ 
culture. His transition programme which was not scrutinised by the press, but rather supported 
eventually led to a ‘low democracy’ (Diamond et al 1999). However, the failure of the press at 
this critical time to preserve the ‘June 12’ struggle (death of Abiola in custody), can be linked 
to journalists’ penchant for romanticising with the military and other political gladiators i.e. 
‘inclination to politics’ (Golden and Elliot 1979) or ‘political parallelism’ (Hallin and Mancini 
2004) or ‘instrument of clientelist networks and neo-patrimonial politics’ (Hadland 2011). The 
upshot of this political enmeshment is that, the press could not properly scrutinise General 
Abubakar’s ‘hands of fellowship’ (Abugu 2013) hence, its inability to safeguard the democratic 
rights of Nigerians.  
With this Abubakar scenario, which ended the sixteen year-long military rule, and which to an 
extent subordinated the press to its final whims, the chapter concludes that whatever remains 
of the credibility of the press was damaged, and that  Soyinka’s ‘magnificent and heroic’ trophy 
could not stand. Rather, the press was part of the Abubakar arrangement that ensured that the 
electoral will of the people (June 12) was permanently eroded. The press was also instrumenta l 
to the implementation of a transition programme in which the choice of the people did not 
count.   
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion 
Neither Magnificent nor Heroic: Nigeria’s Complicit Press (1984 – 1999) 
 
In this thesis I have explored and questioned the performance of the Nigerian press in relation 
to the state during its long period of military rule. In 1998 after Abacha’s death, Wole Soyinka 
made his renowned declaration: 
 
The press and let me seize this very opportunity to stress this, the press has been 
magnificent, really magnificent, heroic and one of these days, when there’s more 
pleasure, we are going to erect a statue. I am going to see personally to this, that a statue 
for heroism of the press is erected at a prominent place in this country; we must never 
ever forget (The Guardian, Saturday October 17, 1998, p. 5). 
In some ways this statement, which was uttered in spite of a sixteen year long military reign, 
sparked this study. Was the press really ‘magnificent and heroic’?  I wanted to question and 
explore Soyinka’s statement (see Chapter One above). My interest partly arose from what 
became a confusing array of changing experiences: son of a first and second republic politic ian; 
an activist involved in anti-military activities; a state official involved in the implementa t ion 
of transition programmes and, a student of journalism. I found myself shifting my views, 
particularly my initial enthusiasm that the press was championing the course of democracy. 
Soyinka’s image and authority in Nigerian society (Gibbs 1983) and the view that he was the 
‘press’s man Friday’ (Olaoye Bisiriyu, deputy editor, Daily Champion, 2013), made exploring 
his statement pertinent if challenging. Such a view had also been taken up and developed by 
other scholars. Ayo Olukotun in his study of state-press relations under the military, argues that 
the ‘the vibrant media played an influential role’ and ‘patriotically rose’ against the military 
(Olukotun 2002, p. 1). Olukotun further averred that given this role, the press will be ‘central 
to the sustenance of democracy in Nigeria’ (Olukotun 2002, p. 233).  
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In exploring Soyinka’s statement and Olukotun’s assertions, chapter two considers the earlier 
conceptualisations and accounts of the Nigerian press by scholars and journalists, from the 
stage set by the first newspaper Iwe Irohin in 1859 up to the period this study began in 1984. 
These are marked by two traditions of the press synonymous with particular journalism practice 
and in tension with each other. The first is the view of the press as anti-colonial (protest or 
nationalist). This definition is earned in the long run up to and glory of independence and 
carries over into the press’s own understanding of itself, and in a public perception that recalls 
the postcolonial struggles (see Chapter Two above). This view is furthered by the near 
agreement by media historians that the protest nature of the press in tackling colonia lism 
accelerated the granting of political independence.  However it is pertinent that liberalists such 
as Ogbondah (1994), Olukotun (2002) and Adesoji (2010) carried forward this view of the 
press as a protest press throughout the military regimes until 1979 when a democratic regime 
was in place.  
The other tradition, the ethno-political press, suggests a different view pulling against the 
notion of a national ‘protest’ culture. These scholars suggest that practitioners of the early 
period hid behind anti-colonial struggles to perpetuate their other interests (Chick 1971, 
Golding and Elliot 1979, Uche 1989, Agbaje 1992), leading to the associated conception 
formulated by Golding and Elliot (1979) that:  
The separation of politics and journalism has remained incomplete and the dual 
allegiances of journalists to professional and political goals have created conflic ts 
whose resolution in daily practice underpins much of contemporary Nigerian 
journalism’ (1979, p. 31).  
Specifically, Golding and Elliot opined that in Nigeria’s colonial press, ‘journalism was a 
narrow avenue’ for politicians to advance their ‘political ambitions’ and the ‘flower ing 
nationalism of these papers was consistently watered by self-interest’ (p. 29). This phenomenon 
is also alluded to by Increased Coker (1960) who argued that journalism came last in the fight 
against colonialists: “the proprietors who fostered this party press were still professionals first, 
politicians second and journalists last” (cited in Golding and Elliot p. 30). Chick (1971) added 
that this culture was also in practice during the period of self-rule, when colonial war was 
replaced by a battle for power between different ethnic groups, using their newspapers as war 
tools. Golding and Elliot (1979) cited West African Pilot’s publisher, Nnamdi Azikiwe who 
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became Nigeria’s independence president in 1960 as one example of newspaper men who 
became political leaders.  
The idea of an ethno-political press and that the ‘separation of politics and journalism has 
remained incomplete’ (Golding and Elliott 1979) in Nigeria, provided a theoretical means in 
the thesis to begin to counter the more prevailing view of a ‘protest’ press which Soyinka’s 
statement endorses.  
Methodologically, choosing titles, seen as independent or liberal and perhaps politica l ly 
‘aggressive’ (Ogbondah 1994, Olukotun 2002, Adesoji 2010), for analysis was in order to see 
if indeed their practices could be described as ‘magnificent and heroic’. As outlined in chapter 
three, the thesis also focused on the initial weeks of each new (military) regime and moments 
of crisis when newspapers’ practices might be expected to be in the ‘national interest’ and/or 
adopt a ‘protest’ style of reporting. These periods posed serious challenges to Nigeria’s 
stability. In addition, the specific formats chosen for analysis – headlines, front page news, 
editorials, photographs and cartoons in particular – were intended to enable a discussion of how 
Nigeria’s newsstand readers might have understood politics and political positions from 
reading the press, and of what I would refer to as a ‘visual politics’. In contrast to some 
accounts, attention to this material by adopting critical discourse analysis, which has not been 
largely adopted in studies of the Nigerian press, provides a richer and more contradictory 
account than is possible through a wider overview of press titles. Interviews with those 
involved as editors and or state officials offers yet further complication to open up or challenge 
the notion of a heroic press.  Together these combined approaches allowed the development of 
a nuanced and complex account of news reporting between 1984 and 1999. 
As the analyses in chapters 4 to 7 demonstrate initial moments of collaboration and alliance 
between press and new regime, followed by ‘crisis’, antagonism  and a shifting of position on 
both sides – the end of the honeymoon (Diya 2011) – was repeated across the regimes.  
For instance, National Concord and The Guardian deployed their editorials to herald Buhari’s 
coup and attack the deposed regime. National Concord’s editorial forty eight hours after the 
coup, ‘Verdict 83’ used ‘foul’ phrases to describe the officials of the Shagari regime, describing 
Buhari’s coup as the ‘authentic verdict ‘83’ not the re-election of Shagari earlier that year. They 
set a political agenda for the regime acting as a ‘think-tank’, suggesting policies the regime 
should adopt. The Guardian also railed against the ‘alarmist editorials’ of the Western media 
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which denounced Buhari for aborting the democratic government and accused the West of 
supporting electoral malpractice and supporting former officials who looted the nation’s wealth 
(see Chapter Four above).  
 
The pattern of alliance was also in evidence during Babangida, Abacha and Abdusalami 
regimes. The Punch used a full length front page photograph of Babangida and Buhari on 
August 28, 1985 (the day following Babangida’s coup) to welcome Babangida. The features in 
the photograph shows a ‘subdued’ Buhari and a ‘victorious’ Babangida, mocking Buhari whom 
the paper in an editorial described as ‘arrogant’ (see Chapter Five above). Their photographic 
stories perhaps more vividly demonstrate their support than the printed word. Vanguard’s 
photographs (see Chapter Six above) presented Abacha in a white flowing robe (a symbol of 
purity) while receiving the Japanese Ambassador. He is depicted as the ‘new man’ in Nigeria 
for readers. Thisday (see Chapter Seven above), celebrated the Abubakar regime by publishing 
colourful photographs once the dust over Abiola’s death had settled.  
 
A striking photograph linking ‘imperial powers’ and the Nigerian military to the dramatic 
events of June/July 1998 (Abacha and Abiola’s deaths) showed a full length photograph of 
Tony Blair and Abubakar (dressed in flowing white robe) at the doorstep on No 10 Downing 
Street, both beaming; Thisday captioned this particular photograph as ‘evidence of what 
changed in ‘98’ (p. 207). However, in this visual war, analysis suggests that Champion 
exhibited restraint, in line with the mood of the people, and maintaining a distance from other 
papers. Abacha was presented in photographs in his army uniform, thus reminding the people 
of a ‘familiar general’ as opposed to the ‘new man’ presented by Vanguard. Its use of cartoons 
also mocked Abacha’s campaigners, whilst in many other formats; the paper fulfilled the duty 
of a liberal press. 
 
On the disagreements between the State and the press, which led to a falling out at different 
moments, self-interest was at the heart of the ‘cat and mouse’ game – cosying up/falling out. 
As evidenced in the collaboration between the regimes and the press initially, the press wanted 
to hold on to its own understanding as a ‘protest’ institution able to attack the officials as it 
deemed fit whilst still a ‘shareholder’ in the government. This contradiction did not sit well 
with the military, offering carrots (appointments, advertisement etc) to the press in exchange 
for cooperation and legitimacy – a negotiation which might be thought about in Gramscian 
218 
 
 
 
terms, thus, as Diya pointed out, the State that courted the press (‘pay the piper’) expected to 
direct the affairs of the press (‘dictate the tune’).  With this scenario ‘double allegiances to 
professional and political goals’ (Golding and Elliot 1979) or ‘political parallelism’ (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004) the press did re-enact the protest culture at different times, sometimes incit ing 
violence against the State and its officials, as symbolically represented in the cartoon in 
Vanguard (see Chapter Six above) where a supposed ‘common man’ threatens Shonekan (head 
of the interim government) with violence: ‘Hun, Oga, katakata go burst o’. Such moments 
were, except under Abubakar, usually followed by repressive legislations and other extra-legal 
measures like detention of journalists and closure of media houses, with any democracy project 
the loser.  
 
Across the chapters, the thesis establishes some of the causes of the tensions. Buhari enjoyed 
‘a red carpet’ welcome from the press and the press supported, even advised before the event, 
the tough actions he should take on corruption and indiscipline. The Guardian asked him to 
‘get cracking’ while National Concord assured him of public support. But then, the moment 
Buhari spread his war against indiscipline to the press, trying to enforce press responsibility 
the latter felt it should be exempt from the rules imposed on the rest of the society i.e. should 
not offer ‘sacrifices’ which it initially agreed were needed to move Nigeria forward. When 
‘The Guardian Two’ were arrested for publishing ‘embarrassing’ diplomatic stories, the press 
felt it was an attack on it. But as Duro Onabule, National Concord editor at the time reasoned, 
the story touched on the ‘sensitive’ diplomatic issue; The Guardian would have lost nothing 
by waiting for the ‘official’ release. Again, at one and the same time this was a partisan press 
– cosying up to Buhari, but one that also wanted to be independent. The fall out of the ‘protest’ 
at this period following the jailing of the journalists was attacks by the press which Buhari 
could not control. Buhari lost, the press went on to leap into bed with another military man. 
 
Adopting a discourse analysis approach, demonstrated that the language deployed by the 
newspapers promoted a military agenda. This meticulous promotion of a military ethos and, 
systematic shielding and or distancing of the military from public anger through carefully 
edited headlines arguably enabled the sustenance of military rule for sixteen years in spite of 
persistent resistance to it by the people. As detailed in chapters six and seven, there was a litany 
of headlines, editorials and PR-ized stories in Vanguard, Thisday and Nigerian Tribune that 
promoted Abacha’s transformation and the Abubakar emergency respectively. Champion, Tell 
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and TheNews remained cautious and offered a semblance of ‘protest journalism. For instance, 
at the peak of the endorsement of Abacha by the parties, when the remaining party had still to 
endorse him, a fracas was reported at the convention ground. Champion headlines clearly 
informed the readers of the final ‘endorsement’ by the last party ‘Presidency: How GDM 
endorsed Abacha’, with a rider, ‘Gani goes to court’. In the story proper, the paper highlighted 
the high wire manoeuvrings by Abacha loyalists leading to his ‘endorsement’, thus exposing 
the corruption at the heart of the process and discrediting the whole Abacah phenomenon. 
Vanguard instead opted for an inconsequential headline that hid the details of the contentious 
convention: ‘Gani in court to stop Abacha’. (You will recall that Gani, who went to court to 
stop Abacha, was a leading rights lawyer who had been detained by the military). Not that 
taking Abacha to court was wrong, but then, court rulings did not matter to Abacha at the time. 
Giving prominence to a story that would not worry Abacha over the one that could encourage 
people’s vigilance about what was going on (as in Champion case) was Vanguard’s way of 
promoting Abacha. In the story proper, Vanguard concealed the ‘endorsement’ process, thus, 
making it look as if everything was smooth sailing, backing Abacha with a powerful cartoon 
that encouraged delegates to queue behind him (see Chapter Six above). 
 
The emergence of Abubakar (following the death of Abacha), and his ‘olive branch’ which 
enabled him to undermine the press further, with Abiola’s death, did not give much room for 
any ‘protest’ attempt. Headlines, from Thisday, Vanguard and Nigerian Tribune, mostly on 
front pages, and at times multiple promoted the leader. Abubakar’s name was prominent and 
was the ‘active subject’. At a time of political uncertainty, the impact of these headlines on the 
readers was to plant Abubakar in the minds of the sceptical readers as a new man moving away 
from Abacha’s past. With Abiola’s death in particular and over ’60 protestors’ (Lewis 1999) 
killed after his death, the press ensured Abubakar climbed out of the chaos quickly (see Chapter 
Seven above). 
 
Tell and TheNews, whose editors were part of the ‘protest’ culture at the time Abacha’s crisis 
reached its peak, were cautious in reporting Abubakar. Though in their cover stories, they 
exposed the ills of his government and referred to him constantly as a ‘junta’; they were subtle 
and not as adversarial as under Abacha. The situation was understandable, with Abiola and 
June 12 cleared off the political space, they had little left to fight for. They were humbled and 
could not offer scrutiny of his transition, leading to the emergence of a military candidate, 
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Obasanjo. Olukotun’s ‘calendar of repression’ referred to the military crackdown on the press, 
but accounts presented as the press’s ‘sacrifices’ for its stance against the military and for the 
enthronement of democracy, scratch the surface of a significant moment in Nigerian 
journalism. Whenever it was dissatisfied with the prevailing situation the press leapt into bed 
with the military thus undermining the democratic aspirations of the people.  
 
Interviews with some of the dramatis personae also challenge assertions in previous studies. 
For instance, Olukotun (2002), Adesoji (2010) both listed newspapers such as The Guardian, 
The Punch, Vanguard, Nigerian Tribune as some of the independent and radical papers that 
were at the forefront of democratic struggles with the military. Evidence from the newspapers 
themselves and from interviews conducted, question this view. Across the chapters, I cited 
Oladipo Diya, a former military governor under the Buhari regime (1984-85) and Abacha’s 
deputy (1993-1997), while discussing the vexed issue of press freedom, argues that the press 
cannot be free in a situation where the State and the press collaborate (Diya 2011). This angle 
was strengthened by the comments from Moshood Fayemiwo (2012, 2013), publisher of 
defunct Razor Magazine detained under the Abacha regime. On why the military was able to 
perpetuate itself in power for sixteen years in the face of press ‘resistance’ to it, he revealed a 
grim picture citing Babangida regime in particular which bought into frontline newspapers 
through proxies so that the press faced a moral dilemma in fighting Babangida. 
 
Overall the interviews offer background context but they also help dismantle accounts of a 
‘magnificent and heroic’ press. Rather the press was in alignment with the regimes and was 
subtle in its criticisms. In this way the interviews contribute in a similar way to those Hallin 
conducted in his groundbreaking study of the role of the America’s news media in the Vietnam 
War (1989) where he attests to the quality inherent in interview as a method of study. In his 
case the journalists voiced a powerful critique of the conventional argument about the media 
reporting on Vietnam: far from being a consistent adversary of government policy in Vietnam, 
Hallin shows, the media were closely tied to official perspectives.  
What this thesis indicates is that titles hitherto celebrated as ‘independent, fearless and 
outspoken’ (Ogbondah 1994, Olukotun 2002, Adesoji 2010, Alimi 2011), should now, in 
retrospect be thought of differently: more ‘ethno-political’ than ‘protest’ and showing evidence 
of Golding and Elliot’s ‘lack of separation from politics’. They represented more the 
aspirations of individual gladiators than any public endeavour. 
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In the chequered history of Nigeria, from the period of colonialism; through post-independent 
civilian and military regimes, up to the moment of the press as ‘magnificent and heroic’, there 
are many historical accounts pointing to the laudable roles the press played. Taken at face 
value, particularly the ‘glory’ of independence, these roles can appear truly laudable if it was 
during this era of struggle against colonialism, and for Nigeria’s political independence that 
the press secured its appellation of a ‘protest/nationalist’ press (Omu 1978, Ogbondah 1994, 
Olukotun 2002). In hindsight, given the plethora of crises that impeded Nigeria’s development 
goals, the press’s role can now be seen as more problematic.  
 
As postulated by many scholars in the concepts discussed in the review chapter, the press’s 
alliance with political gladiators or perhaps the political role it is expected to play often makes 
it an herculean task for journalists to remain neutral and be objective: Golding and Elliot ’s 
‘dual allegiances to professional and political obligations’ (1979); Hallin and Mancini’s 
‘political parallelism’ (2004), and serving as ‘serving as ‘instrument of clientelist networks and 
neo-patrimonial politics’ (Hadland 2011). The Nigerian press, which from its inception has 
been characterised with affiliations to political parties and personalities became a player in the 
process and not an estate afar. For instance, the cosy relationship between Babangida and the 
press not only enable Babangida to stay put in power for eight years, but also to escape 
sanctions over many scandals that rocked his regime, e.g. Giwa’s assassination and the 
annulment of June 12, 1993 elections results. It was also the result of the press’s politica l 
alliance that emboldened the Abubakar regime to end the June 12 deadlock with the murder of 
MKO Abiola in state custody. The result as this thesis shows is that, the press failed to make 
any meaningful impact that could assist the populace to realise their democratic aspirations. 
 
The market concept (Coker 1960; Hallin and Mancini 2004; Curran 2005) is another 
compelling framework that impeded the democratic role of the press generally. As a business 
desirous of making profit, newspapers first and foremost owe themselves an allegiance of 
survival. In this case, proprietors and journalists alike tend to place the economic logic over 
and above the public interest. The Nigerian press as Coker (1960) argues was pioneered by 
Lagos business elites who wanted to have a share of the advertising market from the Europeans. 
This economic foundation continues to characterise the Nigerian press, with attendant 
implications on the matters of general interest. In Nigeria, advertising revenue from the 
government such as supplements has always been a source of income for the newspaper press. 
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The fear of losing out and on other form of economic benefits from the State means the press 
‘gravitated’ to the State. Thus, General Diya’s reference to ‘paying the piper and dictating the 
tune’ couldn’t have been more apt. Under this circumstance, the press often becomes the 
underdog. Yet, the issues of ‘ethnicity and belonging’ (Nyamjoh 2005); ‘audience allegiance’ 
(Hallin and Mancini 2004) and ‘citizenship and nation-building’ (Bornman 2013) are factors 
that cannot be downplayed even if the press attempt to play its role fairly. In Nigeria, where 
over 250 ethnic nationalities (Uche 1989) compete for recognition and politica l control, the 
idea of any form of ‘balancing act’ by the press remains a dream. This ethnic rivalry, as the 
thesis reveals, led to the annulment of the ‘freest’ election in Nigeria, as the military generals 
of Northern extraction were against the emergence of MKO Abiola, a Yoruba from the south-
west. The rivalry was also at stake when General Diya and other senior military Yoruba officers 
were arrested for the 1997 coup, thought to be an avenue by Abacha to get rid of those seen as 
threats to his ambition to become a civilian president without first resigning. 
 
In this thesis, I have amassed credible evidence to counter claims of a prevailing ‘liberal' 
tradition during this ‘definitive period’ (Diamond 1997). It could also be advanced that 
Soyinka’s claims about the press as ‘magnificent and heroic' did not help journalists to reflect 
critically on their role during the period of the last military rule (1998/1999), but rather 
engendered complacency. This ‘frame’ continued to impact negatively on the role the press 
played in the post military years as Agbaje and Adebanwi (2004) have confirmed. Moreover, 
since 1999, Nigeria’s democracy has wobbled like a troubled canoe in the sea with the press 
consistently mentioned as central to the gloomy situation. Politica l violence, election rigging, 
massive corruption, including in relation to the press have continued to be rife (Agbaje and 
Adebanwi 2004). All these have proved wrong Olukotun’s hope that the press post-1999 would 
be central to the sustenance of Nigeria’s democracy’ (Olukotun 2002). I conclude, sadly, that 
Soyinka's acclaims, whether intentional or not, covered-up a most atrocious period of 
journalism in Nigeria’s history and were undeserving. 
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Newspapers and Magazines 
 
The Guardian  
National Concord,  
The Punch,  
Vanguard,  
Nigerian Tribune,  
Thisday  
Champion 
Tell  
TheNews 
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Appendix 1. 
List of major newspapers and magazines in Nigeria between 1960 and 1999, their owners and 
affiliations 
 
NEWSPAPER/MAGAZINE YEAR 
ESTABLISHED 
 OWNERSHIP CLASSIFICATION 
Complete Sports December 1995 Private Independent/Sport/Commercial 
Daily Times June, 1925 Public/Private Independent/Commercial 
Daily Champion 1 October, 1988 Private Independent/Political/Commercial 
The Guardian 27 February, 
1983 
Private Independent/Political/Commercial 
National Concord 1980 Private Independent/Political/Commercial 
New Nigerian 1 January, 1966 Public Public/ Political/ Commercial 
Nigerian Tribune 
 
November, 1949 Private Independent/Political/Commercial 
Newswatch 28 January 1985 Private /Problematic Independent/Political/Commercial 
TEMPO (Underground - 
Defunct) 
1993 Private/Problematic Independent/Radical/Commercial 
The Punch 1971    Private/Problematic Independent/Political/Commercial 
ThisDay January 22, 
1995 
Private/Problematic Independent/Political/Commercial 
TheNews (underground) 8, February, 
1993 
Private/Problematic Independent/Radical/Commercial 
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Tell (underground)  April 8, 1991 Private/Problematic Independent/Radical/Commercial 
Vanguard June 3rd, 1984 Private Independent/Political/Commercial 
P.M. News August, 1994 Private/Problematic Independent/Radical 
 
Additional Notes on ownership and affiliations 
In general terms, it is difficult to establish the true ownership structure of major Nigerian 
newspaper press, as well as the degree of their independence. As the above shows, those whose  
names appear as owners and are known publicly as the owners, also have other co-owners who 
are unknown to the public. The implication of this problematic structure is that, most 
newspapers and magazines have been linked to several public officials, particularly during the 
military era. Where the names of shareholders are listed, many of them are fronts for former 
military officers and past/current civilian officials. With this arrangement, we might be looking 
at the ownership structure from three angles: 
 1. Newspapers/magazines (marked private) owned by notable politicians such as The Nation, 
Daily Independent, Champion Sun and Nigerian Tribune (owned by former state governors); 
notable politicians and ex office holders.  
2. Newspapers/magazines (marked private/problematic) owned by publicly known private 
individuals, and other shareholders fronting for retired military and past/current civilian 
officials; e.g. The Guardian, The Punch and Thisday.  
3. Newspapers/magazines owned by known editors/media professionals but with 
secretive/mysterious shareholders; e.g. Tell, TheNews, TEMPO and P.M. News. 
4. Newspapers (marked public) owned by governments (Federal and States) e.g. Daily Times, 
Daily Sketch, New Nigerian, Daily Trust.... 
Ethically and or legally, equity is thought to be two-way or to borrow the legal axiom ‘he who 
asks for equity must do equity’. For the press to be able to perform the ‘fourth estate’ function 
i.e. (fights corruption and offers, if a fairly free and equitable ‘public sphere’), it must come 
clean and be seen to be transparent and accountable. This lack of transparency may have been 
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responsible for accusation and counter-accusation of bribery and corruption between state 
officials and press corps.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
242 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Notable Dates and Personalities in history from Independence 
October 1, 1960, granted independence by Great Britain with a democratically elected 
government installed. The government was headed by Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, with 
Nnamdi Azikiwe as the Governor-General of the Federation. Ahmadu Bello, Obafemi 
Awolowo and Michael Okpara were premiers of the Northern, Western and Eastern regions 
respectively. Samuel Ladoke Akintola later replaced Obafemi Awolowo as the Premier, after 
Awolowo was convicted of sedition charges. Akintola was Awolowo’s deputy party leader. 
October 1, 1963, Nigeria became a Federal Republic after the Declaration of Independence 
was signed with Governor-General becoming the President. A Mid-west region was also carved 
out of the existing Western region, with Dennis Osadebey as the administrator. 
January 15, 1966, the First military coup led by Major Kaduna Nzeogu killed the Prime 
Minister, Tafawa Balewa; Northern and Western Premiers, Ahmadu Bello and Ladoke 
Akintola respectively; Finance Minister Okotie Ebor and others. The coupists were 
predominantly of the Eastern region, and General Aguiyi Ironsi, an easterner, became the head 
of state - giving the coup an ethnic colouration. 
July 29, 1966, a counter-coup by Northern officers killed the head of state Johnson Thomas 
Aguiyi-Ironsi and his host, the military governor of the western region, Lt. Colonel Adekunle 
Fajuyi while on official visit to Ibadan, the capital of the Western region. Lt-Colonel Yakubu 
Gowon, a northerner, became the head of state. 
May 30, 1967, Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, military governor of eastern region declared 
Biafra's Independence following the killings of easterners in the north. A civil war broke out 
and lasted till January 15, 1970 when Biafra surrendered. 
July 29, 1975, General Murtala Mohammed staged a bloodless coup and toppled Gowon to 
become head of state. 
February 13, 1976, Colonel Buka Dimka staged a bloody but botched coup that killed the head 
of state, General Mohammed. General Olusegun Obasanjo, his deputy became the head of state.  
October 1, 1979, General Obasanjo handed over to a democratically elected president Sheu 
Shagari. Second Republic began 
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December 31, 1983, General Mohammadu Buhari sacked the civilian regime of Sheu Shagari 
to herald another military odyssey in politics. 
March 29, 1984, Buhari regime’s Decree No 4, 1984 Public Officers (Protection Against False 
Accusation) was enacted. The decree became the thorny issue between the regime, the press 
and the wider public. 
July 4, 1984, two journalists from The Guardian, Tunde Thompson and Nduka Irabor were 
found guilty of false publication against the Federal Government under Decree 4, and 
sentenced to one year imprisonment. 
August 27, 1985, General Ibrahim Babangida, chief of Army Staff in Buhari regime toppled 
his boss in a palace coup to become Nigeria’s first military ruler to address himself as the 
president. Others before him designated the title of ‘Head of State’. 
December 17, 1985, Babangida regime arrested several military officers including Major-
General Mamman Vatsa, Federal Capital Territory Minister, for plotting to overthrow his 
regime.  
March 5, 1986, General Mamman Vatsa and others were executed after being found guilty of 
a coup plot. 
October 19, 1986, Dele Giwa, editor and co-founder of Newswatch magazine assassinated via 
a parcel bomb. 
April 22, 1990, Major Gideon Orkar led a bloody coup attempt against the Babangida regime. 
The coup was foiled by loyal troops but Babangida lost his ADC, Colonel U. K. Bello. 
July 27, 1990, Major Gideon Orkar and 41 others were executed after being found guilty of 
the April 22 bloody coup.  Another set of 27 officers were executed in September, 1990 over 
the same coup after a retrial. 
January 2, 1993, Babangida appointed a Transitional Council headed by Ernest Shonekan to 
midwife his transition programme after public accusation he was sitting tight.  
March 27, 1993, MKO Abiola and Alhaji Bashir Tofa emerged presidential candidates of the 
two parties Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRC) at Jos 
and Port Harcourt convention grounds respectively. 
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June 10, 1993, a group Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) filed a law suit to stop the June 
12 presidential election and sought an extension of Babangida regime. Same day, Justice 
Bassey Ikpeme of an Abuja High Court granted the group’s request, barring the electoral 
commission from holding the election. 
June 11, 1993, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) announced it will disobey the court 
order and hold the elections, citing legal protection from court interference on electoral matters.  
June 12, 1993, presidential elections held nationwide. 
June 13, 1993, NEC released some results from 14 of the 30 states showing MKO Abiola 
leading with 4.2 million votes with Bashir Tofa trailing with 2.3 million votes. 
June 15, 1993, the Chief Judge of the Abuja High Court granted another injunction sought by 
the Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) to stop the announcement of the remaining election 
results. 
June 17, 1993, two High Courts in Lagos and Benin cities, ordered the Electoral Commiss ion 
to release the remaining election results. 
June 23, 1993, Babangida announced the annulment of the June 12 elections results. 
August 17, 1993, Babangida addressed the Parliament announcing his intention to ‘step aside’ 
on August 27, 1993, his 8th year in power. 
August 26, 1993, Babangida handed overto an Interim National Government (ING) headed by 
Ernest Shonekan. 
November 10, 1993, Justice Dolapo Akinsanya of a Lagos High Court in a suit filed by MKO 
Abiola declared the Interim Government illegal. 
November 17, 1993, Abacha toppled the Interim Government to become the new military head 
of state. 
June 11, 1994, Abiola declared himself the president at a rally in Lagos. 
June 23, 1994, Abiola was arrested for treason 
February, 1995, Abacha regime announced the foiling of a coup plot. Several military 
personnel and civilians, including Olusegun Obasanjo were arrested. 
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July, 1995, Obasanjo sentenced to 25 years imprisonment after a Military Tribunal found him 
guilty, but later reduced to 15 years. 
November 10, 1995, Ogoni activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues hanged by Abacha 
regime after a trial found them guilty of treason. 
December 13, 1997, Lt-Gen Oladipo Diya, Abacha’s deputy escaped a bomb blast as he was 
about boarding his official plane at Abuja airport. 
December 20, 1997, another coup was uncovered by Abacha regime. His deputy, General 
Oladipo Diya and several other senior officers were subsequently arrested, tried and sentenced 
to death on April 28, 1998. 
April 16 – 20, 1998, Abacha was adopted as the sole presidential candidate by the five 
registered political parties for the coming general elections. 
June 8, 1998, Abacha’s death announced. 
June 9, 1998, Chief of Defence Staff, General Abdusalami Abubakar, succeeded Abacah as 
the new head of state and subsequently released Obasanjo and others in detention. MKO Abiola 
remained in detention. 
July 7, 1998, MKO Abiola died in the presence of American diplomats, Thomas Pickering and 
Susan Rice after a cup of tea. 
February 27, 1999, Obasanjo won presidential election. 
May 29, 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo inaugurated as the new democratic president. 
 
